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THE
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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Art. 1.—SINGAPORE AND SIR STAMFORD RAFFLES.

1. *Straits Settlements Records*, Nos. 10, 66, 70, 182, 182A and others. India Office.
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LOVERS of historical parallels will find in two recent centennial celebrations a source of interesting study. On March 12, 1619, the Dutch founded Batavia; on Feb. 6, 1819, the British secured the treaty which gave them possession of Singapore. Though separated by almost exactly two centuries, the episodes have a close affinity. By one the Dutch established a domination in the Eastern Archipelago which the English of the 17th and 18th centuries were unable successfully to challenge; by the other the British defeated what the Marquess of Hastings (the Governor-General of India of that day) termed 'the profligate speculation' of the Dutch, that their flag and their flag alone should fly on every islet and peninsula of this vast region.

Common influences working through the long interval between the two events fixed the Eastern destinies of the two nations. Exhausted by her effort to secure her hold on Java and further her Far-Eastern designs, in which the occupation of Formosa prominently figured, Holland was compelled to relax the strong hold she had obtained on India, mainly through her long-protracted war against the Portuguese; absorbed in the mighty task of establishing her power on the Indian Continent, Britain had neither the means nor the will to reassert her position in the sphere east of the Straits of Malacca, on which her thoughts of Eastern aggrandisement had first been centred. Thus, as the years went by, each became more and more absorbed in its own sphere of action, until the memory grew dim of those fierce early struggles waged over aims which on both sides were frustrated. But it was a truce and not a peace which was tacitly registered in the dying-down of the old rivalry. Britain, with her rapidly expanding Chinese trade and her increasing responsibilities in India, could not accept as permanent the ban imposed by the Dutch upon her activities in the Eastern Archipelago, nor did she ever renounce any of her old rights in the opulent and historic region about the Straits of Malacca.

The awakening came in the latter part of the 18th century, when British and French were fighting for the mastery in Southern India. La Bourdonnais' bold descent on the Coromandel Coast in 1746, with its humiliating sequel, the occupation of Madras, brought into prominence the strategic weakness of the eastern coast of India. To safeguard this flank in the conditions of the day, when the movements of ships were circumscribed by the prevalence during several months of the north-east monsoon blowing directly on the coast and preventing egress from it, a station to the eastward was necessary, at which naval squadrons could assemble and threaten any force coming from the west. Warren Hastings, quick to realise the essential factor in this important problem of Indian defence, set in motion the necessary measures to the desired end. The occupation of Penang in 1786 by Francis Light was the result.

Here the British Malayan development might have rested if the Napoleonic struggle had not introduced a

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new and decisive element into the situation. In the process of that titanic conflict, when Holland was overrun by Napoleon and one of his nominees sat on the Dutch throne, we became temporarily masters of Netherlands India, as well as of Ceylon and the Cape. We were custodians rather than conquerors of these rich possessions. But, after the experience of the war and the great burdens it had imposed upon us, we could not hand back our charges in their entirety. In the carefully balanced settlement arranged under the Treaty of Vienna we reserved Ceylon and the Cape, and restored Java, Malacca and the Spice Islands.

A nice apportionment of claims and counter-claims was reflected in this arrangement—one which, in the circumstances of the European situation, probably could not have been bettered without detriment to the wider interests involved. But the necessary retrocession of Malayan territory under British rule was disagreeable. Java, which had been administered in the grand British manner by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles for five years, was relinquished only as a painful necessity imposed out of regard for Dutch susceptibilities. What could not be endured was the loss also of Malacca, the historic centre for so many years of Portuguese power in the East, and later the chief Dutch settlement in the Straits. By its retrocession we brought back the Dutch on to the Malay Peninsula, and gave our tacit sanction to claims which, if pushed with the characteristic force of the Hollanders, would severely circumscribe our influence in what, in the years following the occupation of Penang, had come increasingly to be regarded as our special sphere of influence. A feeling almost of despair filled the mind of the enlightened apostles of British development in the Straits, as they surveyed the handiwork of the European diplomatists and noted the formidable efforts which the Dutch promptly made to reassert to the fullest possible extent their old claims to exclusive domination in the Eastern Archipelago.

By none was the disastrous tendency of the arrangement of the Treaty of Vienna more vividly realised than by Stamford Raffles. In it he saw the wreck of all hopes that Britain would secure her rightful place in the Straits of Malacca, and a return to the worst period of

British and Dutch antagonism, with an additional handicap upon British effort in the effect upon the Malayan mind of a retrograde policy which seemed to stultify the natural ambitions developed out of the occupation of Penang and Province Wellesley on the mainland.

Raffles was one of those rare geniuses whose enlightened statesmanship has made the British Empire what it is to-day. He was descended from a family which was originally seated at Beverley in Yorkshire, but in the mid-eighteenth-century period enjoyed a fairly good position in the City of London. Stamford Raffles' paternal grandfather was Thomas Raffles, a Clerk in the Prerogative Office at Doctors' Commons. His uncle, William Raffles, was an attorney-at-law, the father of Dr Thomas Raffles, a well-known nonconformist divine, who for many years was minister of Great George Street Chapel, Liverpool. Stamford Raffles' father was Benjamin Raffles, the captain of a West Indiaman; and it was on board his father's ship at Jamaica, during one of its periodic voyages, that the founder of Singapore saw the light on July 5, 1781.

After a perfunctory education at a local academy at Hammersmith, Stamford Raffles, at the early age of fourteen, found his way, possibly through his grandfather's City influence, into the India House as a clerk. His manifest ability, coupled possibly with an assertiveness which throughout life was a distinguishing feature of his character, early attracted to him the favourable notice of his superiors. His opportunity came in 1804, when, on the elevation of the Government of Penang from the subordinate position it had held under the Calcutta Government to the higher dignity of an administration directed by a President and Council, he was appointed Colonial Secretary in the reorganised system. The choice was almost immediately justified. Entering with enthusiasm upon his new duties, Raffles spent his leisure hours during the voyage in acquiring the Malay language and making acquaintance with Malay literature. The study was continued on shore with such assiduity that in a short time the young Colonial Secretary became the accepted authority on these subjects. His literary attainments secured the notice and friendship of Dr Leyden, who had gone to India with the Earl

of Minto, and had paid a visit to Penang soon after Raffles' arrival.

It was doubtless due to this connexion that Raffles, when visiting Calcutta in 1807, was brought into intimate association with the Governor-General. Lord Minto took at once to the ardent young official, with his vivid and earnest talk about Britain's future in the East; and, when Raffles went back to his duties at Penang, it was as a sort of envoy extraordinary with the official title of Governor-General's Agent in the Eastern Seas. When later, in 1811, Lord Minto conducted in person an expedition from India to wrest Java from the hands of Napoleon's agents, it was upon Raffles that he relied not only for the confidential information relative to the political aspects of his expedition but for advice as to the best course to be taken by the fleet in its way through the Straits. The greatest mark of favour, however, was reserved until after the actual conquest of the island, when Raffles was chosen for the important office of Lieutenant-Governor. His Javan administration, lasting nearly five years, was a solid piece of work, revealing high administrative ability and a rare gift of insight in handling native problems. But, like his predecessor and prototype in the Straits, Francis Light, the founder of Penang, he was the object of bitter and malicious attacks based largely on his land policy. He easily cleared himself of the worst charges affecting his honour, but the Government of India found that he had acted without authority in some important particulars, and for this they censured him. That, however, their resentment was not serious was shown by their action in appointing him Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, the Company's station on the West Sumatra Coast. Next to the Penang Governorship, this was the most important office then in their gift in the Malayan region. But at the period there was no drearier British settlement in the East than Bencoolen; and, for a man of Raffles' temperament, the change from the life and movement and dignity of Java was very depressing. A visit to England, fruitful in intercourse with people of distinction, occupied some pleasant months before the actual resumption of his duties. When at length, in 1818, he landed in Bencoolen, the general situation in the East

was rapidly shaping in the direction which was to take him from this desolate rocky coast of West Sumatra to perform the great work of his life.

Dutch policy in the East in the period following the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna was guided by a fixed intention to assert to the fullest extent their old powers both of territorial occupation and political influence. To this end there was despatched from Holland a larger force than the Dutch had sent eastward since the palmy days of their ascendancy in the 17th century. It consisted of a powerful fleet and an army of at least 12,000 men, well equipped and thoroughly disciplined. Outside India, it was easily the most formidable fighting body of Europeans in the East. Contrasted with it, the British forces in Malaya were almost negligible. They consisted of two or three vessels of no fighting value and insignificant military garrisons at Penang and Bencoolen. If the intention had been, as it probably was, to impress and overawe the native powers, the measures adopted could not have been more effective. They plainly indicated that the Hollanders had the power as well as the will to take up the broken thread of their Eastern policy with all its implications of political and commercial monopoly in a wide-reaching sphere.

The retrocession of Malacca was calculated to deepen the impression which their militant activity created in the native mind. On the one hand was seen the power of Holland reviving in all its old grandeur and something more; on the other, there was the spectacle of a Britain withdrawing its forces in apparent acquiescence in the theory that its interests ceased when the limits of the port of Penang had been passed. If in Europe the peril of this situation had been overlooked, there were no misconceptions on the subject on the spot. In the British settlements officials and traders alike understood that, if the bold move of the Dutch were not challenged, the sun of Britain's influence in the Straits of Malacca would have set for ever.

So early as June 18, 1818, three months before the actual transfer of Malacca, the Penang merchants sounded a note of alarm. Pointing out the very considerable intercourse that was carried on between British subjects in India and the peninsular states, more especially Perak,

Selangor and Rhio, they implored the Government to counteract the obvious policy of the Dutch by concluding commercial treaties with these States. The Penang Government, either in response to this appeal or on its own initiative, sent Mr Cracroft, Malay translator to the Government, on a mission to Perak and Selangor, and at the same time commissioned Major Farquhar, the British Resident at Malacca, to conduct a similar mission to Rhio, Lingen, Pontiana and Siack, native states to the southwards. Meanwhile they forwarded a strongly-worded despatch to the Government at Calcutta, deploring the retrocession of Malacca and pointing out the serious effects that it was likely to have on British trade. After a brief interval, Mr Cracroft returned to Penang with satisfactory treaties concluded with the princes to whom he was accredited. Major Farquhar's task proved a far more difficult one. At Pontiana, whither he first proceeded, he found that the Dutch had anticipated him. Later, at Lingen and Siack, he procured agreements which afterwards proved to be of small value. His voyage is chiefly notable because it appears to have brought home to him the absolute necessity of establishing a new station to the eastward to counteract the monopolistic policy of the Dutch. In a formal despatch, transmitted to Calcutta after his return to Malacca on August 31, he definitely suggested the occupation of one of the Karimun Islands in the Straits of Singapore.

'From the observations I have been able to make on my late voyage, as well as from former experience, there is,' Farquhar said, 'no place which holds out so many advantages in every way as do the Karimun Islands, which are so situated as to be a complete key to the Straits of Singapore, Dryon, and Soban, an advantage which no other place in the Straits of Malacca possesses, as all trade whether coming from the eastward or westward must necessarily pass through one or other of the above straits.'

This proposal is interesting as the first definite scheme for a new settlement officially put forward. It is also of importance from its bearing on the controversy which afterwards arose as to Raffles' title to be regarded as the discoverer of Singapore. Farquhar's aim was right, but his selection of a stronghold was wrong. His selection

was not Singapore but the Karimun Islands, a position near that city, but inferior to it in every way from the practical as well as the strategical standpoint.

While Farquhar was conducting his mostly abortive missions, Raffles was at Bencoolen brooding over what seemed to him to be the fatal blindness of the Government to the inevitable tendencies of Dutch policy. So early as April 14, 1818, we find him, in a letter written to a correspondent in England, pointing out that 'the British have not now an inch of ground to stand upon between the Cape of Good Hope and China,' and urging the imperative necessity of establishing some 'convenient station within the Archipelago'—in the neighbourhood, he suggested, of Bintang. Bintang, or Bentan as it is now called, is in the Straits of Rhio, about thirty miles from Singapore. Singapore itself was probably actually in Raffles' thoughts at this time as a suitable site for the new settlement. He had a fine sense of the historic, and no Englishman was better acquainted than he with the glories of the ancient 'Singapura,' through whose portals, for centuries before the first European foot was set in Malaya, streamed a vast trade from every part of Asia. Moreover, he was thoroughly familiar with the geography of the Straits, and knew exactly in what strategical relation the deserted city stood to them. It was the general, however, rather than the particular that at the outset occupied Raffles' mind. He wanted, his biographer tells us, neither people nor territory, but mere permission 'to anchor a line-of-battle ship and hoist the English flag at the mouth either of the Straits of Malacca or of Sunda, by which means the trade of England would be secured and the monopoly of the Dutch broken.'

After fretting for months at the inaction to which he was condemned in his remote station, Raffles came to the characteristic decision to proceed to Calcutta to represent matters in person to the Governor-General. This was a bold course in view of the Java affair and the impression it had conveyed to the high official mind, that the Lieutenant-Governor was inclined to carry his independence to excess. But Raffles' persuasive advocacy captivated Lord Hastings as completely as it had won his predecessor. When he left Calcutta, it was with all the dignity of a specially accredited agent of the

Governor-General, directly charged with the duty of putting into execution the new forward policy designed to thwart Dutch ambitions. Raffles' instructions were of the widest character and were adapted to almost any possible emergency. 'I have full powers to do all that we can; and, if anything is to be done, I think we need not assure your Grace that it shall be done,' wrote Raffles exultantly to the Duchess of Somerset towards the end of November. Not without reason was the element of doubt as to the possibility of effective action introduced into this message. At the time, the Dutch had occupied Rhio and Lingén, as they had previously established themselves at Pontiana; and the limit of selection of suitable positions for a British settlement had become dangerously narrowed. Raffles, however, at this stage of the proceedings, had quite settled in his own mind where he would plant the British flag. In a letter addressed to his friend Marsden 'from off the Sandheads' on Dec. 12, 1818, at the moment of his departure on his mission, he advised him not to be surprised if his next letter 'is dated from the site of the ancient City of Singapura.'

When Raffles reached Penang, he found himself confronted by a situation of extreme delicacy and difficulty. The worst of his troubles were associated with the obstructive attitude which the local government assumed towards his mission. The then Governor of Penang was Colonel Bannerman, an experienced official who had sat on the Board of Control at home, and was, independently of this, a man of some influence. A pompous and self-opinionated man, he keenly resented Raffles' intrusion into his sphere of influence, more especially as he had already decided in his own mind and had definitely stated in his despatches, that it was 'beyond the power of the British in India to effect among the Malay States any political arrangement as a counterpoise to the influence of the Dutch nation.' Raffles, almost as soon as he landed, was made to feel the force of this antipathy. Bannerman opened the controversy by sending him a copy of a despatch he had forwarded to Calcutta, strongly emphasising the hopelessness of the position from the British standpoint. Raffles replied that the policy of the Dutch had never seemed

to him doubtful. He was, in consequence, less surprised at their protests against British action. Their policy was to seal the southern entrance of the Straits of Malacca; and they naturally objected to anything that stood in the way of that procedure. He was convinced of the necessity of opposing these aims.

'It is one of the leading features of Dutch policy,' he said, 'to lower the character of the British nation in the eyes of the natives. . . . The eyes of the whole Malayan race are turned on us at this moment; and according as we may now act will be their future opinion of our character and power. . . . The empire of opinion is nowhere more imperious than among a half-civilised people like the Malays. The result of our enterprise and commerce during the last sixty years had gained that empire in favour of the British. The effects of a reign of terror during the last two years have nearly lost it to us; and the tacit acknowledgment of the claims they now make to the ancient Empire of Johore may be expected to deprive us of it for ever.'

Raffles went on to say that he conceived that there was no alternative left,

'in order to uphold our character with the native chiefs, to convince them that we are not driven out of the Archipelago as a degraded and secondary nation, and finally to secure our political and commercial interests, but to make a stand in some part to the eastward of Malacca which the Dutch may not have pre-occupied and where, in support of our engagements, we may maintain the British flag flying, pending the references which must necessarily be made to the higher authorities.'

Raffles' firmness finally overcame all opposition to the execution of his plans; but when, on the night of Jan. 19, 1819, his little flotilla of four vessels left harbour, it departed without a word of farewell from Raffles to the local Government. This was probably a calculated indiscretion, designed to prevent information concerning the expedition getting abroad. However intended, it added fuel to the flames of the wrath of Colonel Bannerman, who spent his days in framing strongly-worded despatches to the higher authorities invoking their support in the attitude he had assumed towards the

Lieutenant-Governor of Bencoolen, whose motives he attacked in some violent passages.

Indifferent to the enmity of the irascible Governor, Raffles, meanwhile, pursued the course which he regarded as the only possible one in the circumstances. In deference to Farquhar's strong predilections for the Karimun Islands, he made them the first objects of his attention. He did not, however, long stay in that locality. A report made to him by Captain Ross, of the East India Company's Marine, who had been detailed to survey the islands, convinced him of their unsuitability for the purpose of a station. It now only remained for the expedition to cross the short stretch of water to the anchorage where the historic city of Raffles' hopes lay in all its squalid decadence shimmering in the noonday sun. What happened may be described in the language of an official memorandum drawn up in 1820 for the information of the Board of Control.

'On his [] arrival off the town, a deputation came on board with the compliments and congratulations of the chief native authority and requested to know the object of the visit. Raffles having inquired whether there was any Dutch settlement and flag at Singapore and Johore, and whether the Dutch had by any means attempted to exercise an influence or authority over the ports, the deputation replied that Johore Lama or Old Johore had long been deserted, and that the chief authority over Singapore and all the adjacent islands (excepting those of Lingen and Rhio) then resided at the ancient capital of Singapore, where no attempts had yet been made to establish the Dutch power and where no Dutch flag would be received.'

Some days were spent in examining, with Captain Ross's expert aid, the harbour and its surroundings; and on Jan. 29, 1819, the British flag was formally hoisted on the island. Raffles was pardonably elated at the ease with which he had established himself in the famous seat of Malay commerce. In a letter to Marsden three days after the occupation, he wrote, 'Here I am at Singapore, true to my word and in the enjoyment of all the pleasure which a footing on such classic ground must inspire. The lines of the old City and of its defences are still to be traced, and within its ramparts the British Union Jack waves unmolested.'

Unmolested the British flag might wave, but the occupation none the less was still ineffective. Raffles, however, was equal to the occasion. Without difficulty he concluded, on Jan. 30, a preliminary arrangement with the Dato' Temenggong of Johore, a high state official with ill-defined powers which placed him almost on an equality with the Sultan. This understanding was of value as a provisional concession of occupancy rights, but Raffles was well aware that only the Sultan could conclude a regular treaty. Unfortunately for his purpose, the reigning Sultan of that day (Abdul Rahman) was a usurper upheld on the throne by the Dutch and completely under their influence. Casting about him, Raffles speedily found a way out of the difficulty by getting into touch with Abdul Rahman's elder brother (Tunku Hussan), the legitimate prince, and concluding with him, on Feb. 6, the treaty by which Britain's right to establish a settlement at Singapore was recognised. The validity of this instrument was fiercely assailed by the Dutch, but it stood the heavy tests of criticism to which it was subjected; and, in conjunction with three other agreements concluded respectively in June 1819, June 1823, and November 1824, it constitutes to-day our title to this invaluable Imperial outpost.

No action of Raffles' has been the object of more hostile comment than the conclusion of the first Singapore treaty, with its cool ignoring of the Sultan's nominal authority. It was certainly a daring act, one to which even the epithet 'sharp practice' might be applied if the *locale* were western and not eastern. But viewed in the light of Malayan history, it was the natural and reasonable outcome of the situation created by the aggressive tendencies of the Dutch. That Abdul Rahman was a usurper is undoubted; it is equally certain that he was kept in power only by Dutch aid. In such circumstances, it was well within the province of the British to place the rightful successor to the throne in power for their own ends. A curious precedent for the adoption of this course is to be found in the earlier history of European influence in the Archipelago. At Bantam, in Java, towards the end of the 17th century, the Dutch supported the claims of one aspirant to the throne, while the English identified themselves with the interests of

his rival. Unfortunately, we backed the wrong candidate, and in consequence had to leave Bantam. It was this astute support of the stronger Bantam prince which gave the Dutch final domination in Java and drove us from the Archipelago. Raffles may have had this episode in mind when he called in Tunku Hussan to make his position good.

Raffles had skilfully overcome the native difficulty, but he had still to reckon with the foes of his own household. At Penang Bannerman was eagerly watching for an opening for spoiling his brother official's plans. It only required the receipt on Feb. 11 of the news of the occupation of Singapore to inspire him to indite a minute embodying a ferocious attack on Raffles. In insulting language he charged his colleague with acting solely under the promptings of personal ambition, and flatly declined to forward to the new settlement reinforcements for which an urgent request had been made by Major Farquhar in Raffles' absence.

It would seem, from reading the extraordinary effusions which flowed from Bannerman's pen in these eventful days, that he had completely lost his balance. He was so obsessed with the view that Raffles had taken up an untenable position in occupying Singapore that he confidently imagined the higher authorities would commend his Government for the obstructive attitude it had assumed. A painful disillusionment awaited him. Lord Hastings, writing from Calcutta on April 8, 1819, denounced in unsparing terms the action of Bannerman and his colleagues. While not prepared to pronounce a final opinion upon the occupation of Singapore, the Governor-General denied the right of Colonel Bannerman to express a decisive opinion upon a violation of Sir Stamford Raffles' instructions.

'Commissioned and entrusted by this Government,' continued Lord Hastings, 'to this Government alone he was answerable. The instructions under which he acted . . . were adapted to the port of Rhio chiefly; and the probability that the Dutch might anticipate us there rendered it necessary to prescribe a line which was in that contingency to be followed with the utmost exactness. The same principle was, in the subsequent instructions, extended to Johore. In both cases the injunctions referred to the possible event of

an apparent right having been actually advanced by the Dutch. But, though the spirit of the inculcation to avoid collision with the Dutch applied itself to any other position, it necessarily did so with a latitude suited to the circumstances. We think your Government entirely wrong in determining so broadly against the propriety of the step taken by Sir Stamford Raffles on a simple reclamation from the Governor of Malacca, which, whether well or ill founded, was to be looked for as certain.'

Lord Hastings severely condemned Bannerman's action in withholding the support asked for by Major Farquhar. The jealousy of the Singapore settlement, which, to the regret of the Supreme Government, had been avowed and recorded, would, he said warningly, 'find no tolerance with the British Government should misfortune occur and be traceable to neglects originating in such a feeling.'

In a private letter to Bannerman Lord Hastings expounded the principles upon which the Supreme Government acted in regard to the new settlement.

'We never meant,' he said, 'to show such obsequiousness to the Dutch as to forbear securing those interests of ours which they had insidiously and basely assailed out of deference to the title which they were disposed to advance to supremacy over every island and coast of the Eastern Archipelago. It was to defeat that profligate speculation that we commissioned Sir Stamford Raffles to aim at obtaining some station which would prevent the entire command of the Straits of Malacca from falling into the hands of the Dutch, there being many unpossessed by them and not standing within any hitherto asserted pretensions.'

Overwhelmed by the censure he had received, Bannerman made an effort to justify his action in an apologetic despatch. Later his old confidence revived sufficiently to induce him to appeal to the Court of Directors against what he regarded as the harsh judgment of the Supreme Government on his conduct. They replied in a despatch in which, while conceding that Bannerman had been actuated by a sense of duty, they regretted that he had been betrayed into an imputation on Sir Stamford Raffles' motives 'totally irreconcilable with every principle of public duty.' Happily for Bannerman's peace of mind he was spared this final rebuff, for he died before the despatch reached Penang.

Melancholy as the whole record is in its revelation of official ineptitude, it does not by any means complete the tale of the troubles brought upon Raffles. Before the local storm had died away, he was called upon to face a new and more formidable assault on his policy directed from home. The Government of the day were directly hostile to the step he had taken. They declared against it in language which admitted of no misinterpretation. The India Board were not less outspoken in their denunciation. If Raffles had been a traitor who had betrayed his country, he could scarcely have been more bitterly assailed in high quarters. The one excuse for the attitude assumed was the desirability, viewed from the country's general foreign policy, of maintaining good relations with Holland. The ink on the Treaty of Vienna was scarcely dry; and Ministers shrank from measures which might appear to reopen the settlement, more especially as the condition of the nation in 1819 was very grave. Furthermore, Singapore was, to most officials, nothing but a worthless islet, more likely to be a burden than a blessing to the country.

Abandonment seemed inevitable in view of the pronounced antipathy officially manifested to the occupation. But the Government were happily precluded from following this suicidal course by the rapid march of events. The truth is that, as a port, Singapore was a success from the very earliest days. With rare instinct for the true future position of the settlement, Raffles made the trade absolutely free, while at the same time he did his utmost to attract as settlers the Chinese and other native traders, by whom the vast bulk of the trade of the Archipelago was done. Favoured by this liberal policy, a considerable commerce grew up almost immediately. In the third year of the occupation we find Raffles estimating that the exports and imports by native boats alone exceeded 4,000,000 dollars in the year. In 1822 the total shipping clearances of the port reached 130,689 tons, and the trade exceeded 8,000,000 dollars. Two years later the annual trade had increased in value to 13,000,000. Singapore, in short, had absolutely justified itself while short-sighted critics at home were still discussing the expediency of the occupation.

Raffles' own faith in the future of the settlement

never wavered. Quite early in the occupation, in June 1819, he maintained that, among Eastern ports, it was likely to be second only to Calcutta. It was, he declared, 'of much higher value than whole continents of territory.' About a year later, with prophetic instinct, he assigned to the port a position as 'a connecting link and grand *entrepôt* between Europe, Asia and China.' It seemed to him impossible, in the circumstances, that the position should be abandoned; and he was right. The inevitable decision to make the occupation permanent came only after years of discussion and, for Raffles, of heart-breaking criticism and censure. Eventually, in 1824, it took the form of a treaty concluded with the Dutch, by which, broadly speaking, we exchanged our Sumatran station of Bencoolen for Malacca, with the understanding that, while we retained Singapore and exercised exclusive rights on the Peninsula, the Dutch were to have a free hand in Sumatra.

Raffles did not long survive the vindication of the principles for which he had so strenuously fought. Quitting Bencoolen in February 1824, he spent some troubled months in England in contention with the authorities over questions arising out of his Java administration and his Singapore mission, and then, on July 5, 1826, succumbed to an attack of apoplexy at his residence, Highwood Hill, Middlesex. He was buried in Hendon churchyard. His memory was so soon forgotten by an ungrateful country that even the exact site of his grave became a matter of controversy, not finally cleared up until a few years since, when, on some alterations being made in Hendon Church, an investigation resulted in the position of his remains being accurately located.

It is impossible to over-rate the value of the services which Raffles rendered to the country and to the Empire by the founding of Singapore. His decisive defeat of Dutch ambitions was a turning-point in the history of the whole of this part of the East. The stately Imperial outpost, planted in a position which absolutely commands the principal route from the West to the Far East, is a sign and symbol of the new order that was ushered in with its occupation. The squalid fishing village occupied by a few hundred natives, which Raffles found in 1819, has,

in the course of a century, grown into a noble city of 300,000 inhabitants. Planned on generous lines in accordance with the written instructions of Raffles, it impresses the stranger as do few other Eastern ports. Wide streets flanked with noble buildings devoted to public and private objects, a spacious harbour crowded with shipping from every part of the world, and a dock for refitting ships which is the largest in Asia, are among its most prominent features. As befits its position as a great trade *entrepôt*, its population from the first has been a cosmopolitan one. The earliest census (1826) included among its elements—to adopt the official classification—Europeans, Armenians, native Christians, Arabs, Chinese, Malays, Bugis (natives of the Celebes), Javanese, Bengalis, natives of the Coromandel Coast, Coffries (ex-slaves) and Siamese. To-day the city has a still more varied population, but the Chinese remain what they were at the first census, the predominating race commercially as well as numerically. Hard-working, law-abiding, thoroughly well affected to British rule, they constitute a most valuable force in the settlement, and indeed in the whole of British Malaya. It is a pleasant fact, and one which would have gratified Raffles exceedingly, that one of the most cordial and appreciative of the addresses of congratulation presented to the Governor of the Straits Settlements on the occasion of the centennial celebrations in February last emanated from this community.

Singapore profited greatly by the war between Great Britain and China, when its use as an advanced military base revealed its strategical value. The establishment of direct steam communication with England by the P. & O. Company in 1845 served to strengthen and consolidate the ties then formed. Thereafter, its progress was uninterrupted. In 1850, the trade was worth 5,336,833*l.*, and by 1860 had increased nearly twofold; five years later a further substantial increase was registered, the figure for that year being 14,492,470*l.* Thus, within half a century of the occupation, Raffles' conception of a great trade *entrepôt* was realised.

But the chief value of Singapore is that it has directed Imperial policy and action into a channel in which it has carried the national interest and prestige to a point of successful accomplishment which they could not

otherwise have reached. As was pointed out by the writer in this Review (October 1917), the influence accruing to us from the occupation of Singapore has enabled us to go a long way towards the creation of a New India in the domain known by the generic term 'British Malaya.' The trade of this region in the year 1917 was valued at 145,000,000*l.*, the highest total ever recorded, and one exceeding the total foreign trade of India less than twenty years ago. Indeed, there are few parts of the Empire which are potentially more valuable. British Malaya has vast trading interests, represented by the plantation rubber industry, whose output represents over seventy per cent. of the world's consumption of cultivated rubber, and by the tin mines, which yield about half the tin used on the globe. Coconuts, furnishing an important basic element in the manufacture of soap and of the indispensable margarine of our domestic economy, are extensively grown in a climate and environment peculiarly suited to them. Tungsten is found here in deposits of exceptional richness, together with molybdenum and other rare metals used in modern manufacture. Coal, too, is being worked under promising conditions, while gold has been mined in fair quantities, though, so far, the mining has not been brilliantly successful in a commercial sense. Generally, the peninsula is remarkably productive; and, as a large part of it has been only imperfectly explored, the future undoubtedly offers still greater possibilities.

There are four well-marked periods in the rise of British Malaya: (1) from the founding of Singapore in 1819 to the establishment of Crown Colony Government in 1867; (2) from 1867 to 1874, the date of the Treaty of Pangkor, which established direct relations with the Malayan States of the peninsula and led ultimately to the creation of the Federated Malay States; (3) from 1874 to 1908, when the Anglo-Siamese Agreement was concluded, by which British influence was extended to the States of Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu, hitherto in different degrees under Siamese rule; (4) from 1909 to the present day, a period in which British interests on the peninsula have been consolidated by the strengthening of the ties with the non-federated States. Not the least interesting development of the

later periods has been the execution of an ambitious programme of trunk railways in the peninsula, linking up Bangkok, the Siamese capital, with Penang, Malacca and Singapore, and furnishing arterial lines which will be of the utmost importance in the probably not distant future, when the railway system of India is extended from Burmah southwards. Associated with this railway enterprise has been a wise policy of road construction and harbour development. Through these agencies, the Empire's shipping has directly and enormously benefited, since nowhere in the Empire has trade shown a greater disposition to follow the flag.

But we cannot reckon in terms of commerce alone the advantages which have accrued from Raffles' far-seeing policy. Over those lands which in his day and even a half-century later were a welter of anarchy the breath of a new civilisation has been breathed. Out of the semi-pirate States, which in old days lived by 'the good old rule, the simple plan,' has been evolved in the Federated Malay States an administrative entity with a trade for 1917 of 40,467,196*l.* and a revenue of 7,647,872*l.*, and a stable and ordered federal Government which is working smoothly on lines of civilisation and progress. Over the entire peninsula, over federated and non-federated States alike, broods the *Pax Britannica*. A great and brilliant future undoubtedly awaits this one-time Eastern Alsatia; but, even as it is seen to-day, in the stage of yet early development, it is a transcendent example of the genius of the British race for bringing strange peoples into paths of peace and order. The spectacle which it affords lends a significance to the centenary just passed which will not be missed by any lover of the Empire. It is a rare tribute to the statesmanlike insight of a man who dared and suffered much in the cause of his country, and who perhaps builded even better than he knew, when he conjured up out of the rocky wastes of the almost deserted island in the Straits of Malacca the splendid city through whose confines passes annually a volume of shipping greater than that associated with any other port in the East save Hongkong.

ARNOLD WRIGHT.

Art. 2.—WAR AND MENTAL DISORDERS.

IN ordinary times the public conscience is somewhat tender in the matter of experiments performed on animals; and, in so far as this makes for a check upon the infliction of unnecessary pain, such a feeling is of distinct value. In time of war, however, a vast amount of material is provided for scientific investigation by the injuries which man inflicts upon his brother-man; and, whatever our opinions on the ethics of war may be, they need not prevent us from deriving what scientific benefit we can from the study of the results brought about by war stresses and injuries, with the object in view of improving our methods in regard to the prevention and cure of disease.

The tendency in evolution is towards differentiation and to specialisation; but in the individual, as in the community, the specialised part is only a portion of a complex organisation. In the matter of nervous disorders the latter fact is too often lost sight of and there is, consequently, a lack of cohesion in regard to our knowledge of these disorders looked at as a whole. The result has been that the neurologist and the alienist have considered the question from remotely different points of view; and it is only slowly becoming apparent that the divorce between them is not absolute. It might almost be expressed by saying that the one takes structure as his study, while the other confines himself to investigating function. Only by a system which comprehends both these methods of procedure can any satisfactory results be obtained. It is to be hoped that the wealth of material in regard to nervous disorders which war has produced will serve to demonstrate that, whatever the symptoms, these conditions are due to interferences of varying degrees of intensity with the nervous substructure. The differentiation of disorders into functional and organic, though useful for descriptive purposes, has been pernicious in so far as it has served to obscure the fact that there is no appreciable hiatus between the basal changes which give rise to one set of symptoms or to the other.

In considering the effects of the various stresses associated with a state of war, it is essential to remember

that they are acting upon individuals. Only by bearing this in mind can we begin to understand why different patients who have been subjected to apparently similar stresses exhibit varying symptoms. It is obvious that a greater force is necessary to overcome a robust and well-trained man than is required to upset one who is poorly developed. Expressed in that way, the statement is so simple that its truth becomes at once apparent. Yet if it is borne steadily in mind it will serve to make it clear how it is that one organisation subjected to a certain strain breaks down, while another in similar circumstances either does not become obviously impaired, or, if it does, responds to the stimulus in a different way. The reaction is dependent not only on the stimulus but also on the condition of the person to whom it is applied. The same individual will, too, react differently at different times; for variations will be brought about within the organism as a result of the conditions to which it is exposed.

During life the body is constantly in a condition of unstable equilibrium. In the waking period, especially when work is being done, there is an output of energy which is in excess of the amount which is being stored. A resting stage is, therefore, necessary in order to allow of this waste being made good; and during sleep the tissues have an opportunity of recuperating. The maintenance of consciousness is dependent upon the functioning of certain cerebral areas and upon the integrity of the nerve-cells which compose them. On overaction of these cells, whether as a result of stimuli coming from within the body (for example, abdominal pain or an aching tooth) or from without (such as loud and persistent noise), there is not only wasting in these cells but also in the body generally. The mere deprivation of sleep may, if long continued, have extremely prejudicial results. Those who carried out tortures in olden times were well aware of this; and it was once an all too common practice to keep so-called witches awake for long periods in order that, when their brains were overcome by fatigue, they would confess to having committed the most incredible acts. There is, however, provision made against undue prolongation of the wakeful periods; and, after a time, the need for sleep

becomes so imperative that not even strong stimuli can prevent somnolence. The chance of an attack by the enemy, the pangs of hunger, the pain of wounds—even these are unable to stir the wearied cells upon whose proper functioning consciousness depends. Zola has given a vivid description of such effects of fatigue in the French soldiers at the time of the battle of Sedan.*

Hunger also plays a part in bringing about deterioration. It is a favourite axiom that an army marches on its stomach; and it is essential that, if men are to carry on the laborious duties which active warfare entails, they must be well fed. Remarkable feats of endurance have been achieved at times under unfavourable conditions, but this simply means that the reserve stores of energy are being drawn upon. It can only be a temporary state of affairs and is, obviously, inapplicable in protracted campaigns. During the present war—thanks to the efficient working of the commissariat department—lack of food has been one of the least potent of the factors in the causation of nervous disorder.

There appears to be no doubt that the deprivation of food has played an important part in bringing about mental disorder in certain of those soldiers who have had the misfortune to be interned in Germany as prisoners of war. In some cases doubtless the men were unstable and might have broken down in quite different circumstances; in others, however, it seems reasonable to reckon the inadequate and innutritious diet as probably the most potent agent in causation. This was borne out by the improvement which took place in the mental condition of some of these men after repatriation under the influence of rest and adequate diet.

Some observers are inclined to lay much stress on the influence of emotion in producing certain disorders of the nervous system; and the term 'psychic trauma' has frequently been made use of in this connexion. No one will deny that the stimuli which give rise to emotion

* 'It was now the need of sleep that caused him the most suffering; and, indeed, all around him weariness was conquering hunger. The shadowy flock of soldiers went stumbling hither and thither along the strange streets, and at every step some man or other sank down in the footway or on a doorstep, and remained there fast asleep.' 'La Débâcle,' Part 1, chap. 8.

have often a potent influence upon the nervous system and generally upon the bodily state; but, when the phrase 'psychic trauma' is employed, it is too often forgotten that emotion is itself a result and is brought into being by some change in the nervous system. What we are conscious of as an emotion is, as Maudsley has so well expressed it, a commotion of the nervous system; and this commotion is the result of a stimulus. The subsequent emotion is a complex thing which depends not only on the particular stimulus but still more upon the condition of the organism subjected to the stimulus. Stimuli for practical purposes may be divided into pleasurable and painful; or, from the biological point of view, into those which tend to bring about integration and those which result in disintegration. Fear, the influence of which has necessarily been widespread, is a disintegrative factor. It has been demonstrated that prolonged fear, for example, brings about degeneration of the brain-cells. If the stimulus is sufficiently long continued, recovery does not take place, and permanent impairment results. It is obvious, therefore, that terrifying experiences and fearful sights may well have prejudicial effects.

It is maintained by a certain school of thought that the repression of these painful memories, the thrusting of them into the sub-consciousness (or, as they designate it, the 'unconscious') is the basal factor in many mental disorders. The painful memory is not, however, dormant but is constantly struggling to make its way to the surface. The tension thus brought about in the individual gives rise to an uneasiness which may amount to actual disorder and may incapacitate him.

It is, however, rather the summation of the effects of such conditions as loss of sleep, hunger, pain, noise and fatigue which brings about disordered function in the nervous system. It will easily be understood that such morbid stimuli cannot be applied separately, and even in laboratory experiments it is difficult so to do. In most cases it is, therefore, practically impossible to say that the breakdown is due to one particular form of stress. The most obvious stress may be really only the determining factor in upsetting the balance of a nervous organisation already weakened in other ways. It is

necessary, therefore, in deciding how much the condition is due to any particular strain, to give the benefit of the doubt to the individual.

In regard to the influence of high explosives upon the central nervous system there remains much still to be explained; that is, of course, apart from those cases in which there has been obvious injury. Various factors may come into play in producing nervous disorders where the person has been in proximity to a bursting shell and yet has not received any obvious injury. Where, for example, a number of comrades have been maimed or killed, while at the same time the patient has not been rendered unconscious, the stimulus conveyed through the eye appears to have a prejudicial effect. When one remembers how delicately organised certain parts of the nervous system are, it is not difficult to imagine that such a stimulus as this may upset the balance. In such instances it is, however, difficult to eliminate the possibility of other influences being brought to bear. There are, for example, the effects of concussion and of the noxious gases liberated when an explosion takes place. Dr Mott has dealt very fully with this aspect of the subject.* It is obvious that, in regard to concussion, varying degrees of intensity must have been experienced by different subjects. In some cases instant death has been caused by shell explosions, and 'yet no visible injury has been found to account for it' (Mott). An instance of this happening to a number of men is given by Masefield. In the underground galleries cut in the chalk near Beaumont Hamel 'nearly fifty of the enemy were found lying dead in their bunks, all unwounded, and as though asleep. They had been killed by the concussion of the air following on the burst of a big shell at the entrance.'† Similar cases have been noted apart from warfare. In colliery explosions there are produced powerful waves of atmospheric disturbance which may also bring about death in the same way.

'The damage which atmospheric disturbances alone can do to buildings, even at great distances from the site of the

* 'The Effects of High Explosives upon the Central Nervous System,' by F. W. Mott, M.D., etc., Major, R.A.M.C. (T.). Lettsomian Lectures, 'Lancet,' Feb. 12 and 26, and March 11, 1916.

† 'The Old Front Line,' by John Masefield (London, 1917, p. 50).

explosion, has strikingly illustrated the effect such air currents must have upon human beings, whether standing or lying down, awake or asleep. To me the damage done to buildings carries the conviction that the general shock to the whole surfaces of skin and mucous membrane which protect the exterior of man may be sufficient to disturb the nervous machinery to a degree which may vary from slight symptoms to concussion of the brain by stages which may reach the extremity of sudden death without showing evidence of any visible pathological signs.*

In addition to the injuries caused thus by aerial compression there may be concussion through the soldier being thrown into the air or against the wall of the trench; or he may be struck on the head or spine by a flying sandbag. In some cases, too, there may be no sign of external injury. Another factor to be reckoned with is the liberation of gas which accompanies the shell-explosion. Where it is definitely a gas-shell which explodes, the effects can be traced directly; but in other cases the gas is merely a secondary result, and the explosive effect is the one primarily aimed at. The potent influence of, for example, carbon-monoxide has been noted in connexion with mine explosions and elsewhere. 'The action of CO is most marked upon the central nervous system.'† The symptoms produced by this gas are in some instances similar to those of shell-shock or of other nervous disorders; and, if it is not known that the patient has been exposed to its influence, it will be difficult to diagnose definitely the cause of his trouble.

It is remarkable how little effect upon mental processes may sometimes be produced by injuries of the head and of the brain. This has, of course, been noted long before the present war. Research has shown that, in the brain, differentiation in regard to function has taken place in separate areas; and this discovery receives confirmation from the localised injuries which have been so numerous in recent times. The symptoms may be localised, as in paralysis of a certain area, and may remain so until recovery takes place. On the other

* 'Peripheral Shock and its Central Effects,' by J. Lynn Thomas, C.B., F.R.C.S. ('Brit. Med. Jl.,' Jan. 8, 1916).

† Mott, 'Lancet,' Feb. 26, 1916.

hand, it is not possible to say definitely that mental symptoms will not supervene. When they do occur, it appears as if a gradual spread of the disintegration takes place; or it may be that there is a period of delay before a sufficient number of the cells, upon the adequate functioning of which mental processes depend, are put out of action. Cases of this description have been observed; and the deterioration has been progressive, with a corresponding mental enfeeblement. Sometimes the paralysis, for example, of one side of the body, has passed off; while in other cases the paralysis and the mental symptoms have both continued.

There are, of course, many other causative factors besides the gross injuries brought about by the impact of some missile on the tissues of the body. Indeed, speaking generally in regard to these disorders with which it is proposed to deal at present, visible injuries do not have as potent an effect as might be supposed. Though wounds, the results of which can be perceived by the naked eye, are doubtless in a number of instances associated with disorders of nervous functions, it is remarkable how in many instances the reaction to the injury is almost entirely local, and the general nervous or mental functions are not appreciably impaired.* This has been noticed in regard to that class of disorders designated as hysterical. In these the reaction is directed towards the local injury; and thus the hysterical symptoms—which are, apparently, in certain instances, part of a protective nervous process—do not appear. This is, however, not an invariable rule; instances to the contrary have been by no means uncommon. Here, therefore, the individual factor also plays an important part.

The factors in causation are numerous, and the symptoms which are produced are multiform. Since, also, the individuals subjected to these injuries vary in their powers of resistance, it follows that there will be much difficulty in saying what disorder will be brought about. Where there is a definite wound, the immediate effects are obvious. For example, when a bullet or a fragment of shrapnel cuts through a motor nerve, we

* 'The wounded are practically immune from shell-shock, presumably because a wound neutralises the action of the psychic causes of shell-shock.' 'The Etiology of Shell-shock,' by Dr H. Wiltshire; 'Lancet,' June 17, 1916.

know that there will be paralysis of the muscles supplied by that nerve; or, if the spinal cord is severed, that there will be paralysis of the body below the lesion. If, however, the lesion is less severe, perhaps only a jarring or concussion, the symptoms will not be so definite, but they will, on the whole, be comparatively simple as compared with results produced in the brain by injuries of the kind mentioned. In local lesions of the nerves or of the spinal cord much light may be thrown upon the extent of the injury by means of a careful testing of reflexes, defects in sensibility, etc. But, though these methods can be resorted to with considerable success in certain brain conditions, their utility is, for the most part, very much less. Prognosis has, therefore, to be based much more upon experience gained from the observation of previous cases. This is, of course, true also of the local lesions of nerves, but by no means to the same extent.

The result is that, up to the present, a more guarded opinion has to be expressed in the cases which exhibit mental symptoms—at least in the early stages of the disorder. This may perhaps be expressed in another way by saying that it is difficult to place many of the cases in the apparently definite categories of disorders at present in use. More particularly is this so when the term used to distinguish one set of disorders from others is not clearly defined, and when, therefore, it is made to include more or less, according to individual predilection. This has been characteristic of classifications in mental disorders since the beginning; and it is likely to remain so until knowledge respecting them becomes more precise. If, on the other hand, it be admitted that the categories made use of are provisional, and if opinions be not stated dogmatically as results based upon ascertained facts, no harm will be done nor will further investigation be precluded.

As Dr Mott remarks, 'Instead of theories we should seek, however, some bio-chemical or bio-physical explanation why sudden emotional shock or continued emotional disturbance should produce an acquired emotivity in neuro-potentially sound individuals.*' The

* 'War Psycho-Neuroses,' by Lieut.-Col. F. W. Mott, M.D., etc.: 'Lancet,' Feb. 2, 1918.

same statement may well be given a much wider application. Dr Mott himself has done valuable work in this direction; and Dr Crile has demonstrated the effects of such stimuli as fear, anger, etc., on the brain-cells, and has shown that the 'essential pathology of shock is identical whatever the cause.'*

The term 'neurasthenia' has been used in rather a vague way in connexion with the nervous disorders associated with war conditions, though the same may be said of its employment at other times. It may simply be a cloak for our ignorance in those indeterminate cases which require prolonged observation before a more definite diagnosis can be arrived at; and, if one may be permitted to make use of that sadly overworked word, it serves as a *camouflage* for definite mental disorders. On the other hand, many instances occur where it is not possible to say what the real underlying condition is; and the neurasthenic symptoms may be the early stage of some grave disorder of the nervous system. Many cases have, however, occurred where the neurasthenia is apparently the only, or the chief, disorder present.

Some observers look upon neurasthenia as a sign of hereditary defect. In many cases met with in the ordinary way, a history of mental disorder in the family or of indulgence in excess in alcohol on the part of the parents may be elicited. The condition usually described as neurasthenia is then looked upon as a form of chronic nervous exhaustion. But, as applied to cases occurring in the Army, the two are usually considered together. The truth would seem to be that, whereas neurasthenia supervenes more readily in an organism which suffers from hereditary defect, there is no reason why any body which is subjected to a certain degree of strain should not become so exhausted of nervous energy as to exhibit the symptoms of neurasthenia. In shell-shock there are seen symptoms varying from those of slight nervousness with tremor, abnormal fatiguability, disordered sleep, terrifying dreams, to other states where the patient is

* 'The Origin and Nature of the Emotions,' by G. W. Crile, M.D. (London, 1915). The microphotographs illustrating the effects of various morbid stimuli upon the brain-cells reproduced by Crile in this volume are of extreme interest.

so agitated, so apprehensive and so depressed, that it is obvious that his mental condition has become disordered.

Conditions of 'shock' were common enough before the war, but they were then usually associated with some injury, such as a railway accident, a fall from a horse, etc. They have been much more frequent, however, in men exposed to the effects of heavy artillery; and, as a consequence, more attention has been directed to these conditions. A new label has been attached as if they were something entirely novel, whereas the fact seems to be that we are dealing with similar disorders produced in an unusual way. That the essential pathology of shock is identical, whatever the cause, has already been noted. But the degrees of change underlying the condition of shock are different; and there is, therefore, a difference in the symptoms observed. It may, for example, be so profound that death results instantaneously; or, on the other hand, it may show itself in slight nervous tremors and, on the mental side lack of inhibition (or self-control) and increased susceptibility to the effects of stimuli such as those associated with fear. On the other hand, this inhibition may be increased in order to adapt the organism to the changed environment; and a defensive mechanism may result. Thence may arise some of those symptoms designated as hysterical, which have been by no means uncommon in patients suffering from the effects of war-strain. Or these may be the result of fatigue and exhaustion in certain portions of the nervous system—the inhibitory mechanism—with loss of control and a tendency to 'short-circuiting' in other parts.

Many cases in which the symptoms are slight clear up quickly, but even these require rest and quiet. Tonic treatment directed towards improvement of the vasomotor trouble is of much utility. A good number of even the more serious cases progress satisfactorily. There is, however, a residue in whom, as a result of the graver disturbances mentioned, the trouble is persistent. But, as Lépine remarks, considering that, as a rule, we are dealing with youthful patients with a healthy circulatory system, the general prognosis for the shell-shocked should be extremely cautious and even pessimistic as

regards duration, but relatively favourable as to eventual complete recovery.

It was only to be expected that the stress and strain of warfare would play havoc with the nervous systems of those involved. The factors which brought about mental downfall were, of course, innumerable; and they were not confined by any means to the area where fighting took place. There was in addition the nervous exhaustion entailed by the conditions which rendered every man of military age liable to be called up for service. The mere thought of being removed from those surroundings to which they had become habituated was sufficient to bring about mental breakdown in certain unstable individuals. Potentiality for adaptation to environment is a very variable quantity. This has been shown phylogenetically; and many species have proved quite unfitted for the struggle for existence. So with individuals; their adaptability has been inherently defective, or advancing years have so lessened their potentiality in this direction that they have speedily given way under the strain of altered conditions.

There came into play also the toxic factors such as previous alcoholic excess or the absorption of unusual quantities of stimulants by those men who have to face the ordeal of active service. There can be no doubt that alcohol has been responsible, in conjunction with the various strains and stresses already mentioned, for a large number of cases of mental disorder. Acute alcoholic insanity, or delirium tremens, has occurred; but reference is now being made rather to instances in which alcoholic excess has been a predisposing factor in helping to bring about mental disorders other than those definitely associated with acute intoxication. Even in those cases it is highly probable that exposure to stress may have rendered them more susceptible to the effects of alcohol. From either point of view we may look upon it as a vicious circle; alcoholic excess lowers the vitality of the brain-cells and brings about loss of inhibition, and the loss of inhibition in turn paves the way for fresh alcoholic excess.

It appears that alcoholism has been an even more potent factor in bringing about mental disorder among

the French troops. Lépine* takes a very grave view of its influence.

'The sum total (he writes) of my experiences, spread over a period of three years, and referring to some six thousand patients, reveals alcohol as the sole and primary cause of at least a third of the cases. Taking into account those in whom it is only of slight importance, it would appear that half, sometimes close on two-thirds, of our patients have been influenced by alcohol.'

The commonest of all mental disorders has been a confusional state in which the patient becomes dazed, disorientated (unable to locate himself, to appreciate correctly the passage of time, or to realise his identity), and exhibits a more or less pronounced degree of cerebral torpor. In many instances the dazed condition was transient; in others, however, it persisted for days or even months, and was so severe as to amount to stupor, or there was much restlessness and incoherence of speech. Many cases were extremely resistive and refused to take food or allow anything to be done for them, so that it was often necessary to resort to tube-feeding. In some of these there appeared to be permanent cerebral deterioration; in other cases apparent recovery has yet concealed a permanent weakness which shows itself in defective self-control. This may, indeed, help to some degree to explain the violent conduct of certain men who, though apparently normal, have yet a history of precedent confusional disorder or of shell-shock.†

This confusional state was not infrequently an early stage of premature dementia (*dementia praecox*) or it masked another progressive disorder, general paralysis of the insane. In shell-shock also the element of confusion was occasionally very noticeable. Numbers of men who were found wandering from their companies and who were tried and even convicted for desertion were found to be suffering in this way. Where expert opinion could substantiate this fact, the men were, of

* 'Mental Disorders of War,' by Jean Lépine (English translation, London, 1919, p. xx).

† For a more detailed discussion of this and of other mental disorders of the war see Lépine in the work by him already cited: and also 'Stress of Campaign,' by Hubert J. Norman; 'Review of Neurology and Psychiatry,' Aug.-Sept. 1917.

course, referred for further treatment; but there can be little doubt that some of them suffered penalties for acts for which they were not fully responsible.

All the ordinary types of mental disorder met with in civil practice were represented among the soldier patients. Attacks of mania or of melancholia, either in association with wounds or without any apparent injury, and of the most varying degrees of intensity, were numerous. General paralysis of the insane appeared in some instances to have been aggravated by stress or injury. The syphilitic virus must of course have been present already; but, when the body was rapidly denuded of its resisting power, an opportunity was given to the organisms to thrive more rapidly. Opinions differ as to influence of war conditions in bringing about epilepsy. Certainly in some cases, where there had been injuries to the head, there were epileptic seizures, but these were of the traumatic (or Jacksonian) type. Even these were not so frequent as might have been expected. Allowing for these cases, Lépine thinks that 'there does not seem to be any doubt that the war has produced an increase in epilepsy'; but he goes on to say that 'it is more especially the number of fits which have increased, rather than the number of affected cases.'

Mental defectives have been a great source of trouble and anxiety to every one concerned. How some of the misfits could have been passed into the Army passes the comprehension of any one who has any experience in psychiatry. Many of them certainly were well-proportioned and strong, but their mental defectiveness was obvious. Some of them had been under care for years and had been removed therefrom by relatives who did not lack prevision in so far as separation allowances and pensions were concerned. Obvious imbeciles could, indeed, be weeded out without much difficulty; it was those with defective moral sense who were the most pernicious and troublesome. Opinions may differ as to the existence of instinctive criminals, but there can be no doubt that individuals of this type come very near to being placed in this category. Some of them were more than potential criminals; they had served their apprenticeship to crime before enlisting and had made acquaintance with the interiors of numerous prisons.

The imbecile is prevented by congenital defect from adapting himself to his surroundings. Even under ordinary conditions infinite patience is required to educate such defectives up to anything approaching the normal standard. It can easily be understood, therefore, that they were found incapable of coping with the exigencies of military life, especially when, under war conditions, an intensive system of training was essential. So deficient were some of them in a sense of responsibility that they were a positive source of danger to their comrades. Such a one was the man of whom Major Hotchkiss writes. He was on sentry-duty and was questioned by his officer as to what he would do if the enemy appeared. He said he would present arms and say, 'Pass, friend, all is well!'

Attempts at suicide among the mentally deranged have been numerous, especially (as in civil practice) in cases suffering from melancholia. It is a curious but interesting fact that, even when the men had fire-arms in their possession, they did not attempt to shoot themselves. The method usually adopted was by cutting the throat either with a razor or, when in hospital, with a piece of glass or of tin. Sometimes, as in alcoholics, the attempt was impulsive; but in many cases it had been carefully planned, and men have even gone the length of gradually sharpening the edge of a piece of tobacco tin in order to achieve their purpose. Cases of self-mutilation in order to avoid service have been relatively uncommon; and it seems that in most of them there is some mental defect to account for their resorting to such measures. Malinger, in so far as it takes the form of simulating mental disorder, has seldom occurred. There are observers who appear to regard every man who is mentally ill as a potential malingerer who has, so to say, to prove his insanity. On this point Lépine says, 'Those who will insist on seeing a malingerer in every mental case would be making a very silly blunder.' What the men do simulate (he adds) are functional disorders, such as pains, inabilities, paralysis, even nervous fits. Insanity is not simulated, because the malingerer is not anxious

* 'A War Hospital for Mental Invalids,' 'Journal of Mental Science,' April 1917.

to be made to associate with the insane; because it is difficult to keep up the appearance and symptoms; and also because 'the coward who longs to keep his skin intact is as afraid of the lunatic asylum as he is of the front.' It may be thought that the fact of the malingerer's achieving his purpose is likely to inspire others to emulate his example. In practice this is not so, at least to any great extent. The average man does not become a malingerer any more than he becomes a criminal. It is interesting to note that simulation of insanity was made use of by some of our prisoners of war in order to bring about their repatriation. In some cases they were successful. The difference of language no doubt complicated the matter, for German alienists are skilled in the practice of their branch of the profession.

In the early days of the war it was thought advisable that the insane soldier should be treated as if he were not so. In order to avoid the 'stigma' of insanity, arrangements were made whereby the sufferers were treated in special hospitals where no necessity for certification arose. So far, so good; an admirable provision. But then came the corollary that, as they were not certified as insane, they were not really insane and did not need to be treated as such. Therefore any association with asylums or with asylum staffs, medical or otherwise, was to be avoided. The futility of this was fortunately soon realised. Whatever euphemisms might be used, there were many soldiers who were insane, and very badly insane. They were noisy, violent, destructive and generally troublesome; or they were resistive and refused food so that tube-feeding became essential; * or they were suicidal and required constant watching. In the ordinary hospital wards the staff very soon became perturbed when there was any suggestion that a man was 'mental'; and there was much anxiety that he should be transferred to the special wards or special hospitals at the earliest possible moment.

In acute insanity rest and maintenance of nutrition are essential. The patients were, therefore, kept in bed, and, if necessary, sedatives were administered in order to

* The present writer during one period of ten months had to administer nourishment in this way on about eight hundred occasions.

quiet restlessness and to procure sleep. The visits of friends were curtailed; and generally the less interference there was with the patients the better was it for them. If necessary the patient was placed in a separate, partially darkened room. For those who were too excited and restless to remain in bed the padded room was of much utility.* In fact, the routine treatment as carried out in asylums was adhered to for the very good reason that it is the result of years of experience. It may safely be said that the results justified the methods adopted. A good many men had, of course, eventually to be certified and removed to civil asylums, when it was found that treatment in the special hospitals was not likely to produce any amelioration. In considering the number it is well, however, to remember that some of them were men who had previously had attacks and had been certified, while some were insane epileptics, general paralytics, alcoholics, or mental defectives with acute symptoms possibly arising as a result of stress.

It cannot be said definitely that any fresh treatment has been discovered as a result of our experience of the mental disorders of the war. Treatment by suggestion, which in its various forms has been of much use in dealing with certain nervous disorders such as 'hysterical' or 'functional' paralysis, mutism, stammering, etc., does not seem of much utility in the graver forms of mental disorder. The same must be said of the psycho-analytic method upon which some have based their hopes. The fact is that many who have come in contact with Army patients suffering from mental disorder have had little experience of such conditions in the ordinary way. With commendable enthusiasm they have desired to bring about revolutionary changes in treatment. It may be that in time their enthusiasm will be justified by results; but the tendency in so many instances to revert to 'psychological' theories appears to be reactionary and does not seem to augur well for the future.

It is difficult to conceive of mental disorder taking place without some change in the nervous substructure.

* 'I cannot insist too strongly upon the value of quiet, rest and isolation, as practised by placing screens, when available, between the cots in the early control of these cases.' Dr Auer in 'Mental Hygiene,' July 1917.

In many of the cases observed the changes were apparently of minimal character; but it is not scientific to ignore the possibility of their being present. The opportunities for pathological research were, however, necessarily limited; and, where it was possible to carry it out, there was no one of sufficient skill to do so, or there were other obstacles in the way, such as the lack of a properly equipped laboratory or the necessary apparatus. Research into the changes which take place in general paralysis of the insane, and the work of Crile, of Mott, of Shaw Bolton, of John Turner, and of others, have tended strongly to substantiate this view. Up to the present, cerebral pathology has only had a tithe of the necessary attention directed to it. The matter is really a financial one; and the community has seldom to look long for competent workers if it is prepared adequately to remunerate them.

It does not appear from investigation of such cases that we have to deal with new disorders.* What does seem clear is that disorders which were not commonly met with in ordinary practice have occurred in considerable numbers since the beginning of the war. This is particularly to be observed in regard to cases which have exhibited hysterical symptoms; but it holds in other instances as well. People have been subjected to severe shocks and strains; they have been wounded by flying missiles; they have been knocked over by violent explosions; they have had their resistance weakened by fatigue, anxiety, lack of sleep, etc.; in a word, they have had to contend with the morbid stimuli which have acted over so wide a field during the recent war. When this is taken into account it becomes evident that there is little need, if any, for inventing fresh nomenclature or for proposing new categories of new disorders. Even if this be granted, there is still an intense interest in these disorders, for the reason that so much research is needed before we can arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the symptoms observed.

HUBERT J. NORMAN.

* 'Les Troubles Mentaux et la Guerre,' by Dr G. Dumas, 'Revue de Paris,' July 15, 1916, p. 270. 'There is general agreement amongst authorities that the strain of war has not produced any new or specific form of mental disorder.' 'Med. Annual,' 1919; Article, 'Mental Diseases.'

Art. 3.—JANE AUSTEN: A PERSONAL ASPECT

Was Jane Austen a moralist? 'No!' many of her fervent admirers will exclaim—'Thank Heaven! that she was *not*! Her mission was to amuse, to delight, to refresh us, but neither to reprove, nor to condemn us! Those who want "Moral Tales" must seek them elsewhere; they are not to be found among Jane Austen's writings!' They are not indeed, if to be moral is to be dull, and if no one can instruct without growing tedious. Far, far away from such odious reproaches must those pages for ever shine to which we turn again and again, as beguilers of trouble and companions in mirth, equally welcome in society or solitude, in early life or in advancing years. They seem even to grow with our growth and strengthen with our strength, for, old though we may be, and wise as we may think ourselves, we never outgrow their freshness or their wisdom. Such is the creed of Jane Austen's earnest adherents. Nor is this all. In addition to the unflagging interest taken in her books by successive generations of readers a separate interest has grown up in the hearts of many. For them, to know her books—in some cases almost by heart—is much, but it is not enough; they desire to know herself also.

The existence of this feeling came to light as soon as the original 'Memoir of Jane Austen' was published, in 1869, by her nephew the Rev. J. E. Austen Leigh. The production of this book not only caused the appearance of a large number of articles, notices and reviews concerning its subject and her works, but it also brought to the author a variety of interesting letters from unknown correspondents, both English and American, describing the effect that its perusal had produced upon the writers' minds. These letters afforded him much pleasure and not a little surprise. Until that period he had not realised to how large a number of readers, and in what a high degree, the aunt, to whom he as a boy and a young man had been so warmly attached, had also become a living, though an unseen friend. The letters contained not only requests for additional information, but also entreaties that any stories, or fragments of stories, left by Miss Austen in manuscript might be

published, one correspondent urging that 'Every line from the pen of Jane Austen is precious.'

The writer of the Memoir could however do little beyond attending to the last-mentioned request. Having obtained the necessary permission from those members of his family to whom the original manuscripts had been bequeathed by Jane's sister, Cassandra, he included in the second edition of his Memoir 'Lady Susan,' 'The Watsons,' the alternative ending of 'Persuasion' and some of Jane's childish writings. More than this he could not at that time do, for, though aware that letters written by his aunt were in existence, he was unable to obtain access to them, nor were they published until nearly ten years after his own death took place. They had been written by Jane to her sister, and are a peculiarly restricted selection, which should never be taken as a specimen of her general correspondence, having been spared by Cassandra only from a belief that they contained nothing sufficiently interesting to induce any future generation to publish them. All that she thought of real interest she destroyed—as treasures too precious ever to be profaned by the eyes of strangers. Since the publication of these letters others have been recovered, written by more distant branches of the Austen family, bearing upon the life at Steventon Rectory in old days and consequently upon that of Jane herself. Another book, giving some authentic details of that life, and dealing especially with the careers of her sailor brothers, was subsequently published by a great-great-nephew and niece.* All the additional information thus acquired has been embodied in the latest† 'Life of Jane Austen' published in 1913 by a great-nephew and a great-great-nephew; and those eager readers of the original Memoir who have read this latest 'Life' may have found their wishes for further information fulfilled in some degree.

But though gratified, they may not be wholly satisfied. They may still desire a more intimate acquaintance with her inner self, with those hidden recesses of feeling

* 'Jane Austen's Sailor Brothers.' By J. H. and Edith Hubback (John Lane, 1906).

† 'Life and Letters of Jane Austen.' By W. and R. A. Austen-Leigh (Smith Elder, 1912).

concerning which a delicate reserve impelled her to keep a sacred silence. They may long for a sight of the vanished letters, not from idle curiosity, but that, in the words of one writer already recorded, 'much as they loved and honoured her before, they might learn to love and honour her still more.' A natural but a vain wish! The letters perished long ago—sacrificed by Cassandra as an offering of love and reverence to the memory of a sister unspeakably dear to herself.

Yet, though in this way we can learn nothing, there is another path, hitherto we believe untrodden, by the help of which we may attain a point of view affording us some fresh knowledge respecting those inner convictions which Jane Austen was always slow in revealing to the public gaze, and which will at the same time furnish an answer to the question asked at the beginning of this article.

To accomplish such an object we must turn to her books, and reverse our usual attitude of mind towards them by considering each story, not as a separate creation, but as part of a general whole. From an artistic standpoint there is nothing that can tempt us to act in this manner. Every novel is complete in itself, possessing its own plot, characters and distinctive atmosphere in a remarkable degree. We find no repetition of ideas among the six; and this may induce the belief that, while comparison is easy, generalisation is impossible. Nevertheless, it will be seen, on reflection, that, apart from the creative, dramatic, humorous qualities common to all, there is one moral or religious feature which declares their family likeness. One line of thought, one grace, or quality, or necessity, by whichever title we like to know it, is apparent in all her works. Its name is—Repentance.

It will be found, on examination, that this incident recurs in all her novels, being neither dragged in as a moral nor dwelt upon as a duty, but quietly taking its place as a natural and indispensable part of the plot, an inevitable incident in the formation and development of each successive child of her imagination. Every one, gayer or graver as the case may be, has his own testimony to give on this question, while all display the skill with which the author knew how to handle the subject,

according to the varying needs of place, character and surroundings.

We shall find that even in her very early and most lighthearted story 'Northanger Abbey,' the episode could not be dispensed with. The young heroine of this story, under the excitement of wild and captivating romances, allows herself to believe that the man in whose house she is a guest had, not long before, desired, perhaps connived at, the death of his own excellent and charming wife, or, at the very least, is keeping her immured in some dungeon on the premises. Such delusions could not be suffered to go unpunished. Nor were they, but, as they arose from nothing worse than ignorance and folly, the penalty inflicted is mercifully abridged. Still, the offender has to undergo a period of sharp anguish, brought upon her by a not unreasonable remonstrance, on the part of the hero, a son of the supposed villain. Its effect was immediate. 'Catherine,' we read, 'was completely awakened. Most grievously was she humbled. Most bitterly did she cry. She hated herself more than she could express.' But Jane Austen, we are very sure, would never break a butterfly upon the wheel; consequently we learn with no surprise that, after forming a resolution of 'always judging and acting in the future with the greatest good sense,' and being assisted by Henry Tilney's 'astonishing generosity and nobleness of character in never alluding to what had passed,' Catherine is ready to be consoled. The lenient hand of time 'did much for her by insensible gradations in the course of another day'; and she soon found that she had nothing to do but to 'forgive herself and be happier than ever.' Nevertheless, so effectually has the work of penitence been performed that, when General Tilney, not long afterwards, turns her out of his house at a few hours' notice, she magnanimously abstains from reverting to her previous suspicions that he has at an earlier period either poisoned or incarcerated his wife.

Passing from these playful pages to those of her latest and most pathetic work, 'Persuasion,' we find the same chord struck, but in a minor key and with a softer tone. Nothing glaringly wrong could befall a character of whom her own creator wrote beforehand to a niece, 'You may perhaps like the heroine, as she is almost too

good for me.' Anne Elliot's error was want of judgment, of too meek a submission to the direction of an older friend, an error that 'leaned to virtue's side' and was embraced by her unselfish spirit the more readily because, though destructive of her own happiness, she was persuaded to believe that it would promote the future good of a man whom she devotedly loved. Want of mental balance and some youthful weakness of character are the worst charges that can be brought against this almost perfect being, yet for these she has to suffer long, and has to learn, through suffering, the nature of the mistake she had made. Repentance, in the form of deep regret, overtook her as years passed on. 'She felt,' we are told, 'that, were any young person in similar circumstances to apply to her for counsel, they would never receive any of such certain immediate wretchedness—such uncertain future good.' Captain Wentworth had, on his side, a worse fault to repent of: 'I was proud,' he cried; 'too proud to understand or to do you justice—too proud to ask you again. This is a recollection which ought to make me forgive every one sooner than myself.' Readers can only agree with both speakers and rejoice in the sequel that closes these confessions.

Instances of graver misconduct and its subsequent results will be found in the four remaining novels. Even in the story written when Jane Austen was quite a young girl, called first 'Elinor and Marianne' and afterwards 'Sense and Sensibility,' the plot is made to hinge upon the evils inflicted by the heroine upon herself and her family through a too violent indulgence in a romantic passion. This renders her indifferent to the needs and the claims of other people, and blind to the sorrow of her sister, who is also suffering, but in silence, from an unfortunate attachment. It is not until Marianne is herself in the depths of disappointed affection that her eyes are opened to the truths around her. Then, 'Oh! Elinor,' she cries, 'you have made me hate myself for ever. How barbarous have I been to you!—you, who have been my only comfort, who have borne with me in all my misery, who have seemed to be only suffering for me!' Such is her first burst of penitence, to be strengthened by time and a severe illness, after which she speaks once more: 'I considered the past . . . I saw

in my own behaviour nothing but a series of imprudence towards myself and want of kindness to others. I saw that my own feelings had prepared my sufferings, and that my want of fortitude under them had almost led me to the grave. . . . Had I died, it would have been self-destruction.' The enthusiasm of her self-reproving spirit flows on, to be varied only by resolutions of future amendment, for, though as yet unable to believe that her remembrance of Willoughby will ever be weakened by time, she can still add, 'But it shall be regulated, it shall be checked by religion, by reason, by constant employment'—a resolution sincerely made and faithfully kept.

Repentance, in a double form, comes before us in the next novel. Nowhere in any of her other writings does it play so conspicuous a part as in 'Pride and Prejudice.' The whole scheme of the book depends upon its being felt, in a very high degree, by the two principal characters, upon its influencing their actions during the last half of the book and leading steadily up to its closing scenes. The late Prof. W. J. Courthope has left a striking analysis of the manner in which this feeling affected the hero of the book and of the consequent changes it wrought within him.* For this, as for the whole work, he expresses the warmest admiration, comparing it, on account of the manner in which 'under a commonplace surface a great artist has revealed a most dramatic conflict of universal human emotions,' with the structure of some grand Greek play. By no other writer can Jane Austen's genius have been dwelt upon with more eloquence or more sympathetic recognition, but even this appreciation is incomplete, for it contains no reference to the corresponding work of repentance effected in the heroine by the words and actions of the hero. Yet, had this been lacking, the perfectly proportioned plot, to which he accords unqualified praise, could never have been constructed and developed.

Elizabeth's self-reproach, so soon as she recognises the truth, is not less severe than Darcy's. 'She grew absolutely ashamed of herself; . . . of neither Darcy nor Wickham could she think without feeling that she had

* 'Life in Poetry, Law in Taste.' Lectures delivered in Oxford, 1895-1900 (Vol. v, Macmillan, 1901).

been blind, partial, prejudiced, absurd.' 'How despicably have I acted,' she cried, 'I who have valued myself on my abilities . . . how humiliating is this discovery! . . . Yet how just a humiliation! I have courted prepossession and ignorance and have driven reason away, where either was concerned. Till this moment I never knew myself.' Again, in a confession to her sister she admits, 'I was very uncomfortable, I may say, unhappy, and with no one to speak to of what I felt, no Jane to comfort me and say I had not been so very weak and vain and nonsensical as I knew I had! Oh how I wanted you!' Time, by disclosing more of Darcy's real character, could only deepen such regrets and make her grieve over 'every ungracious sensation she had ever encouraged, every saucy speech she had ever directed towards him. For herself she was humbled, but she was proud of him. Proud that in a cause of compassion and honour he had been able to get the better of himself.' Darcy's self-condemnation was equally strong.

'My behaviour towards you,' he assures her, 'merited the severest reproof. It was unpardonable; I cannot think of it without abhorrence. . . . The recollection of what I said, of my conduct, my manners, my expressions, is now, and has been for many months, inexpressibly painful to me. . . . I have been a selfish being all my life . . . what do I not owe you! You taught me a lesson hard indeed at first, but most advantageous. By you I was properly humbled.'

Such reciprocal repentance and confession could not fail to bring reciprocal forgiveness; and the title of the book ceases to be appropriate before the last page is turned.

Reciprocity in error and penitence were not destined to console the remaining heroine who falls, entirely through her own fault, into deep distress. Emma Woodhouse, having erred alone, has to endure her burden of remorse in solitude. Every reader will admit that Emma went, through vanity, further astray than Elizabeth Bennet through prejudice—a verdict foreseen by the author, who, while declaring that she does not know how she would be able to 'tolerate those who do not like Elizabeth,' frankly admits that in 'Emma' she is going to take a heroine 'whom no one will like but herself.' She did, in fact, endow her with that 'nature

and spirit' which were dear to her own heart, and drew a being full of faults, and yet, as Emma's lover believes at the end, 'faultless in spite of them.' But justice could not allow this conclusion to be reached until great vicissitudes of feeling had been endured. Emma's faults had inflicted much pain and distress upon other persons; consequently, at the proper moment, they had to bring corresponding wretchedness upon herself. 'Her feelings,' we are told, after Mr Knightley's expostulation on Box Hill, 'were combined of anger against herself—mortification and deep concern. . . . The truth of his representation there was no denying. She felt it at her heart. How could she have been so brutal, so cruel to Miss Bates!' Heavier retribution, however, is awaiting her when she, with horror, finds herself obliged to listen to Harriet Smith's outpourings of hopes and expectations respecting Mr Knightley. Then she saw her own conduct with a clearness which had never blessed her before.

'What blindness, what madness had led her on! It struck her with dreadful force, and she was ready to give it every bad name in the world. . . . With insufferable vanity had she believed herself to be in the secret of everybody's feelings; with unpardonable arrogance proposed to arrange everybody's destiny. She was proved to have been universally mistaken; and she had not quite done nothing—for she had done mischief. . . . What,' in conclusion, 'could be increasing Emma's wretchedness, but the reflection, never far distant from her mind, that it had been all her own work? The only source whence anything like consolation or composure could be drawn was in the resolution of her own better conduct and in the hope that every future winter of her life would find her more rational, more acquainted with herself, and leave her less to regret when it were gone.'

Satisfied with such genuine repentance, the author could now make this favourite heroine once more happy.

Can we avoid perceiving that these five pictures of life resemble each other in so far that every one of them gives a description, closely interwoven with the structure of the story and concerned with its principal characters, of error committed, conviction following, and improvement effected, all of which may be summed up in the

word 'Repentance'? If so, do we not also, through this perception, gain more knowledge as to the habitual bent of that mind in which these successive creations arose? Does not Jane Austen's outlook upon life grow clearer to us when we learn that it was not merely by the 'follies and nonsense, whims and inconsistencies' (as she makes Elizabeth Bennet call them) ever visible on the surface of Society, that her quick eyes were caught, but that her penetrating gaze went down to the hidden springs of action, prompting her to reflect upon the race that all human beings have to run in this world, upon the various courses they pursue, and upon the necessity of powerful influences being exercised over them, in order to bring about that improvement of character which is the final purpose of it all? Can we fail to see how, in dealing with these heroines, she desired to leave them, not only happier, but better than she found them, wiser, stronger, humbler and more charitable, richer in self-control, and in that self-knowledge on which she always places a high value? If we have seen all this, we have seen also something of her hidden self.

There is still another book, standing in some respects apart from the rest, through which we acquire even more information on this subject. 'Mansfield Park' is the gravest novel Jane Austen ever wrote. It was composed after a long interval of silence, and may be called a 'Second First.' It was the result of a wider experience of mankind, together with that of various personal trials which she had to undergo during the eight years she passed in large towns after quitting Steventon in 1801. She herself, when writing this book, declared 'it was not half so entertaining as "Pride and Prejudice"'—an opinion with which her readers may or may not agree. In its pages, humour, insight into character, creative genius, and power of description shine as brightly as ever; but, in addition to these, we are aware of a deeper seriousness and a more searching inquiry into the ultimate issues of conduct than had as yet appeared in her works. The author of the original memoir was informed that a number of literary men, who happened to meet at a country house, agreed to write down the title of their favourite novel. The only name which appeared more than once was 'Mansfield Park,' and this had been

chosen by several of the company. Such a power of attracting powerful minds may be due to the union of brilliant writing with serious reflection which its pages contain; and it is interesting to recall the circumstances under which this novel, the first important original work taken in hand by her for ten years, was written.

The lapse of ten years, beginning in early womanhood, can hardly pass over any head without producing sensible differences. To Jane Austen they had brought many changes.* Sorrow had touched her closely. She had lost through sudden death and almost simultaneously her father and her much-loved friend Mrs Lefroy of Ashe. The same cause had brought to an end her own personal romance, inflicting a wound which is, as we know, not the less but the more likely to have been deeply felt, on account of the silence preserved by Cassandra on this subject for many years after her sister's death, and the guarded manner in which she at length alluded to it. Other trials and troubles had come upon the Austen family in recent years, one being of a most unusual nature, threatening to overwhelm some of them in irretrievable disaster, and to bring lasting distress upon their whole circle.† It is not surprising that such practical acquaintance with some of life's heaviest afflictions should for a time have stopped all flow of fancy on Jane Austen's part, or that the only new work she began during this period should have been broken off at the end of the twelfth chapter, apparently because the author ceased to feel any interest in its contents. One more loss—this time neither sudden nor unusual—must be added to those already mentioned. She had lost her youth. At the age of twenty-five, while still a young woman, she had left her native place, her earliest friends, and every well-loved scene associated with the first overflowings of her happy girlish fancies. It was the birthplace, not of herself alone but of many creations, born to a far longer existence than hers was destined to be upon earth, of all those characters that live and move for us throughout the pages of her first three novels.

Eight years were to pass before a return to Hampshire would take place; and her own words have

* Cf. 'Life and Letters,' chap. xiv.

† 'Life and Letters,' chap. ix.

described how much such a period can include. 'Eight years . . . what might not eight years do? Events of every description, changes, alienations, removals, all, all must be comprised in it.*' The varied events which this passage of time had held for herself can hardly have been absent from her thoughts when she placed such a reflection in the mind of Anne Elliot, rejoicing no doubt that it was in her power to restore to that heroine a happiness which her own heart might never now know. It is certain that, on beginning a country life at Chawton, she and Cassandra were satisfied to assume to themselves—too readily, as some of their relations considered—the position of middle-aged women. It is impossible, however, not to rejoice at any decision that ensured to her a larger amount of quiet leisure for composition; and it was now, after the revision of two earlier works had renewed the habit of writing, that 'Mansfield Park' was begun in February 1811, to be finished in June 1813.

Here we find the theme, never absent from her works, displayed again, and in an acuter form; for in this book we meet with the chief and saddest example of Repentance that her pen ever drew—the saddest because, in a sense, the most unavailing. There can be no comparison between any of the cases already mentioned and that of an unhappy father whose 'anguish, arising from the conviction of his own errors in the education of his daughters, was never to be entirely done away.' Such are Sir Thomas Bertram's feelings as he contemplates a domestic tragedy for which he believes these errors to have been the primary cause. It is not with folly and thoughtlessness that 'Mansfield Park' deals, but with vice and sin, with misery and degradation—subjects the writer herself describes as 'odious,' which she touches as distantly and dismisses as rapidly as possible. That she forced herself to write of them at all tends to show that some of the phases of the fashionable life she had been observing around her had impressed themselves so deeply on her soul that her spirit could not rest until she had entered a protest, through the medium of her own dramatic art, against these forms of evil.

* 'Persuasion,' chap. vii.

A record remains which shows that in her opinion this was the only proper method for a writer of fiction to employ. Soon after the publication of the original Memoir, its writer received a letter from a well-known clergyman, who stated that he had been intimately acquainted with a lady who had known Jane Austen well and from whom he had heard much about her. He spoke of 'the tribute of my old friend to the real and true spring of a religion which was always present though never obtruded.' 'Miss Austen,' she used to say, 'had on all the subjects of enduring religious feeling the deepest and strongest convictions; but a contact with loud and noisy exponents of the then popular religious phase made her reticent almost to a fault. She had something to suffer in the way of reproach from those who believed she might have used her genius to greater effect; but,' her old friend used to say, 'I think I see her now, defending what she thought was the real province of a delineator of life and manners, and declaring her belief that example, and not "direct preaching," was all that a novelist could afford properly to exhibit.'*

Means such as these, when employed by herself, are so powerful and speak so plainly that it is difficult to see how to any writer the title of 'Moralist' can be more justly given. Those who object to it in her case, as necessarily implying a double point of view in a writer's mind, destructive of that simplicity of aim which ought to be the inspiring motive of any true work of art, should consider whether there is in 'Mansfield Park' any evidence that the design of the artist has been cramped by the mind of the moralist. There are, again, others who would disapprove of the terms 'Morality' or 'Moral Precepts,' as falling short of the highest ideals, implying something that may be only cold and formal, based upon a theory that correct conduct should be maintained because it is in the long run the most likely method of obtaining success and comfort in this world. If so, then 'Mansfield Park' may again be quoted to refute, in its author's opinion, any such theory, for it contains a strong protest against worldliness and the ideals

* This lady used to add: 'Anne Elliot was herself; her enthusiasm for the Navy and her perfect unselfishness reflect her completely.'

that worldliness upholds whether in education, marriage, or general society. She plainly declares her belief that moral conduct must spring from a deeper source and must cherish a higher aim than this. She had seen, and would describe, how little dependence can be placed upon well-bred decorum and outward propriety unless they are inspired by religious principles. The veil of habitual reticence employed by her on these subjects is here drawn further back, and the language used is more explicit, than in any of her other books. Sir Thomas Bertram's self-reproach is addressed to this very point. He came to feel, we are told, that

'Something must have been wanting *within*. He feared that principle, active principle, had been wanting; that his daughters had never been taught to govern their inclinations and tempers properly, by that sense of duty which can alone suffice. They had been instructed theoretically in their religion, but never required to bring it into daily practice. To be distinguished for elegance and accomplishments, the authorised object of their youth, could have had no useful influence that way, no moral effect on the mind . . . Of the necessity of self-denial and humility, he feared they had never heard from any lips that could profit them.'

Again, the term 'Sin' is given to express flagrant evil. Edmund employs it in his last interview with Mary Crawford; and of her brother we are told that, 'though too little accustomed to serious reflection to know good principles by their proper name, yet in his highest praises of Fanny he expressed what was inspired by the knowledge of her being well-principled and religious.'

We learn here more of Jane Austen's deep feelings on moral and religious questions than she has expressed elsewhere, but every allusion to them in her other works is in complete harmony with the teachings set forth in the latter chapters of 'Mansfield Park.' When, therefore, we find in the sister volumes the not infrequent words 'principles' and 'duty,' we should remember how much they imply, and that we have, as already stated, evidence proving her general reticence on the highest subjects to be intentional, and not accidental. 'Still waters run deep'; and the uniform though restrained teaching in

these books assures us of the steadfastness of conviction respecting these important points on the part of her to whom we owe their existence. The virtues she loves to cultivate in her characters she would certainly desire for herself; the 'self-knowledge' she prizes so highly, as a means of improvement, she would personally desire for the same reason; nor was there in her that want of humility which prevents some souls from acquiring it. All her life she looked up to Cassandra as her superior in wisdom and goodness; and to its very close she esteemed others as better than herself.

That she had reflected silently on solemn questions some expressions in her letters show us; and one of her nieces has written, 'When Aunt Jane was grave she was very grave, graver I think even than Aunt Cassandra.' Such thoughts on her part, and such an attitude of mind, will not appear improbable when we recall her ancestry and education. Her father, on one side, her grandfather on the other, had been excellent and active parish priests. By precept and by example she had received both from her stricter mother and her gentler father the firm religious principles which governed her throughout life. Mrs George Austen writes, on returning from a visit to London, that in it 'every one seems in a hurry,' adding, 'Tis a sad place; I would not live in it on any account; one has not time to do one's duty either to God or Man'—a verdict that may provoke a smile, but which serves to show the speaker's conviction as regards the great object of human life. George Austen's instructions to his sons express, as might be expected, the same belief. In a long letter, written to Francis, the elder of his two sailor sons, 'attention to religious duties' is given the primary place. Round these twin poles, therefore—'Duty to God and duty to Man'—had Jane Austen been taught that life should revolve; and this it is that she always presupposes would be accepted in a like manner by the heroes and heroines in all her books. Not that she therefore considers them to be 'already perfect.' 'Pictures of perfection,' she owns, 'make me sick and wicked.' She knew human nature too well for it to be possible that she should accept such pictures as faithful portraits, but it is towards moral perfection that she makes her own favourite creations aspire.

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To some, perhaps to many, it may appear hardly necessary to insist upon all this. 'We have long known,' they would say, 'the moral tendency of her books, and have believed in the firmly religious convictions of the mind that produced them. Why then spend so much time in painting the lily?' Two answers may be given to this question, the first and obvious one being that what is evident to certain minds is not therefore so to all. But there is a second reason, and a weighty one. Jane Austen has now more than one public; her novels are read, appreciated and reviewed in other countries besides our own. In France they have recently been again brought forward, in a work of great ability,* by a writer who describes her as '*une romancière que l'Angleterre compte parmi ses plus parfaits artistes de lettres et que l'originalité aussi bien que le mérite de son œuvre font qualifier d'incomparable.*'

The knowledge and enthusiasm displayed by Mlle. Villard could hardly be surpassed, while the insight and talent with which her book is filled can scarcely be overpraised. As a piece of literary criticism it is so valuable and exhaustive that it will probably, for some time to come, be accepted in France as a standard work on Jane Austen and her novels. Already it may have served to increase the number of their readers in that country; and this number is likely to become larger, for at the present time, when a strong desire is felt that the bonds between ourselves and our nearest ally should be drawn closer, those formed by a mutual study of each others' literature can hardly be neglected. It is at the same time highly desirable that correct ideas concerning the writer of any English Classic should be offered to the French public, but, strange to say, this is so far from being the case in Mlle. Villard's book that those most nearly concerned in seeing that justice is done to the personal character of Jane Austen, and who are best able to speak of it from authentic and unimpeachable testimony, could hardly be excused if they failed to protest against the estimate regarding it put forth in '*La Vie*,' as being wholly unworthy of her, and entirely

* Jane Austen: sa vie et son œuvre.' Par Léonie Villard, Agrégée de l'Université, Docteur ès lettres. Lyons and Paris, 1915.

misleading in regard to a vital part of her nature—its religious aspect.

Mlle. Villard, having asserted in the first place that the Church of England was, in the 18th century, destitute of all religious fervour, which in her own words 'a disparu pour faire place à l'indifférence' (p. 325), passes from the general to the particular by assuming that the same must therefore be true of Jane Austen's writings; and that, for the characters she depicts, religion is merely 'une fait de même ordre que celui d'observer les règles de la bienséance mondaine.' In proof of this estimate of the 18th-century Church, a remark of Archbishop Secker, divorced from its context, is given, no reference being made to any evidence on the other side, furnished by English divines and above all by those who employed the natural voice of strong emotion, poetry, though of these there were a considerable number, including those who belonged to the school of religious mystics. Of one of these latter—Norris—Sir F. Palgrave writes that in 1730 his poems had passed through ten editions, 'one proof out of many,' he adds, 'how exaggerated is that criticism which describes that period as devoid of inner life and spiritual aspiration.'* It is, however, thus spoken of by Mlle. Villard, who calls it cold, formal, concerned with externals only, and destitute of any 'élan vers un au-delà.'

Having passed this judgment upon the Church to which Jane Austen belonged, the writer reaches similar conclusions regarding herself. Sermons, it is said, were wearisome to her; but a love of sermons, as St Louis told our Henry III long ago, is not an indispensable element in the religious life. Moreover, Jane Austen herself says: 'I am very fond of Sherlock's Sermons and prefer them to almost any.' It is also asserted that she took no interest in anything outside 'a series of traditional rites,' as the Services of her Church are called, and that as a writer she 'éloigne de son observation la souffrance, la tristesse et la laideur'—which proves that, as a woman, she cared nothing for the sorrows and wants of the poor. Other entire misapprehensions of Jane Austen's nature are also evident in this work; but,

* The Treasury of Sacred Song. Note CXLIX.

being concerned with points of comparatively minor importance, these need not be discussed here. The collective picture, however, portrays a narrow nature, with a heart cold towards God and unsympathetic towards man, somewhat contemptuous of the needy and ignorant, and caring little for any fellow-creatures beyond those of her immediate family circle. Easy indeed would it be to prove to the contrary, both from her own letters and from the writings of her relatives, and to show how completely such a conclusion misrepresents the attitude of her mind towards the highest questions. But all serious students of her biography may be left to discover this for themselves. They can weigh the assertions made in this work against the testimony given by those who knew her intimately, concerning her faith, her unselfishness, her humility and the 'piety which ruled her in life and supported her in death.' Above all, they will examine the records of that closing scene, when, face to face with a comparatively early death, 'neither her love of God, nor that of her fellow-creatures flagged for a moment,' and will consider whether such faith, courage and entire submission to the Divine will could have been felt by one to whom religion was merely a 'matter of externals.'

It is well to recall in this connexion that a juster and more discriminating judge, Archbishop Whately, summed up, in this 'Review' (No. XXIV, Jan., 1821) nearly a hundred years ago, his estimate of herself and her works :

'Miss Austen introduces very little of what is technically called religion into her books, yet that must be a blinded soul which does not recognise the vital essence, everywhere present in her pages, of a deep and enlightened piety.'

MARY A. AUSTEN LEIGH.

Art. 4.—THE FRENCH NOVEL.

1. *A History of the French Novel (to the close of the 19th Century)*. By George Saintsbury. Two vols. Macmillan, 1917-1919.
2. *Essays in Romantic Literature*. By George Wyndham. Edited, with an introduction, by Charles Whibley. Macmillan, 1919.

THE quality of readableness, which is the first though not the last virtue of French novels, is also a challenge to their historian to imitate them. Mr Saintsbury has not declined it, massive as his volumes are. No other Englishman would have been so at home in the whole subject, from the first phases to the last; and the survey which he has made is an extremely close one. But what he has also done conspicuously is to enliven the abstracts of forgotten novels with a play of humour which breaks out on almost every page. This is often so diverting that we hardly regret his habit of re-telling the plots of novels in great detail. His claim as a historian is to keep to the facts; and his book is a safe place in which to find them. As a critic, too, he remembers that the facts he is dealing with are always facts of art. The lines of development and distinctions of kind are indicated clearly, though not emphatically. Yet there are moments when we are tempted to wish he would abridge the facts, such as a forty-page summary of the 'Grand Cyrus,' for the sake of a wider horizon; at times his History seems like a projection into space without enough light from the life and the other arts around it.

In this dense and attractive material there is nothing which Mr Saintsbury handles more skilfully than the origins of the novel in early romance. That richness of the romantic sources, beginning with the *chansons de geste*, was what also attracted George Wyndham in his 'Essays'; but his pursuit of the romantic spirit led him on not to the novelists, but to the poets, Villon, Ronsard, and the Elizabethans; and he only returns to fiction at the end in a memorial speech, full of exquisite feeling, about Scott. What has interested Mr Saintsbury is the way in which France, as he says, grew the seed of romance and dispersed it to other countries, and

cherished and perfected that art of telling a story which is a peculiarly French gift. He does not lose sight of the romantic strain, and it finally leads him to the conclusion that even the 19th-century French novel is dominated from first to last by romanticism. This provocative idea needs perhaps more defence than he has given it. If we take George Wyndham's excellent definition of romance as 'a welcome of the strange'—and Mr Saintsbury seems to agree with it—we get a good measure for testing the special quality of Victor Hugo and Gautier, or of Flaubert in 'Salammbô'; but, if we go on to extend it to all 19th-century novelists, it must be diluted into vagueness. No doubt, any original work is strange, as casting an individual, unsuspected light. This was how Flaubert described talent; it shows us something that no one else has seen. But it is a different thing from the fantastic, emotional spell of the great Romantics; and, even though Mr Saintsbury enlarges the meaning of romance, he hardly escapes this confusion.

The volume on the 19th-century novelists was bound to expose itself to more criticism than the first. Almost every writer named is the object of lively affections or dislikes, and there is no novel of repute about which good judges have not differed. Mr Saintsbury is a writer with such clear antipathies that the general fairness of his verdicts does him all the more credit as a critic. He does, indeed, leave us under an impression that the reason why he rates 'Les Travailleurs de la Mer' so high is because he knows Guernsey and has pleasant memories of scenery and good cheer. He finds it difficult to be just to George Sand, and hardly succeeds; and his pen runs away with him when he mentions the Goncourts. But the only real disappointment in this volume is his treatment of one of the authors whom he most admires, namely Flaubert. Though he calls him the greatest of all novelists since Thackeray, he has given him only half the amount of space allotted to Maupassant, and a good deal less—Flaubert would have appreciated the irony—than is allowed to Paul de Kock. The excuse that he has written at length on Flaubert elsewhere is merely tantalising, for this book is surely the place where Flaubert's position should be vindicated.

We are sorry, too, that he has declined to deal with living novelists, since MM. Anatole France, Pierre Loti, and Paul Bourget, to mention no others, seem to belong distinctively to his period of the 19th century. But when all is said we are left with a feeling of sheer gratitude to Mr Saintsbury for these stores of knowledge and entertainment, which make his book not only a history but a dictionary of the French novel.

Few readers of French novels care to look for them farther back than the 18th century; and they may console themselves by thinking that the earlier stories are tentative excursions in which the complete novel is felt after rather than attained. There is no barrier between romance and novel; it is one and the same stream of story-telling which descends from the old *conteurs* to Mérimée and Maupassant. But, when we take down the delicately beautiful 'Aucassin et Nicolette,' or such a vivid wandering in dream-country as 'Parthenopeus de Blois,' the pleasure that we get is one of poetry and strange imagination rather than the close-woven interest of life and character which is the substance of the novel. In reading Rabelais, again, any special interest of this kind is swallowed up in the humorous expansion of his 'bel et joyeux amble.' The heroic romances of the 17th century are hardly read at all; and there is perhaps some antiquarian flavour in the appreciation of Scarron and Furetière, or even that decisive book, 'La Princesse de Clèves,' where the novel thrusts up strongly towards the light. With the 18th century the case alters. It is not only that the writers are the first of the moderns, speaking to our minds and using their own with the same freedom with which we use ours. This appeal is sometimes blurred by the waves of sentiment which come flooding in upon the age of reason. The chief reason why they hold us is that they have grasped and disengaged some of the greatest possibilities of interest in the novel. These different themes can be worked still deeper; above all, they have yet to be brought into a rich harmony of design. But they are clear enough for us to be able to judge these novels as we should judge the fiction of to-day. Our release from antiquarianism is marked by the feeling that we read them because we

want to read them, and that we need not read them unless we have the desire.

There are, of course, imperfect sympathies; some of these books have aged a little—for us, if not for all time. There is a certain apathy towards the two works which, whether judged by their fame or their dimensions, are the most considerable French novels of the 18th century. A blight has fallen on 'La Nouvelle Héloïse,' perhaps unkindly, for it is the failure of a genius who was trying something difficult and great. The 'Nouvelle Héloïse' is great in scope; not only does it bring in the note of passion, and the poetry of nature which was Rousseau's best gift to art, but it has the true intention of exhibiting Julie as a person who changes and develops throughout her life. It fails because Rousseau transmits his unconscious insincerity to his characters; they say one thing and mean another, and, much as they do say, Mme d'Epinay was clearly right when she said it was the author who is talking all the time. The other great book to which readers have grown insensitive is 'Gil Blas'; the random succession of incidents and adventures has masked its humanity. But Le Sage's novel may have a better life than Rousseau's, if only because it appeals without second thoughts to the eternal pleasure in story. The modern reader takes this pleasure more concisely, and in closer mixture with some interest or passion. Even so, he may still satisfy himself in the 18th century. There is no better proof of the indestructible French instinct for a story than the way in which it flourished through the age of reason, and permeated the philosophers themselves. We can turn from the best story of Maupassant to Diderot's 'La Religieuse' without the sense of crossing a gulf; the astonishing rapidity of narrative never falters, and not a word is wasted. Voltaire caught the same impulse and wrote 'Candide,' 'bâclé en trois jours pour l'immortalité.' The most consummate work in this kind is Prévost's 'Manon Lescaut,' which rises out of his host of failures as a masterpiece of sureness and decision, expressing for all time in Des Grieux the self-immolating passion which speaks through acts rather than words.

The French imagination, with all its instinct for the striking effect of a tale, and its grasp of social situations,

does not stop at externals. It is keenly inquisitive into the workings of the mind, especially the play of motives and the power of illusions. The high society of the 17th century had shown their taste for an analysis of this kind in their self-portraits; and La Rochefoucauld struck a deeper note in his bitter half-truths. In the novel the same strain comes out decidedly with Marivaux. The incidents scarcely matter in the most remarkable of his books; it is the exposure of a character and a mind. Marianne, as Mr Saintsbury reminds us, is the first of all coolly virtuous minxes, and therefore extremely amusing. But she gives also the impression of something more; is it the fine flower of egoism or a new sense of personality? The self is hateful, we read in Pascal; we find in Marivaux that it is of endless interest and value:—

'Cette situation ne regardoit que ma vie; et ce qui m'occupait me regardoit, moi. Vous direz que je rêve de distinguer cela; point du tout; notre vie, pour ainsi dire, nous est moins chère que nous, que nos passions. A voir quelquefois ce qui se passe dans notre instinct là-dessus, on diroit que, pour être, il n'est pas nécessaire de vivre; que ce n'est que par accident que nous vivons, mais que c'est naturellement que nous sommes.'

If this seems a super-subtlety of Marianne's, all will appreciate her meaning when she says that to admire a person for his virtues rather than himself is to grant the superfluous and refuse the necessary.

The lens of analysis and the perfected art of the story were only the first conquests of the French novel. It was left for Balzac, working on ground that had been reconnoitred but not explored, to claim every corner and detail of ordinary life as matter for fiction. Two poets, Hugo and Gautier, brought their passion for beauty into the novel, and revealed the human affinities for what was vast and strange. Flaubert and Mérimée found a more precise beauty through clear vision and plastic style; they saw the artistic shapes which life could take and reproduced them. In face of these achievements, which are only some of the most obvious, it seems ungrateful to question the variety of French novels. But a lack of diversity and substance is the reproach

that has been brought against them; and, if we want to measure their scope, so far as such a thing is possible, it may be well to consider the objection frankly. There is an impression that French novelists, though pre-eminent in form, do not range so widely as the English or pierce so deeply as the Russian. The very scruple for clearness may have limited their choice of subjects. They have seemed, to some critical eyes, to pursue one line of interest while excluding others, to repeat unreal conventions, and to represent typical rather than individual figures.

No doubt there is a bent in French art towards economy. To cut away all superfluous tissue that crowds and stifles the real intention is a feature of good art anywhere; but the French have a tendency to fine down the subject as well as to disengage it. It was Racine who confessed that an extremely simple matter allured him, and said that all invention lay in making something out of nothing. Flaubert says that the most beautiful works are those which have least substance. His darling wish was to write a book about nothing, which would exist simply by its power of style. This capacity for doing great things with little is the same national gift which makes the French fine artists in such practical matters as cookery, millinery, and market-gardening. There is an interest in seeing what becomes of this instinct when it is applied to fiction, for the novel, of all forms of art, seems to be that which most depends upon material. If Henry James was right in calling it the most independent, most elastic, and most prodigious of literary forms, not only is there no finality of type in fiction, but the value of each experiment depends on the richness of the idea conveyed. The best method can only be a means towards exhibiting some fresh interest of life or character.

Whenever it is suggested that French novelists are too thrifty, the irresistibly tempting answer is to give the case of Balzac. He is the writer who, by general admission, attempted a bigger task than any other novelist. Judged simply by quantity, the list of Dumas' novels or George Sand's is more imposing. But it was Balzac who undertook to draw all the doings of man in society, all the effects of character and passion, and

every way of life in public or private. 'Man, society, and humanity will be described, judged, and analysed without repetition in a work which will be, as it were, the Thousand and One Nights of the West.' This was the programme of the *Comédie Humaine*, which Balzac never completed, for it was indeed beyond completion; and he may appear rather mad for having conceived the idea. But his sincerity must be tested by what he gave. He gives the illusion of the most perfectly real world that is to be found in fiction. In spite of all emphasis and exaggerations we cannot question this reality. His world is indeed so complex that we have to make the same kind of effort to follow its ramifications as we do in order to learn the details of the real world we live in; and this is why Balzac is not an author to be read at any moment. But for the same reason he can provide us, when we need it, with an alternative existence; not in a world of humour, like Dickens's, or a romantic world, like Scott's, but one so true and substantial that we can walk about there with a certainty of finding doors to knock at and real people passing their lives inside.

There may be a sameness in his great monomaniacs, like Goriot and Hulot, and in the perpetual *question d'argent* which fills nearly as large a place in his novels as in his life. But not only can he vary the rhythm of life when he passes from the tense intrigues of Paris to the brooding ambitions and buried existences of the *vie de province*, but the scenes and characters exchange their monstrous proportions for such fine and accurate painting as we find in 'La Vieille Fille.' The last proof of his versatility is that he could have his successes, materialist as he was in grain, when he entered the supernatural regions of 'La Peau de Chagrin' and 'Séraphita.' His antitype, George Sand, also knows the magic of variety. Her fluency carries along, and half conceals, not merely distinct changes of manner, but an astonishing quantity of topics and ideas; any candid reader will notice the differences between 'Indiana,' 'Consuelo,' 'La Petite Fadette,' and 'Valvèdre.' Flaubert took so long a stride from his *romans de mœurs* to 'Salammbô' and the 'Tentation' that critics have had to suggest a miracle of dualism to account for it. Zola only too obviously ransacked the contemporary world for subjects. Then the

historical novels ought not to be forgotten, though we are apt to forget their diverse entertainment except in the act of enjoying Dumas or Hugo.

Among these lavish inventors we can hardly complain of being stinted. Yet the instinct for order and economy is strong in Balzac, enraptured though he is with his subjects. He simplifies characters and plots; he could sacrifice the highly interesting conflict in Rastignac's mind to the exhibition of Goriot's ruling passion, and avoid all side-issues in 'Eugénie Grandet' or 'César Birotteau' to write narratives of classical simplicity. Flaubert, despite his desire for an art without matter, does not need to be thrifty; he gives all interests their due and keeps them in their place by sheer intelligence. The Romantics, on the other hand, stretched the elasticity of the novel to its extreme point; they took a malicious pleasure in ignoring limits and traditions. George Sand owned frankly to her absence of plan, and said there was matter for three or four good novels in 'Consuelo'; the pity is that she did not leave out those nightmare hours in the Bohemian castle. Hugo was the chief iconoclast. It was an original stroke to make the cathedral into the central figure of 'Notre-Dame de Paris,' though it failed because Hugo never dissolved the artifice into atmosphere; we need only contrast the rôle of Notre Dame with that of Egdon heath in 'The Return of the Native' to see the difference between a conscious suggestion and a living impression. In 'Les Misérables' he touched the limits of profusion. It has, indeed, more unity of idea than the only other novel which can be compared with it for scope, Tolstoy's 'War and Peace'; but it is broken up, as Tolstoy's novel is not, by the constant intrusion of the author and irrelevancies of every sort. There come moments when we can no longer bear these disquisitions on slang, or convents, or revolutions; when the colouring of the chief figures is seen to be crude, and Valjean's prodigies in the sewers fail to thrill us because he has performed so many others. But the spirit of poetry is strong in the book. Hugo poured into it so much life and imagination that we read it with excitement for the end of the story, and return to pick up the casual treasures which he has dropped by the way.

The scope of the French novel has been anything but narrow. It has adventured among all kinds of subjects and interests; to read its history is to wonder whether any other novelists have covered more. If any image of sameness or monotony is called up by the words 'French novels,' it is not because they have ignored large tracts of life, but because they tend to repeat conventional situations. The most familiar of these situations is that one of wife, husband and lover which Mr Saintsbury refers to as 'the triangle.' It is fair to say that the absolute predominance of this situation is a good deal more common in second-rate or third-rate French novels than among the greatest. It is also a theme whose importance has varied with time. Still, it occurs so constantly that we have to take account of it, and of its influence on the art of the novel. To say that French novels begin with marriage, while English novels end with it, would be untrue in the letter; but it marks the contrast of emphasis. Our own novels have their convention just as much as the French. It is not necessary to weigh the morality of the two conventions, or to enquire how far the French *motif* results from a plan of marriage by family compact. We need not even ask whether this situation is an accurate mirror of what happens. The point to consider is its influence on the novelist's way of treating life, and on his power to interest us by presenting real character.

Convention for convention, the difficulties of the married may seem to give more scope for character than the aspirations of the *ingénu*. But then the demands of the situation have to be reckoned with. As generally treated in French novels they are imperious; and the characters have to conform to them. The predicament becomes more important than the persons, who lose something of humanity. The influence of the drama on the novel can certainly be traced here, as is only natural in France, where the theatre is so potent that sooner or later almost every man of letters is tempted to write for it. But the allurements of the 'triangle' is best seen by the way in which the stories cling to it; the romance and interest of the situation seem to lie for the lovers precisely in its hidden, ambiguous nature; comparatively seldom do they break away and openly accept the

consequences. This is why a novel like M. Anatole France's '*Le Lys Rouge*,' in spite of its pictorial power and vivacity, fails to give the full measure of two such interesting characters as Thérèse and Dechartre. The criticism implied on marriage is interesting as coming from a highly sociable people like the French; but the effect on art of this mingled defiance and convention is not entirely an advantage.

The thirst for irregular situations leads to a discord which is fertile in dramatic effects, but which possibly lessens the truth and fulness of the picture. Suppose we take, for instance, as the most famous French heroines, this 'set of six'—Manon, Julie, Corinne, Consuelo, Eugénie Grandet, and Emma Bovary. Of these Manon is frankly an outlaw, and Emma is secretly on the same road; Julie's position always has something ambiguous. Corinne and Consuelo are artists who deal freely with society; Eugénie is the only one who meets the demands of a perfectly definite position. Against the French heroines let us put these six from English novels—the list, of course, may be varied at pleasure, though probably without changing the impression—Diana Vernon, Elizabeth Bennet, Ethel Newcome, Jane Eyre, Maggie Tulliver, and Diana of the Crossways. Meredith's Diana has affinities with Corinne and Consuelo; Diana Vernon and Jane Eyre are children of romance; but surely all of them are more in the mid-stream of life than the French women, and therefore tested at more points and more obliged to show what is in their character. In fairness we ought to put in on the English side Becky Sharp, that great disintegrator; but, though Becky is an enemy of society, there is nothing more remarkable about her than the way she keeps in with it.

Our general impression is that French heroines, though as finely drawn as the English, are exhibited in more isolation, and to this extent may seem to lack substance. French fiction teems with elaborate portraits of women, but it is not always the tragical protagonists who are the most firmly realised. There is often more vividness in the quiet characters outside passion, or in those whose individuality is strong enough not to be submerged by it. It is Maupassant, of all unexpected authors, who has worked out two of the most interesting

feminine variations; his Michèle de Burne in 'Notre Cœur' is a wonderfully acute study of a modern woman, and his Yvette is a still more attractive portrait of a girl, in a predicament not unlike that of Henry James's Maisie.

So large a place is claimed by passion in French novels that a reader may be rather surprised to find Mr Saintsbury coupling Gautier's 'La Morte Amoureuse' with 'La Nouvelle Héloïse' and 'Manon Lescaut' as one of the very few expressions in French prose of really passionate love. But, if passionate love involves the highest qualities of imagination as well as the sheer impetus of feeling, he is probably right in noticing that it is rare. French writers have devoted an extraordinary amount of scrutiny to the attractions and cross-currents of the sexes. Stendhal, a theorist on the matter as well as a novelist, analyses minutely the various kinds of love. This habit of analysis has made the French unequalled in detecting how an emotion grows and fluctuates, and none can suggest more powerfully the irresistible rush of a passion which sweeps barriers away. Colour and radiance, however, are perhaps less common in these pictures than force. Stendhal makes Mathilde's feeling for Julien in 'Le Rouge et le Noir' begin as an *amour d'imagination*; but, as the author says himself, "l'amour passionné était encore plutôt un modèle qu'on imitait qu'une réalité." Hugo's 'Idyll of the Rue Plumet' is in a higher, simpler mood; the dawning love of Marius and Cosette is as true, as ardent, and as brilliant with fancy as the passion of Richard Feverel and Lucy. But then Hugo, like Gautier, was a poet, and a poet of great imaginative scope. It is just the poetic quality, the magic which colours and transfigures, that is needed to complete so many of these studies of passionate love.

The heroes of French novels are as subject as the heroines to the *besoin d'aimer*, but they are also, as a rule, more interesting when they are not entirely absorbed by it. Des Grieux is an exception to this; he does express himself simply and solely through his love for Manon, but this is brought to such a rare pitch of intensity that he is vividly alive. Lucien de Rubempré and Adolphe are not more living, though they are seen

in greater detail and relief. The mightier figures in Balzac and Hugo tend, like the lovers, to become impersonations of one dominant quality or passion, so much so that a French critic has described Balzac's as 'theorems in motion.' Valjean and Javert, and still more Goriot or Grandet, certainly make themselves physically present; their dress, their manner, and the way in which they age are clear; but it is the mastering emotion which grips us, rather than the men. For characters which are personal at all points, entirely individualised and yet full of universal truth, we must go to the masters of exact vision, and above all to Stendhal and Flaubert.

The Julien Sorel of Stendhal is perhaps the most completely realised study of a man in French fiction, as Emma Bovary is the most poignant study of a woman; both portraits are relentless, but they arouse the sympathy which their creators intend but do not express. The peculiarity of Stendhal's picture is that it is at every turn an analysis of mental states, and he affects the coolest detachment while he is exhibiting his hero. Yet under the surface is so much creative fire that Julien, instead of being a dry mechanism, is magically human. A Rastignac without the hesitations, the 'shreds of virtue,' he wins and keeps our sympathy by the desperateness of his case; society has condemned him to this tragedy of sacrificing one charm and quality after another in a Napoleonic battle with the world. In contrast with Stendhal, Flaubert chose, as ever, the most difficult line when he took two such fluid, irresponsible beings as Emma Bovary and Frédéric Moreau for his chief personages. If they yield in his hands the whole tragedy of waste and weakness, it is because he sees them, not as personified failings, but as real persons. In 'L'Education Sentimentale' the impression is deliberately subdued to greyness; in 'Madame Bovary' it is thrown into sharp relief by contrast with the ever-complacent Homais and the appealingly stupid and sincere Charles Bovary.

The kind of individuality which is whimsical or humorous rather than complete has much less interest for French novelists. A few characters in Balzac, rather caricatured; Flaubert's Homais; some vivid sketches in Maupassant and several in Alphonse Daudet might

almost sum up their excursions into fanciful character. Daudet's *Tartarin* is exuberantly great; but his relative isolation suggests that the sense of humour does not get really free play in French novels. We find them as inferior to English novels in this humanising faculty as they are superior to ours in irony and wit. Perhaps it is the one secret which they have failed to learn from Rabelais. Maupassant, certainly, had the gift from nature, though it was mixed unkindly with other thwarting elements. It was the note he struck in 'Boule de Suif,' his first masterpiece; it revels uproariously through 'Bel-Ami,' and tempers the biting taste of a story like 'La Ficelle.' But in almost all French novels there is something which reminds us of Bergson's idea that laughter begins as a social chastisement. From Voltaire to Anatole France they have supplied us with a brilliantly ironic commentary on man's proceedings, but they have been too keenly critical of his absurdities to accept them with sheer joy.

Yet it is to this critical attitude, combined with their deep interest in men and women, that we owe their subtle explorations of the heart and mind. Inheriting the fine tools of analysis from La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyère, they have adapted and improved them. Through constant interest in this theme they too have become moralists in the French sense of the word; not preachers or philosophers, but observers of the ways in which people behave towards one another, and of their secret mental agitations. Sometimes, as in M. Paul Bourget's case, the artist may seem to be swallowed up by the zeal of the investigator; yet here, too, as a rule French novelists are guided by their innate feeling for measure. This zest for mental and moral analysis has survived the efforts of Zola and his followers to simplify or debase it. But it has not escaped the temptation to dwell on pathological cases; and one may wonder if dissection can be so pursued without arriving at a discouragement which chills the creative power.

Graceful and amiable as so many French novels have been, from George Sand onwards to M. René Boylesve, the undertone of disillusion may be caught fairly often. There is an ashy taste in Stendhal, as Mr Saintsbury observes, though it does not prevent us from reading

his two great novels with delight. Mérimée, a born *conteur*, subdued his chagrin to an agreeable tartness in his stories, and let it consume his own life instead. Flaubert controlled the mood by his faith that there was an ideal beauty in the real. Maupassant, great artist though he was, could not control it. Towards the end of the 19th century it is no longer one or two minds, but a whole generation, which seems stricken with disenchantment. When France was still benumbed by a great national disaster, and the Naturalist school were reducing life and action to physiological terms, there was some excuse for depression. For that generation there seemed to be no refuge except the indulgence of fine perceptions, or the easy superiority of dilettantism. Many currents of disillusion meet in the exquisite impressionism and incurable sadness with which M. Pierre Loti has seen the fair regions of the earth. There is an obvious strain of dilettantism in the earlier work of M. Anatole France; but he could shake off this to do battle for a cause, and he has risen beyond it to be the sage and ironist of his time, humane and yet malicious, as bitter on occasions as Voltaire, but with rather more humour and compassion than Voltaire possessed.

But this is not the last word of the French novel, for the attitude of the new generation is not the attitude of Anatole France. Indeed, it was by express reaction from him that the most original of the young novelists, the late Charles-Louis Philippe, defined his position. The age of urbane and cultured art, he thought, was over. 'Maintenant il faut des barbares.' This is more than an outcry against intellectual elegance, though Philippe wrote with deliberate naïveté as a man of the people. It means that the freshness of experience is preferred to a cool comment on it; the new writers would exchange the analysis of motives for a sounding of consciousness from within. Dostoevsky's name has been invoked in the quest, and with reason, for its object is to reach a deeper intuition through sympathy. M. Maurice Barrès foreshadowed the change by passing from brilliant studies in egoistic psychology to the discovery of those primal ties of fellowship which are bound up for him with *la terre et les morts*. Outside the novel, the work of Péguy and M. Claudel appeals

directly to the life of the spirit; and a similar movement among French thinkers has been equally clear.

The novel can scarcely lose by this impulse, which seems too general to be shut up in mystical formulas or sterilised by political nationalism. The special gifts which have marked French novelists show no signs of disappearing. Nothing is likely to rob them of their instinct for a story, or of the art of easy communication, the care for method in which they are so plainly our superiors, and the brilliance of style which has distinguished author after author from George Sand to M. Barrès. Their general outlook can change only as the French mind changes. On the whole it has been more psychological than philosophic. French novelists have preferred to paint and analyse people as social beings rather than as individuals face to face with destiny; they seldom raise those final questions which English and Russian novelists, even when they do not expressly ask them, constantly suggest. But the new tendency we have mentioned seems to open a fresh range of feeling here; and fiction offers endless chances of testing it to the successors of Marivaux and Stendhal.

ARTHUR McDOWALL.

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Art. 5.—A SERBIAN ANGLOPHIL, DOSITHEUS OBRA-
DOVIĆ.

1. *Serbia of the Serbians*. By C. Mijatovich. London, 1915.
2. *Dosithej Obradovic i ego literaturnaja dejatelnost*. By K. Th. Radchenko. Kieff, 1897.
3. *Dositheus Obradovic's Klosterjahre*. By T. Ostojić. Archiv für slav. Philologie, XXX, 1908.
4. *Srpska Knjizevnost u XVIII veku*. By J. Skerlić. Belgrade, 1909.
5. *La renaissance intellectuelle de la nation serbe*. Vol. II. *Dosithee Obradovich*. By Louis Léger. Journal des Savants, No. 10 (October 1911).
6. *Prilozi K. bavljenju Dositeja Obradovića u Engleskoj*. By V. Milićević. Sarajevo, 1911.
7. *Dela Dositeja Obradovića*. Belgrade, 1911.

LITERARY links between England and Serbia are not rare. Many English poets, novelists and other writers have been translated into Serbian; and some of these have exercised a notable influence upon the literature of Serbia, and on that of the Jugoslavs in general. As I have no intention of giving an exhaustive bibliography of Anglo-Serbian literature, I will merely mention a few examples. Twenty-two of Shakespeare's plays have been translated into Serbian; and many a Serbian dramatist has modelled his plays on those of the great English poet.* Milton's 'Paradise Lost' was translated long ago, and, moreover, furnished our greatest poet, Niegos, with the inspiration for one of his finest poems. Butler's 'Hudibras' was a favourite book of J. S. Popović, one of our best humorous writers, just as Pope's 'Essay on Man' was dear to our lyric poet Mušicki. 'The Pilgrim's Progress,' 'Robinson Crusoe,' 'Gulliver's Travels,' 'The Sentimental Journey' and 'The Vicar of Wakefield' have all been translated into Serbian. 'Tristram Shandy' and 'The Vicar of Wakefield,' 'Tom Jones' and 'Clarissa Harlowe,' were held up as models to our authors by a Serbian critic in 1818, and 'Pamela' even earlier, in

* See I. Gollancz, 'A Book of Homage to Shakespeare,' Oxford, 1916, pp. 524-527; P. Popović, 'Shakespeare in Serbia.'

1783. Gray's 'Elegy written in a Country Churchyard' was translated in 1843. Addison's 'Spectator' and Johnson's 'Rambler' were not unknown to our 18th-century writers. Sir Walter Scott exercised a decisive influence upon J. Jurčić, a Slovene, the author of several historical novels. In 1862 we find Southey quoted, in English, in a Slovene short story. Burns, Shelley and Moore are somewhat fragmentarily represented in our literature, but Lord Byron is very popular. Many of his poems have been translated, among them 'Childe Harold,' 'The Giaour,' 'The Bride of Abydos,' 'Parisina,' 'The Prisoner of Chillon,' 'Manfred,' 'Mazeppa' and 'Don Juan.' He also inspired one of our best Serbian poets, Radićević, who modelled one of his poems, 'Stojan,' on 'Lara,' and another on 'Don Juan.' Lord Lytton's 'Last Days of Pompeii' has delighted many young generations of Serbians. Tennyson's 'Enoch Arden' has been translated, as have some of the shorter poems of Swinburne and D. G. Rossetti. Other important translations are those of Dickens' 'David Copperfield,' 'Oliver Twist,' 'The Pickwick Papers,' 'A Christmas Carol,' etc. George Eliot's 'Mill on the Floss' and 'Brother Jacob' are also translated.

Carlyle's 'Heroes' and Macaulay's 'Essays' have not been overlooked. Buckle's 'History of Civilisation in England' was a great favourite with our scholars, and has been twice translated. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences' was translated long ago. For many years Prof. Nedić based his course of University lectures upon John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' just as Svetozar Marković based his work on Mill's 'Political Economy.' Mill's essays on 'Liberty' and the 'Subjection of Woman' have also been translated, the former by King Peter himself. Gladstone, as is only natural, is very popular with the Serbs. Slobodan Jovanović has given us an excellent essay on Lord Morley, and another on Mr Arthur Balfour. Charles Darwin attracted the attention of our translators so far back as 1869. His 'Origin of Species' was translated by Radovanović, a very gifted young student of natural science; and a translation of the 'Descent of Man' was ready just before the outbreak of the recent war. John Tyndall and Sir John Lubbock are held in great esteem by our authorities on

natural science. Some of their books and essays, 'Faraday as a Discoverer,' 'The Pleasures of Life,' etc., were translated long ago; the same applies to some of Huxley's essays. Macmillan's 'Series of Scientific Primers' was a great delight in my young days; and the names of Sir H. E. Roscoe, Balfour Stewart, Sir Archibald Geikie, Sir M. Foster, Sir Norman Lockyer and Sir J. D. Hooker, became quite familiar to Serbian boys.

But of all Anglo-Serbian literary links, one of the most interesting is that represented by the Serbian 18th-century writer, Dositheus Obradović, who familiarised the Serbian reading public with the ideas and works of Addison and Dr Johnson, and whose name is known and held in honour by every Serbian. He is our foremost moral philosopher, and one of our greatest social reformers. He ranks among our best stylists; he created our modern literary language. His attachment to England, his visit to London in 1784-'5, and the influence of English literature upon his work, are special reasons, in addition to his importance as a man of letters and a leading figure in the Serbian renaissance, why we should give some account of him here.

Obradović was born in 1742 of poor parents, in a village near Temesvar in the Banat, that part of South Hungary which is inhabited by Serbs. His parents died soon after his birth; and he began life as an apprentice in his native village. But his passion for books was so strong that he spent all his spare time in reading as soon as the day's work in the shop was over. He was a great reader, and that by nature. But he was placed in somewhat exceptional circumstances. As his parents were dead, and there was no one to take their place, his future depended entirely upon his own ideas of life. In some of these ideas Obradović was right, in others wrong. He was right in his craving for books and learning. But, as his reading was in the main restricted to lives of the saints and accounts of the miracles they performed, he became so wrapped up in this kind of literature that he thought quite seriously of taking up his abode in a desert, of becoming a saint, and eventually working miracles himself. Once he actually tried to run away, with the intention of seeking a suitable desert in Turkey;

but he was prevented by one of his friends. His desire for the saintly life was so strong, however, that he made a second attempt, and this time he succeeded.

At the age of fifteen, he was sure that he had found the ideal spot for his life of seraphic piety in the monastery of Hopovo, sixty miles from the town of Temesvar. A fellow-apprentice in the shop where he worked, a lad named Nicholas, joined Obradović in his great adventure. The two boys counted up their money. Three grossi (sixpence) was all the capital Obradović possessed. As for Nicholas, his contribution to the enterprise consisted only in his goodwill. He said: 'Three grossi' worth of bread is enough for two days' journey.' As a matter of fact, they were four days on the way, and of course on foot. This was quite a natural mode of travel in those days for young Serbians travelling in search of learning. Our great historian Rajić travelled on foot all the way from South Hungary to Kieff in Russia, a distance of some 800 miles. In the same way, young Obradović set out from Temesvar one morning with his friend Nicholas, taking the road along the river Begej, until they reached the monastery of Hopovo, towards the end of July 1757.

In the monastery, Obradović very soon took orders. He was very happy now. No more work in the shop; he was free to devote the whole of his time to reading; and, as the library was full of sacred books, he found himself in the very surroundings he required. His passion for the lives of the saints and his desire to become a saint himself reached their climax at this time of his life. But presently they began to decline. The aspiration to the saint's halo was in itself so preposterous that Obradović very soon dismissed it from his mind. The beautiful and pleasant surroundings of the monastery of Hopovo were very different indeed from the deserts for which Obradović had yearned. The monks who lived at Hopovo were anything but saints; and only a boy with a very exalted imagination could have been so blind as to see his ideal in these unworthy creatures. The most important discovery, however, made by Obradović about himself was that his desire for learning was greater than his craving for the vocation of a saint. Such ambitions, he now realised, had

only been a passing fancy. He must away from Hopovo, out into the world, where great libraries and good schools are to be found! It was thither that his true vocation was calling him; and it would be mere waste of time for him to remain any longer in the monastery.

So, after having spent more than three years at Hopovo, Obradović threw off the cowl. On Nov. 2, 1760, he escaped from the monastery and went to Zagreb (Agram). Thence he planned to go further afield. But whither? To Russia, to the great Slav country, whither several of his young countrymen had already gone to pursue their studies? Or to Vienna, where the schools and libraries were perhaps better suited to his own particular needs? Some one advised him to go first to some place where he might possibly find a post as schoolmaster—to Dalmatia, for instance—and so have a chance of saving money for his further studies. Obradović acted upon this advice and went to North Dalmatia in the spring of 1761.

In Dalmatia he met with a very cordial welcome. Some Serbian priests from the districts of Knin offered him a post as schoolmaster in one of the villages in that neighbourhood. Obradović accepted the offer and remained, greatly to their satisfaction and profit, and his own. His life in this Dalmatian village was a perfect idyll. He was greatly beloved by the good folk of the village; and it was a serene, comfortable and kindly atmosphere in which he lived, like that which surrounded the 'Vicar of Wakefield.' From Dalmatia it is not far to Montenegro; from Montenegro it is no distance to Albania, even to Greece, Constantinople, and Asia Minor; so, stage by stage, and always earning his daily bread as a private tutor, Obradović visited all these lands, especially Greece, which was the most prosperous among them. Thus ten years—from 1761 to 1771—passed away since he set out upon his travels.

Obradović made great strides during this period. To begin with, he learnt Italian and acquired a pretty thorough knowledge of Greek, both ancient and modern. He also made studies in theology, history, moral philosophy and literature, in so far as he found the necessary material in the then newly-born modern Greek literature, in Italian popular books and in old

Serbian MSS. Another advantage was, that by travelling so much in Serbian and other Jugoslav lands, he acquired a direct local knowledge of almost all parts of our nation. This circumstance stood him in excellent stead in later years, because it enabled him to know exactly the public he was addressing when he began to write. A third result of these ten years of travel was that Obradović himself became a writer.

This came about in a very simple manner. It was not a publisher's offer, nor anything of that kind, that stimulated him to write. He did it solely at the request of a young girl. The daughter of the Serbian priest in that idyllic village—and could you imagine that the Serbian Vicar of Wakefield had no daughter?—asked him to write something for her, anything he liked, in the Serbian vernacular. At that time he was reading some of the sermons of St John Chrysostom; so he made a selection of some of his favourite aphorisms in the works of this Father of the Church, translated them and put them into alphabetical order. Thus he prepared an anthology of some fifty pages for his charming young reader. She was delighted with it, and so were others to whom she showed the manuscript. It was quickly copied and disseminated throughout Dalmatia, where it became widely known and popular under the name of 'Obradović's Anthology.' This gave Obradović the first encouragement to embrace the career of a literary man and author. 'That was the first stimulus,' he says, 'which kindled this great desire in me. May God grant me life to write and publish Serbian books for the use of the gentle daughters and sons of my people'!

Thus Obradović reaped some good results from his sojourn in the East. But his fund of knowledge was still very limited. He had not yet visited Western Europe. At last, in 1771, he travelled to Vienna, where he remained for several years, and then to Italy and Germany, so that he spent some thirteen years in all in those countries. He earned his living, as before, by giving private lessons in Greek and Italian. Meantime, he added to his own store of languages; he learnt German, French and Latin, and began to study literature, history and philosophy systematically. Then he enriched his knowledge of the Greek classics. We

may suppose that he already knew *Æsop* and perhaps *Plutarch*; but now he added *Homer*, *Aristophanes*, *Plato*, *Theophrastus* and many others to the list. He also acquainted himself with the Latin classics, as may be seen from numerous quotations from *Horace*, *Virgil*, *Livy*, *Pliny* and others in his books. He read the works of German contemporary writers—*Lessing*, *Wieland*, *Frederick the Great*, *Kotzebue* and others. But he had a special preference for French authors. For *Fénelon* he had unlimited admiration; he translated several of *La Fontaine's* fables and *Marmontel's* tales, and often quoted, or referred to, *Montaigne*, *Molière*, *Le Sage*, *La Bruyère* and *Rousseau*. He also turned his attention to Italian prose; and both *F. Soave* and *G. Gozzi* are represented in his translations. It was during this period of his life that *Obradović* began to publish his works. In 1783 his 'Autobiography' (Part 1) appeared; then, in 1784, his 'Commonsense Philosophy' and 'A Church Homily' (translation), the books by which our modern Serbian literature was created.

Obradović was now forty-two years of age. God had answered many of his prayers, as we have seen, but there were yet many ardent desires, for the fulfilment of which he prayed devoutly. One of these was that he might be permitted to visit England. Great was his joy when he received the offer of a post as private tutor in a small town for a year, at the end of which he would be afforded an opportunity of visiting England. 'I was so glad to hear this,' he says, 'that I would have promised to serve not only one year, but as many as *Jacob* of old served for fair *Rachel*.' The plan, as a matter of fact, failed; but *Obradović* never lost sight of his intention to visit England. He quite made up his mind that he must see *London*, and *Paris* by the way; and he says: 'Constantly to hear and to read about these capitals of great nations, every day to hold in my hand books by English and French authors, and never to see their countries or their peoples, would be for me the same as having to live in permanent darkness.' So *Obradović*, having saved a little money, started for England.

'In the early twilight of a Monday in December'—to quote the words of the excellent novelist and essayist

Milićević, from his essay on Obradović—‘one might have seen a large mail-coach approaching London through a grey drizzling haze and heard the strange echo of its clatter through the slumbering valleys and hills. On the top of the mail-coach two young fellows in good spirits were sitting close together, muffled up in warm travelling rugs. They chatted away and laughed softly every now and again at the memory of some merry moments they had spent in Paris, and their laughter was lost in the ringing noise of sixteen horses’ hoofs as they made the mud and sparks fly, and in the constant whistling of the coachman’s long whip.’

One of these two passengers was a man of about forty-two, with a wide forehead, long-haired but clean-shaven; the other was a younger man, dressed in black and wearing the shovel-hat of a priest. They were Obradović and a young Irish priest who was returning home after finishing his theological studies in Paris. This was on Dec. 13, 1784, the very day when Dr Johnson died at his house in Bolt Court, Fleet Street.

But Obradović was not absorbed in merely frivolous memories. This coming to London seemed to him to represent the very summit of his life, the culminating point of his arduous and toilsome career. At that moment he recalled the modest beginnings of his fortunes, and he felt proud of his present condition.

‘Doubtless,’ he says, describing this moment in his ‘Autobiography’ (Part II), ‘my mother brought me into this world in a propitious moment. Where am I now? Who am I? Am I indeed the same who, so many years ago, travelled on foot in company with my friend Nicholas, from the Banat to Hopovo along the River Begej? And now, behold me sitting on the top of this mail-coach like a Roman Dictator, entering as if in triumph after victory, a city more famous and more beautiful than ever was Rome!’

This visit to London, which extended over six months—from December 1784 until June 1785—is described by Obradović in his ‘Autobiography’ in an interesting chapter translated in Mr Mijatović’s book. Obradović lodged somewhere at the back of St Paul’s. Blessed time, when one took lodgings in the City! But of course that was in the days when Chelsea, Kensington and Camberwell were pleasant country villages, and green fields

covered the site of Waterloo Station. Obradović says that next door to him lived a merchant named Jackson. We know to-day that this said merchant, John Jackson, lived at No. 31, Clement's Lane, Lombard Street. Later on, Obradović moved to the East End. Describing his migration, he says: 'My friend and I walked past the Tower, and then we walked on and on, God knows whither, until in the end we reached the part of London called Hermitage, and arrived at a house called China Hall; our walk lasted more than a full hour.'

The 'Hermitage' mentioned by Obradović was indeed a peculiar part of London now merged in Wapping; it lies directly east of St Katherine's Hospital, which in 1825 made way for the docks. The name is preserved in 'Great Hermitage Street' and 'Hermitage Basin.' This quarter was probably at one time more fashionable than it is now. At all events, Lieut. Tom Bowling, the well-known character in Smollett's 'Roderick Random,' lived 'at the Sign of the Union Flag, near Hermitage.' As for China Hall, this old and once much-frequented place of entertainment was known to Pepys; and there is a modern description of it in Sir Walter Besant's classical work on London. It stood opposite the Hermitage, across the Thames, in Rotherhithe, at the junction of the Hawkstone and Deptford Lower Roads. To-day it has disappeared. Rotherhithe was then a mere village, numbering about 1500 houses, with a new church, which was just then being completed. Obradović lived in the immediate neighbourhood of China House, the residence of John Levie, who was a porcelain merchant; hence the name of his house, which Obradović seems to have confused with China Hall.

Our Serbian scholar began to study English upon his arrival in London. He had not done so before. He had read English authors, but only in French translations. He had mixed with English people in Chios—and indeed he could scarcely have travelled so much in the Near East without meeting a few—but he had no opportunity of learning the language. Now he found a certain Mr Layard, recommended to him by an Irish friend, who gave him 'English lessons and full board besides, for three guineas a month.' As he already spoke both French and German, Obradović expected to find no

difficulty in learning English. He was used to learning languages; he had a special gift for them, and also the necessary perseverance. He was told that the pronunciation was exceedingly difficult, but that did not daunt his courage. 'I will surely master the pronunciation,' he says, 'even if it be a seventy-headed Hydra!'

Poor Obradović! he had no idea how many difficulties beset the pronunciation of this otherwise easy, rich and flexible language! We foreigners have cause to know it; and the English are to be congratulated on being so fortunate as to be born English, and thus to know English as their mother-tongue. Obradović was not slow to discover this. 'When I was first taught the pronunciation,' he says, 'it fairly gave me the gooseflesh and made my hair stand on end.' But in the end he made considerable progress, and within six months he knew enough to read and to translate, and even to speak a little and to understand what was said. His teacher, Mr Layard, was only anxious to help his Serbian pupil, and so was the whole family. 'My teacher's old mother,' says Obradović, 'his wife, sister, brother, sister-in-law—all of them were my dear and kind teachers, and I heartily pray God may grant them long and prosperous lives!'

But Mr Layard and his family were not the only kind friends Obradović found in London. There were a Mr and Mrs John Levie, who were his first friends and neighbours in the East End and are likewise remembered with deep gratitude by him. Some of his friends, moreover, were men of letters and learning. The wine-merchant already referred to, John Jackson, is also known as an author. Just about the time when Obradović stayed in London, some Roman antiquities with inscriptions were discovered in the immediate neighbourhood of Jackson's house, in Lombard Street and Birchin Lane; and Jackson published a monograph upon these excavations in 1786. He subsequently travelled in the East, and his 'Journey from India towards Europe' was published in 1799. On that occasion, Jackson travelled through Bulgaria and Roumania. He mentions that he 'wished much to come through Serbia and Belgrade,' but was unable to manage it. But he saw Temesvar in the Banat, the place where Obradović had served as an apprentice, and doubtless remembered his Serbian friend

at least at this stage of his journey. The British Museum contains to this day a very interesting relic of Obradović's connexion with his English friend. I mentioned that Obradović had published three books of his own before he came to England. Copies of all three, in their first editions, are to be found in the British Museum—doubtless the very copies which Obradović himself brought to London. One of them bears the following dedication: 'This book is presented to the British Museum by Dositheus Obradović, the author, as the first book ever printed in the Serbian dialect. Signed: John Jackson, Clement's Lane, Lombard Street, 1st of March, 1785.'

Another author whom Obradović met in London was Saviour Lusignan, a Greek of Cyprus who had 'lived in London for many years.' He was a descendant—or pretended to be—'of the ancient family of Lusignan which at one time reigned in that island.' He was a scholar and the author of several books. His most interesting work is a book of travels in the East, which was published under the pseudonym of S. L. Kosmopolitis in 1788 with the title of 'A Series of Letters addressed to Sir William Fordyce.'*

Sir William Fordyce was the third and most distinguished among Obradović's friends.† The Fordyces belonged to the well-known Aberdonian family. Old George Fordyce was a rich merchant and at one time Lord Provost of Aberdeen. He had a family of twenty, several of whom attained distinction in after life. Here I am not alluding to Alexander, the youngest, who achieved a melancholy celebrity by his unfortunate speculations as a banker. David was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen. James was a very popular preacher, much admired for his eloquence in the pulpit. Sir William, Obradović's friend, was perhaps the most distinguished among the brothers,

* This book was translated into German in 1789.

† Cf. the 'Dictionary of National Biography'; Chalmers' 'Biogr. Dictionary'; John Nichols, 'Illustrations of the Literary History of the 18th Century,' London, 1822, iv, 827; 'Gentleman's Magazine,' vol. 62, 1218; Munk, 'Roll of the Royal Physicians,' ii, 359; John Nichols, 'Literary Anecdotes of the 18th Century,' London, 1812-15, vol. iii, 260; Lusignan, *op. cit.*; August Hirsch, 'Biogr. Lexicon der hervorragenden Aerzte,' ii, Vienna and Leipzig, 1885; besides Fordyce's own works.

being greatly esteemed as a most skilful physician. He published many learned treatises on medicine, and is said to have spoken the best Latin in Great Britain. Having made a considerable fortune by his large practice, he helped his brothers, and people in general; indeed, his generosity and hospitality are said to have been very great.

Obradović was introduced to him by Mr Levie; and Sir William, then sixty years of age, took a very keen interest in the Serbian scholar, who was so much his junior. He soon made a friend of him and received him most cordially every Friday evening at his house in Brook Street, Grosvenor Square. He certainly appreciated the good Latin scholarship of his Serbian friend, with whom he both conversed and corresponded in Latin. He also enjoyed talking to him about Vienna and Italy, where he had himself been. But most of all he appreciated the talent, the perseverance and the character of the self-taught Serbian. On the day of his departure, Obradović was presented by Sir William Fordyce with a handsome copy of his '*Fragmenta Chirurgica et Medica*,' which had just come out. (The Preface is dated: prid. Id. Dec. 1784.) The dedication, written in the book by Fordyce and signed also by Mr Livie, is worded as follows: 'To Dositheus Obradović, Serbian, versed in various languages, a man of perfect morality, who earned the heartiest sympathies of the English with whom he spent six months, these '*Fragmenta*' are most cordially offered as a small token of the most sincere love and friendship.'

On the other hand, Obradović was filled with sympathy and admiration for the English. He was the first Serbian Anglophil and a great admirer of England. Nor did he admire only English literature and science; his admiration went out equally to the ordinary, typical English man and woman. It is worth while to recall his impressions on meeting a typical English lady. He called upon Mrs Levie, in company with Mr Lusignan.

* 'Dositheo Obradović, Serbiano, viro linguis varils erudito, sanctissimis moribus morato, Anglis, apud quos sex menses diversatus est, perquam dilecto, *Fragmenta* haec, parvulum quidem at amoris sincerissimi et amicitiae pignus, libentissime merito obtulerunt, Londini, VIII Kal. Jun. MDCC LXXXV Gulielmus Fordyce, Joannes Levie.'

I do not know what had been Obradović's opinion of women before that date, but he certainly did not expect to find Mrs Levie anything besides a good housewife. It was a time when some of the greatest changes that ever agitated the kingdom were being ushered in by the advent of Pitt's Government, the dissolution of Parliament, the Reform Bill, etc. The affairs of the East India Company were very much to the fore when Pitt introduced his East India Bill. Vessels arrived frequently from India, and Warren Hastings's ship was just about due. Trade was going on as usual, and the proposed tax on retail shops was being hotly discussed. Many important books had just come out, e.g. Mitford's 'History of Greece,' Charlotte Smith's 'Sonnets,' Cowper's 'Task,' besides many reprints. These were the topics of the day, and Obradović did not expect them to figure in the conversation of the lady of the house, whom he saw sitting with a piece of fine linen in her hands and sewing. Great was his amazement when he heard her discussing these and other kindred subjects.

'She began,' he says, 'a long conversation with Mr Lusignan about the Parliamentary debates, about the East India Company, about the vessels that had just arrived from India, about commerce, and finally about recent publications—what they were, who were their authors, and the contents of the books.' And she talked without leaving her sewing and stitching. Obradović was transported with amazement and delight. How came she to be so well-informed on all these topics, so as to chat about them—as he puts it—'so simply, so easily, so lucidly'? At one moment he was inclined to believe that she was reading it off from a book, so clever was her conversation. He listened for two hours, and they seemed to him like two quarters of an hour. He would gladly have stayed all day and missed his dinner—it was just dinner-time—only to listen to her as she talked. When Mr Lusignan—I am still quoting Obradović's words—began to speak, he (Obradović) frequently hoped that his friend would finish quickly and be silent, so that she might speak again.

Obradović had a very high opinion of the beauty of English women. 'I gaze on the women and girls (says he); they are such beautiful creatures that there is

nothing in the world you could see or imagine more beautiful.' And then he compares them with the female beauties in other lands. 'Of course there are handsome women to be seen also in other lands, but they are mostly proud and fancy themselves to be superior creatures, while English women do not care, or think, or know that they are beauties, but look at you in a perfectly natural, open and friendly manner.' Mrs Levie herself was beautiful in this way. 'She was not exactly what is called a typical English beauty, but, if an Apelles or a Raphael had wished to paint innocence, kindness and that divine serenity of heart and perfect purity of soul, he certainly could not anywhere have found a better model than he would have found in the face and the eyes of this English woman.'

Obradović experienced the influence of English literature very strongly. The books he wrote before his arrival in England, and to which we have already referred, are almost entirely devoid of English literary reminiscences. If he quotes some author or alludes to any book, the authors and books are always Greek, Latin, Italian, German or (occasionally) French. In all his books written before 1785, only one single English work is referred to, and one anecdote from English history; the work being Richardson's 'Pamela,' and the anecdote one about Queen Elizabeth.

But after 1785 his books fairly teem with English quotations and literary reminiscences. He then wrote the second part of his 'Autobiography' (1788); and we have already seen how great a part England played in it, especially in the chapter devoted to his stay in London, from which we have taken almost all our quotations of his works. His second important book is entitled 'Fables' (1788). It is a collection of fables translated mostly from Æsop, Lessing, Lafontaine and others, but each fable is followed by a short philosophical, religious or moral commentary upon the fable in question. These commentaries are full of English quotations, usually in English, sometimes written in Serbian characters and spelt phonetically. Sometimes he quotes proverbs, sometimes aphorisms and maxims. The next in importance of his works and the best after the 'Autobiography'

is his 'Essays,' in two volumes (I, 1793; II, 1818). They are essays on patriotism, on the nature of man, on reading, on the love of learning, etc., to which are added some philosophical tales and moral stories. This work is saturated with English literary influences, and also contains translations from English authors. A fourth work, called 'Ethics' (1803), is a translation or rather adaptation from the Italian philosopher F. Soave.

Obradović was a great admirer of English literature. 'I wish you would accept, my dear readers (says he in prefacing a collection of English aphorisms in translation), these anemones, violets and lovely roses from the gorgeous English gardens.' Explaining his literary programme, he says that his only desire is 'with the help of the divinely wise English books to write something which will outlive him.' In his portrait painted by a Polish artist about the end of the 18th century, Obradović is represented sitting in an armchair beside a table covered with books; one of these is his own 'Fables,' the title of another, though mostly undecipherable, shows that it was English.

His greatest favourites were the English essayists—Addison first of all. In a letter written in June 1785 to his benefactress Mrs Levie, he thanks her 'because she had enabled him to read and understand Addison's writings.' In a second letter, written on Sept. 20, 1788, he exclaims: 'Oh! how many lovely things one could translate from . . . Addison!' 'Addison's writings are to be without any hesitation admired and praised more than all London buildings' ('Autobiography,' Part II, 1788). Addison is 'the English Socrates,' says he. We may add that Obradović had the highest opinion of that Greek philosopher, to whom he also devoted a special chapter in his 'Essays.' In another portrait of him, which shows a number of books scattered on the table, one of these quite distinctly bears the title 'The Spectator, I, II.' The 'Spectator' was a model for his 'Essays.' In the preface to the latter, he explains why he publishes separate essays instead of a book devoted to a single subject: 'To read a large book on one and the same subject is not suited to everybody, and there are few who can do it, whereas the manner adopted by Addison and similar authors is suitable for all people, whether young or old.'

His 'Essays' include a translation of the 'Vision of Mirza' ('Spectator,' No. 159).

Next to Addison he admired Dr Johnson, from whose 'Rambler' he translated the anonymous tale (No. 44); 'Obidah and the Hermit' (No. 65); and 'Truth, Falsehood and Fiction' (No. 96). Of Goldsmith's works he also chose an Eastern tale for translation, 'Asem, or a Vindication of the Wisdom of Providence in the Moral Government of the World.' The essays typical of English 18th-century periodicals were what he loved most to read and translate. Thus he translated 'Almet the Dervish' out of Dr Hawkesworth's 'Adventurer' (No. 114), and the tale of 'Abdullah and Balsora' from the 'Guardian' (1729, No. 167)*; and from the 'London Magazine' (May 1773) he took the fine anecdote of Dr R. Mead. The way in which this physician, famous in his day, helped his colleague, Dr Friend, by obtaining his release from the Tower, and how he presented him with the thousand guineas he had received in fees for attending Dr Friend's patients during the latter's imprisonment, was singled out by Obradović as one of the noblest examples of mutual love and friendship in his essay 'On Love and Friendship.'

Obradović was also acquainted with other moralists, philosophers and scholars. He quotes John Knox, the 'highly-learned and keenly intellectual' reformer. He twice quotes Francis Bacon, whom he calls 'the famous and great scholar.' Lord Verulam must have been a great favourite of his, because, on one of the books in the portrait previously referred to, 'Baconi Opera' is distinctly to be read. 'Newton and Locke,' he says, 'revealed the highest scientific truths to mankind without compelling anybody with sword or anathema to accept them.' From Lord Chesterfield's 'Letters to his Son,' he quotes and translates an interesting anecdote of Cardinal Chigi, subsequently Pope Alexander VII (Chesterfield, Letters, No. 158). Obradović also translated a collection of aphorisms, to which we have already alluded (about 150 in all) 'from a lovely English book' (title unknown).

Obradović was very fond of poetry—he himself

* This tale was also translated by the German poet Wieland ('Sechs Erzählungen,' 1752), who erroneously ascribes it to Addison.

occasionally wrote verse—and also of fiction—he translated some of Marmontel's tales—but he does not often mention English poets and novelists. Still, he has great praise for Pope and Swift, and places them in the same category with Addison. He admires Defoe's 'Robinson Crusoe' as much as Fénelon's 'Télémaque' or Le Sage's 'Gil Blas.' Of Richardson he thinks very highly. 'Oh, when will it come, that blessed and golden time, when Serbian daughters and wives will be able to read "Pamela" translated into Serbian speech!' It is a curious fact that he never mentions either Shakespeare or Milton. This, however, does not signify much, because Obradović never gave a systematic opinion on English literature; he only quotes authors and books as he happens to need them in discussing various matters and problems. He incidentally refers to two English satires of unknown (to us, at least) authorship, viz, 'The Ass Philosopher' and 'The Ass as a Lord.'

Obradović was fully imbued with the spirit of the English 18th century. He acquired all the leading ideas and sound scholarship of that enlightened age. In Serbian literature he represents that 'Peace of the Augustans' spoken of by Prof. Saintsbury; and that is, I think, his chief title to fame.

Our Serbian philosopher spent the last years of his life in Serbia. He had never been in that country before. He was a native of South Hungary, as we said before, but he was a Serbian by race, and called himself one. We have seen that Sir William Fordyce, in his dedication, applied that term to him. We may add that, when he was a student in Leipzig, he was matriculated as 'Dositheus Obradović from Serbia.' The reason why Obradović was never in Serbia before was simply that at that time Serbia did not exist as a State. It was spoken of as part of Turkey, and was indeed a Turkish province.

But in 1804 Serbia began to awake. Karageorge, the grandfather of King Peter, raised a general insurrection against the Turks. He drove them out of the country, took towns and fortresses, defeated every Turkish army that was sent against him and bade fair to deliver Serbia completely. Obradović, who was now sixty-two years of age and settled in Trieste, was moved to tears

by the good news. He wrote a poem: 'Awake, Serbia, long hast thou slept, and dwelt in darkness.' He called on many Serbian merchants in the town to bid them send money to help the insurgents who—poor desperate men!—were sometimes fighting without weapons, and whose whole artillery consisted of a single gun, and that a wooden one!

Although only a poor schoolmaster, Obradović himself sent money. As it happened, he had saved eight hundred florins (about 80*l.*); and one half of that sum he sent to Serbia. And he longed to go thither. 'Ah, my only wish,' he wrote to a friend, 'is at last to breathe, somewhere, the sweet and free air of our mother Serbia!' Hard fighting was going on around Belgrade; Obradović anxiously expected the fall of the capital, so that he might enter it; Belgrade, however, still remained in Turkish hands. But, though Belgrade was unattainable, he crossed the Danube and visited Smederevo—another Serbian town lately delivered—only for a little while, only for the joy of feeling Serbian soil under his foot.

At last, the insurgents took Belgrade, and Obradović entered it immediately, on Aug. 6, 1807, to remain there until his death. 'From the very moment I came here,' he writes, 'I began to grow young again; and my case will be that of the legendary Assyrian king, whose skin is said to have grown like that of a child.'

We may imagine the welcome he received from the simple insurgents who stood so greatly in need of scholars! He was cheered like Anacharsis among the Scythians; he was revered like Voltaire at Ferney; he was considered the intellectual patriarch of the Serbian nation. And he was modest, devoted to the cause of Serbia, helping wherever he could. He was despatched to Syrmia on a special mission. He was sent to Bucarest to negotiate with the Russian troops there. He became a member of the Council of State and even a member of the Government, being appointed Minister of Education. There are many documents extant proving the high honour in which he was held by Karageorge and the other Serbian leaders. Only Austria hated him; and Baron Simbschen, the Military Governor of Peterwardein, gave orders to the frontier guards to shoot him at sight.

As was to be expected, Obradović's efforts were directed towards education, schools and literature. He founded a college, the so-called Great School, from which in due time grew the University of Belgrade. He founded a public library, mostly with his own books. He tried hard to establish a printing office, and it was his wish that his last book should be printed there.

For he was at work upon his last book—his swan song, as he calls it—slowly, like an old man, utilising such leisure as remained to him after transacting affairs of State. All around him was warfare—the formation of regiments, the transport of ammunition, an atmosphere laden with danger and anxiety. The streets of Belgrade were resounding with the tramp of horses loaded with military equipment and led by some sunburnt warrior, or the clatter of waggons, laden with bags of powder secretly imported from Peterwardein; while the call of the bugle or the beat of the drum were heard from afar. And there we can picture him, in a white, rough-cast cottage, modest but roomy and comfortable in the old Serbian style—which still exists, and on whose high chimney there is a stork's nest from which every spring you may hear the merry noise the storks make with their beaks—there, beside the window which looks out on the Danube and is framed by the clustering vines in his 'large and pretty garden,' sits the gray-haired venerable old man, a sheet of paper spread before him, goose-quill in hand, writing the last chapter of his last book. And it is pleasant to think that at that moment Obradović had a volume of Addison or Dr Johnson before him.

PAVLE POPOVIĆ.

Art. 6—LORD FRENCH'S '1914.'

No man, it has been well said, was ever written down except by himself; and we wish that Lord French had pondered this aphorism before he sat down to write this book. The Field-Marshal at the opening of the war enjoyed a military reputation which was second only to Lord Kitchener's in this country; and he had worthily earned it. The memories of South Africa are swamped in those of the past five terrible years; yet there are some who have not yet forgotten the name of Colesberg and the excellent and audacious service of General French which is associated with that name. At the close of the Boer War no one was surprised to see him rise successively to the command of the First Army Corps at Aldershot, to the Inspectorship-General of the Forces, and to the supreme post of Chief of the General Staff. Lord Haldane has testified to the valuable assistance which he received from Sir John French in preparing the forces of the Empire for the great struggle which has so recently been brought to a successful end; and this is a thing which we must never forget. The time will come when the country will set aside old political prejudices and acknowledge the vast debt which it owes to Lord Haldane; and then the names of the officers who were associated with him in his reorganisation of the forces of the Empire will likewise be remembered with honour.

The country therefore heard with confidence and satisfaction of the appointment of Sir John French to command the British Expeditionary Force in August, 1914. People hardly realised that his army was, though small in numbers, incomparably the best trained, the best equipped, the best organised and the best disciplined that Britain had ever put into the field. It was (we say it after mature consideration) certainly superior to that which Wellington led from Portugal to the campaign of Vitoria in 1813, and from the battlefield of Vitoria through the Pyrenees to Toulouse. This is no small praise, but it is the truth. It was felt in 1914 that Sir John French was the right man to command such an army.

By Aug. 20 the British force—four infantry divisions

and one cavalry division—was assembled; the infantry south-east of Landrecies, the cavalry north-east of it about Maubeuge, seeking touch with the French Fifth Army under General Lanrezac, on the left of which the British were appointed to stand. A great advance of the French and British line along the whole length of the French frontier from Longwy north-westward to Landrecies was, so Lord French tells us, in immediate prospect; and all ranks were in the highest spirits. So far only one misfortune had overtaken the British, namely the sudden death of Sir James Grierson, who commanded the II Corps, on Aug. 17. Sir John French asked that Sir Herbert Plumer might take General Grierson's place. Lord Kitchener preferred to send Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien; and thereby hangs a very sorry tale.

On the 21st the British began their movement northward; and at the close of the day the cavalry reached the line of the Mons Canal on either flank of Mons, while the four divisions of infantry, according to Sir John French's account, radiated forth (so to speak) from Maubeuge, the I Corps north-eastward to Givry, and the II Corps north-westward to Sars-la-Bruyère. This, if correct, would be rather a curious disposition; but it is not correct. Lord French cannot describe even his first day's march with accuracy. On the 22nd the Field-Marshal motored eastward to visit General Lanrezac, and came upon the French Army in retreat. What had happened was obscure to him then and is still somewhat obscure to us now; but the fact of the retirement was certain. Unable to find General Lanrezac, Sir John French returned to his own troops, but did not arrest their further advance, which had gone forward in accordance with his previous orders. Nightfall found the II Corps on the Mons Canal, upon a line running from Obourg (three miles east of Mons) westward, with the cavalry moving away westward to prolong the left of the II Corps, and the I Corps thrown back on the right from Mons south-eastward.

Concerning the object of these dispositions Sir John French is silent, but it is certain from his own confession that he had some idea of an offensive movement. Early on the morning of the 23rd the Germans opened an attack between Obourg and Mons, which gradually spread

westward until the whole line of the II Corps was engaged. This was the action of Mons, which the Field-Marshal airily dismisses as mere 'heavy pressure upon our outposts.' General Smith-Dorrien, he says, 'was nowhere threatened by anything more than cavalry supported by small bodies of infantry.' Unfortunately German as well as British accounts show that large bodies of German infantry were engaged, and that they suffered very heavily. But the Field-Marshal cares nothing for facts so long as he can say something unpleasant about General Smith-Dorrien. He implicitly blames Sir Horace for evacuating the untenable salient of Obourg, and drawing back the whole of his line slightly to conform with the movement; and he sneers at his subordinate for feeling anxious when he, the august chief, was calm.

The sequel showed that the subordinate was right. At 5 p.m. Sir John received 'a most unexpected telegram' from General Joffre, saying that Lanrezac's army was in full retreat, and that three German corps were moving against the British front and a fourth round their left. As the Field-Marshal had seen the French retirement with his own eyes and had been warned, by his own admission, on the 22nd that at least three German corps were opposed to him, it is difficult to understand why this telegram was 'most unexpected.' However, he still waited for yet another telegram, which reached him at 11.30 p.m., before he gave his orders for retreat. Thus, on his own showing, Sir John French wasted from six to seven precious hours until he decided to extricate his army from a position of the utmost peril.

On the 24th the retreat began. The Field-Marshal would have us believe that the I Corps covered the retreat of the II. This is ludicrously incorrect. The II Corps was heavily engaged all along the line, and fought a desperate flank action on the extreme left with brilliant success; whereas the I Corps was not pressed in the least. Lord French gives the whole of the credit for the flank action to the cavalry, though the brunt was borne by the 1st Norfolks and 1st Cheshires, and to the 19th Brigade, which had no share in it at all. The II Corps was commanded by General Smith-Dorrien and therefore could do nothing right. Even a clever little movement,

by which Sir Horace made the 3rd and 5th Divisions change places, is set down as "confusion," and is described, quite unwarrantably, as having hampered the retreat of the I Corps. By a singular irony, however, Lord French does blunder into commendation of the 8th Brigade which, though he forgot it for the moment, belonged to the II Corps, but was commanded by Doran and not by Davies, as he inaccurately says.

On the 25th the retreat was continued. An awkward obstacle, the Forest of Mormal, lay in the way; and it was necessary for the I Corps to pass to east and the II Corps to west of it. At the day's close the two corps were six miles apart, General Haig's left being at Landrecies, where it ought not to have been, and General Smith-Dorrien's right in its appointed place at Le Cateau. How did this come about? The Field-Marshal talks vaguely about serious German attacks on the I Corps at Maroilles and Landrecies, and assigns as the time of the engagement at Landrecies a varying series of hours from 9 p.m. on the 25th to the early morning of the 26th—all for the purpose of excusing the failure of the I Corps to arrive at its proper halting-ground. This is quite useless. There must have been some grave mistake or neglect on the part of his staff; and we cannot forget that, though Lord French covers Sir Archibald Murray and Sir Henry Wilson with fulsome praise in his book, he did not keep them on his staff till the end of his command. Sir Archibald, being Chief, must, in the absence of further information, be held responsible for the gap between the I and II Corps, and for the action of Le Cateau which followed in consequence.

The Field-Marshal's orders were for the retreat to be continued on the 26th; and General Smith-Dorrien had issued his commands accordingly to the II Corps. It was past midnight, however, before he could ascertain the whereabouts of all his troops; and then he discovered that the 4th Division, which had joined the army on the 25th, was in isolation in advance of his line, that his troops were greatly exhausted, and that the cavalry was so weary and so much dispersed that it could not be counted on longer to cover the retreat. He therefore took his memorable decision to stand and fight, in spite of the Field-Marshal's orders. Lord French condemns

this resolution, omitting, however, to say anything about the situation of the 4th Division, and inserting instead a story (of which we are sorry to say that we believe not one word) about General Allenby's warning Sir Horace that, unless he continued his retreat, he would be surrounded. And here we approach the most astonishing and unsavoury incident in the whole of Lord French's volume.

In his despatch of Sept. 7, 1914, the Field-Marshal gave General Smith-Dorrien full credit for the cool courage he had shown in accepting battle at Le Cateau. Further, he by implication blamed the French General, Sordet, for failing to help Smith-Dorrien. In the volume before us he takes back his praise, alleging that, when he wrote his despatch, he was unaware of the service rendered by General Sordet; and he now contends that, but for General Sordet, Sir Horace would have been pinned to his ground and surrounded. Now it is an indisputable fact, established by documentary evidence, that General Smith-Dorrien, in addition to writing his own thanks to General Sordet and recounting his obligations to him in a special order to his troops, reported within three days to Lord French himself the good help that he had received from General Sordet, and begged that thanks might be sent to him through General Joffre. The Field-Marshal's statements upon this point, therefore, both in his despatch and in his book are not correct.

The fact, we fear, is that on the 26th Lord French and his staff completely lost their heads, and that, in the vain endeavour to conceal this, he has taken leave of all sense of accuracy. He would fain have us believe that at Le Cateau, as at Mons, General Smith-Dorrien was opposed by nothing but cavalry; but this absurd contention can be equally disproved in both cases. It is significant that the Germans never mention and never have mentioned the action of Le Cateau, which is pretty sure evidence that it went ill for them. Lord French, in his eagerness to belittle it, contends that, without General Sordet, General Smith-Dorrien would never have escaped. Yet the safe retreat of the II Corps was assured long before General Sordet came into action. Lord French avers (on p. 78) that the fight cost at least 14,000 men

and 80 guns, and on p. 87 that the casualties of the II Corps since Aug. 23 numbered 15,000 men and 80 guns. The two statements are plainly incompatible with one another; and the actual casualties at Le Cateau—as Lord French could easily have ascertained if he desired to know the truth—did not exceed 8000 men and 36 guns. He actually has the effrontery to assert that the German cavalry reached St Quentin, in pursuit of the II Corps, on the evening of the 26th, whereas it had not done so even on the morning of the 28th. Lastly, he commends the withdrawal of the I Corps from Landrecies, which was hardly even hampered by the enemy, as one of the most brilliant episodes of the whole retreat.

No doubt there is ignorance as well as malice in this portion of his narrative. Lord French himself, long before the issue of the action of Le Cateau was decided, hurried away to Noyon, forty miles from the battlefield, and there waited, leaving his army for one day, if not two, to look after itself. Happily Von Kluck, instead of pursuing the II Corps, marched south-westward across its rear; and the British force continued its rapid retreat unmolested. It is evident that Lord French sent home very gloomy reports, for they brought Lord Kitchener to Paris, where there was a stormy interview between the two Field-Marschals. As to what actually passed, we are too distrustful of Lord French's accuracy to accept his account for gospel; but we must record our entire agreement with him upon one point, namely, that a Commander-in-Chief in the field must not, so long as he be Commander-in-Chief, be subjected to interference from home. The Government may remove him if it so pleases, but, if it does not remove him, it must leave him alone.

Retreat gave place to advance and to the battle of the Marne. Lord French throws little new light on the rather feeble movements of the British on Sept. 6; but he, who ignores the great work of the II Corps during the retreat, finds space to describe every petty action of the cavalry and I Corps in the subsequent movements. The truth is that, though the British share in the battle of the Marne was important, it was not very arduous. As to the battle of the Aisne, again, he has little of

interest to say; and it is not until its close, when he very rightly pleaded for the transfer of the British Army to its old place on the left of the line, that Lord French's narrative again becomes arresting.

It seems that the resolution of the Belgian Government to abandon Antwerp, when the Germans began actively to threaten it, came as a most disagreeable surprise to the Field-Marshal. 'It was difficult (he says) to understand why the Belgians, who had fought so well at Liège, were unable to do more in defence of a fortress which was much stronger, and situated, moreover, in a position where it could be supported by the British fleet.' Was it so difficult? The example of Liège had shown that no fortifications could stand for long under high-explosive shells of large calibre; and forty-five miles—the shortest distance between Antwerp and the sea—is surely longish range even for the very newest guns of the British fleet. Or does Lord French think that the fleet could have steamed up the Scheldt to Antwerp or near it? However, Lord French at once realised that Antwerp was to be made the base for a German advance against the Channel ports; and he very naturally and rightly became eager to move northward as soon as possible in order to relieve Antwerp, if it might still be saved, or, if not, at any rate to bar the way to the sea.

Unfortunately Lord Kitchener and Mr Churchill were also framing plans for the relief of Antwerp on their own account, and making arrangements with General Joffre in furtherance of the same, without consulting Lord French in the first instance at all. A hundred and twenty years ago Henry Dundas had initiated operations upon this same Belgian coast under his own direction, ignoring the Duke of York, who was in command of the Army in the field; and history repeated itself. The relief of Antwerp failed egregiously; and the Belgian Army, having delayed its retreat until dangerously late, suffered very heavy losses before it reached the Yser. Beyond doubt Lord French is right in maintaining that the troops sent by Lord Kitchener and the First Lord of the Admiralty to save Antwerp should have been placed under his command, subject to the supreme direction of General Joffre; and there is very much to be said for

his contention that, if this had been done, Lille would have been saved. Antwerp has been a tender spot to British statesmen for over three centuries; and it seems that both the Admiralty and the War Office lost their heads when they realised that it was in serious danger.

Meanwhile the main British Army had been travelling northward from the Aisne; and the race for the sea, begun by both French and Germans in September, had become very keen. There were high hopes that the British and French would on the 13th make a combined advance, and that the French left would reach Lille and the British centre Courtrai. Unfortunately the Germans were too quick for the Allies; and, to save the French from being outflanked in the north, it was necessary to throw the II Corps hastily into the fighting line in that most difficult and detestable country just to the north of La Bassée. This was hard upon the II Corps, which had borne all the brunt of the retreat and had, by sheer ill-fortune, happened also upon the most difficult ground in the valley of the Aisne. Many of its battalions had suffered so heavily that their numbers, in spite of the drafts sent to them, were very low; and they were sadly short of officers. In such circumstances its fighting power had necessarily been diminished; and General Smith-Dorrien could not but be alive to the fact. Lord French endeavoured, as he himself tells us, to calm Sir Horace's misgivings by pointing out that the cavalry, the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade had all of them been as heavily engaged at Le Cateau as the II Corps. We should doubt if his arguments carried great weight. In the first place the cavalry was very little engaged at Le Cateau; and, in the second, the 4th Division had not been seriously engaged before that action, whereas the II Corps had had two severe days' fighting on the 23rd and 24th, as well as a wearing day on the 25th of August before it turned and stood to bay at Le Cateau on the 26th. To this day we believe that Lord French has no idea of the work done by the II Corps between the 23rd and the 26th. He has persuaded himself that the I Corps covered the retreat of the II, which is the exact reverse of the truth; and he has not grasped the elementary fact that the II Corps lost more men in

combat with the enemy on the 23rd than did the I Corps during the whole of the retreat.

In any case this premature, though inevitable, launching of the II Corps into the fighting line seems to have militated against the success of the great offensive movement in the north upon which Lord French, and apparently General Foch also, had built great hopes. The British troops were thereby broken up; and the II and III Corps, instead of standing side by side, were some miles apart, the gap being filled by French cavalry, which, in such a country, was at great disadvantage.

Meanwhile the Cavalry Division and the III Corps cleared the high ground that lies east of Cassel and the lower hills to south of it, encountering no very serious opposition; and the II Corps also made some progress. But there was continual evidence that the Germans were growing stronger and stronger on the line from La Bassée northward, and the Allied troops were none too thick at any point. On Oct. 19 the I Corps came up from the Aisne; and Lord French had to make up his mind whether he should use it to reinforce his sorely tried troops from Menin southward to La Bassée, or to meet, by a counter-offensive, the enemy's threats against Ypres and the Yser. On the one hand, if the Germans succeeded in driving a wedge through the British at some point south of Menin—and the place of junction with the French about La Bassée was likely to be chosen for the purpose—then they would either force the British Army to surrender or drive it into the sea. On the other hand, if they broke through the line about Ypres or to the north of it, they would reach the sea-board and master the Channel ports. Lord French, as he puts it, had to choose between the certain disaster of losing the Channel ports and the less certain though, if it should overtake him, more overwhelming disaster of being driven into the sea. He decided to avert the certain disaster, thereby taking terrible risks; and the event showed that his judgment was correct. This, in our opinion, is the one great thing that Lord French did during his period of command on the Western Front; and too gladly admit that it was really and truly great. He had every right to select for himself the title of Lord French of Ypres.

On Oct. 21 he launched the I Corps to an attack for the recovery of Bruges; and on the same day, whether before or after he had committed these troops to their offensive he does not tell us, he learned that the Germans had brought up four fresh Reserve Corps to break his line at Ypres. The strength of this reinforcement and the suddenness of its appearance came to him, as he confesses, like a bolt from the blue. Apparently the Intelligence Departments of the Belgian, French and British armies must all equally have been taken by surprise. Then the storm broke, and the projected offensive of the Allies became a stubborn, almost desperate, defensive. The story of the first battle of Ypres affords such numberless examples of British coolness and tenacity that it is hard to select any one of them as more conspicuous than the rest. Lord French dwells in particular upon the defence of Messines by the cavalry; and, though he may foster some natural prejudice in favour of the arm in which he was trained, we do not think that he is unduly partial here. He gives no instances of individual gallantry, and herein shows sound sense; but we can never read of those days without recalling Lieutenant Stewart, of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, who on Oct. 24 went out with two men only to parry a flank attack upon his battalion, and shot down seventy Germans, including the teams of two machine-gun detachments, with his own rifle.

Lord French's account of the crisis of the battle on Oct. 31 is highly dramatic:

'As I passed through Ypres on the way to Haig there were manifest signs of unusual excitement, and some shells were already falling in the place. . . . I saw loaded vehicles leaving the town, and people were gathered in groups about the streets chattering like monkeys or rushing hither and thither with frightened faces. . . . I had not gone more than a mile from the town, when the traffic in the road began to assume an anxious and most threatening aspect. It looked as if the whole of the I Corps were about to fall back in confusion on Ypres. Heavy howitzers were moving westward at a trot—always a most significant feature of a retreat—and ammunition and other waggons blocked the road almost as far as the eye could reach. In the midst of the press of traffic and along both sides of the road, crowds of wounded came limping along as fast as they could go, all heading for Ypres. Shells

were screaming overhead and bursting with reverberating explosions in the adjacent fields.'

Sir John pursued his way on foot to the château of Hooze and found General Haig and his Chief of Staff, John Gough, anxious but cool, poring over their maps. They gave a bad account of affairs; and the Commander-in-Chief passed the worst half-hour of his life until a staff officer came galloping in with the news that the lost village of Gheluvelt had been retaken, and that the advancing Germans had been checked. Lord French's account of the reason for this sudden turn of the tide is the usual one—that Brigadier-General FitzClarence had on his own initiative summoned the Worcesters of the 5th Brigade and ordered them to counter-attack. But is it not the fact that the Worcesters had been held ready by the Divisional Commander for just such a contingency, and were brought into action according to his orders? This in no way detracts from the good service of General FitzClarence in the actual direction of the counter-attack; and it must not be considered derogatory to the fame of the Worcesters if we mention that the Berkshires also attacked Gheluvelt independently, and contributed not a little to the re-establishment of a favourable situation. A Commander-in-Chief has no time to trouble himself with such details; but we, who have leisure, can do justice to the good work of one of the finest battalions of the Old Army.

With the last phase of the famous battle we shall not concern ourselves further than to note that the II Corps, which had been withdrawn from the line, utterly exhausted, on Oct. 28, was gradually drawn into it again, brigade by brigade or battalion by battalion, until almost the whole of it had been absorbed into the I Corps. Even so Sir Douglas Haig had under him but a shadow of a corps, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was left with hardly a man under his command. Such was the price of the victory of Ypres—the destruction of the Old Army, probably the finest, for its numbers, that ever went forth to war.


We shall not follow Lord French into the rather controversial matter which concludes his volume. We agree heartily with him that it was a great mistake in

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Lord Kitchener to raise new armies, instead of utilising the organisation for expansion of the Territorial Force which Lord Haldane had already prepared for him; but beyond that we shall not go. We have found too many inaccuracies in his book to permit us to accept any statement of his without the utmost caution; and, though this may seem to be a hard saying, we must warn our readers to follow our example.

Upon the whole we must pronounce this to be one of the most unfortunate books that ever was written. It does not preach even sound military doctrine. There is some parade of commonplace military reading, but there is also the curious teaching that such a river as the Somme or the Oise would provide a military barrier, behind which a retreating army could rest and refit. Surely such a notion is hardly one which in these days should be put forward upon the authority of a Field-Marshal. But this is not the worst. It is the spirit of the whole work which really gives us pain. The author has descended to misstatements and misrepresentations of the clumsiest and most ludicrous kind in order to injure the reputation of a subordinate, who is forbidden to defend himself; and, coming from one in his high position, this brings shame and dishonour not only upon the Field-Marshal himself but upon the Army. A worse example to young officers than is to be found in this book we cannot imagine. We entreat them to avoid it, or, if they do read it, to study it for warning against what is wrong rather than for instruction in what is right. Lord French is, it is true, still the recipient of honours and rewards; but no accumulation of titles, bâtons, grants, orders or decorations can ever fit him to stand in the company of such men as Ralph Abercromby, John Moore, Rowland Hill and Thomas Graham. Let these, and not Lord French, stand before the youth of Britain as the models upon which to train themselves to be officers and gentlemen.

J. W. FORTESCUE.

Art. 7.—THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

1. *Germany, 1815-1890.* By Sir Adolphus William Ward. 3 vols. Cambridge University Press, 1916-1918.
2. *The German Empire, 1867-1914.* By William Harbutt Dawson. 2 vols. George Allen & Unwin, 1919.
3. *Bismarck.* By C. Grant Robertson. Constable, 1918.

WHEN war broke out in 1914 English readers who were ignorant of German were singularly ill provided with authoritative narratives of the modern history of their principal enemy. It was possible to trace the fortunes of the Bund and the German Empire by diligent study of the relevant chapters in the last three volumes of the Cambridge Modern History, Mr Headlam's excellent life of Bismarck and the unfinished American translation of Sybel's official record of the foundation of the Empire. But there was no complete, scholarly and up-to-date survey of the stages through which the German people had passed from the overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 till William II staked the existence of his empire on the hazard of war. When peace was signed at Versailles in 1919 there was no longer any excuse for ignorance of the history of the terrible enemy who had been overthrown. Treitschke's voluminous masterpiece, which despite its glaring faults remains an indispensable guide through the first half of the 19th century, was in process of translation. Mr Grant Robertson had published a careful and judicious study of Bismarck incorporating the mass of material that had come to light in the twenty years following his death. Above all, Sir Adolphus Ward and Mr William Harbutt Dawson had completed detailed narratives, distinguished not less by impartiality than by erudition, which reflect the highest credit on British scholarship.

'The present volume,' wrote the Master of Peterhouse in 1916, 'forms part of a piece of work undertaken in times which already seem remote. After the outbreak of war it would have been unnatural had I not felt forced to lay aside for the moment what I had begun as a congenial task, since one of the chief pleasures of my life had long been to contribute anything in my power to the promotion of a better

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understanding between two nations now estranged from each other for many a long day. But, on further reflexion, it seemed that nothing would be gained by postponing *sine die* the treatment of a chapter of history which, like other chapters, must be studied with care if its outcome is to be judged with candour. The Germany of 1915 cannot be understood . . . unless the struggles and humiliations of the half-century after 1815 are taken into account as well as the successes of the ensuing years.'

The *doyen* of English historians was well advised to complete the task to which he had set his hand, and for which no scholar in either hemisphere was so well equipped by the studies and observations of a life-time. In his youth he spent several years in Germany, and it adds to the personal interest as well as to the scientific value of the book that his account of the later development of the Schleswig-Holstein question is largely based on the papers of his father, who was accredited to the Hanse Towns from 1860 to 1870.

The work opens with chapters on the revolutionary era and on the German States in 1815; and three further chapters cover the generation of little men and secondary events which fill the stage till the outbreak of revolution in 1848. At this point the narrative naturally becomes much fuller; and the four years' drama which began at Frankfurt and ended at Olmütz demands as many pages as the thirty-three years which preceded it. As readers of the Cambridge Modern History are aware, Sir Adolphus has made this territory his own; and the almost infinite complexities of the constitutional struggle for German unity become intelligible under his skilled guidance. The second volume, after a chapter on the decade of stagnation and disillusion which followed, is entirely devoted to the nine crowded years in which Bismarck won three wars and created the Empire. The chapters on 'the rupture between Austria and Prussia' and 'Franco-German Relations, 1866-1870,' are perhaps the most valuable as well as the most interesting in the whole work. To a mind wearied and confused by the inevitable partisanship of Sybel and Friedjung, Ollivier and La Gorce, it is an emancipation to follow the unravelling of German, Austrian and French diplomacy by one who knows all that is to be known of the rival cases and who

stands 'above the battle.' The author has lightened his task and enhanced the value of the work by entrusting the military history of the campaigns to the expert hand of Prof. Spenser Wilkinson. The third volume, which carries the story from the Treaty of Frankfurt to the Fall of Bismarck and contains two supplementary chapters on 'Social and Intellectual Life' and 'The New Reign,' is of somewhat smaller bulk and lighter texture. The *Kulturkampf* is described at length in a masterly chapter; but Sir A. W. Ward's readers would have been glad of an equally detailed narrative of other aspects of Bismarck's foreign and domestic policy. The sketch of the Emperor William II's reign breaks off in 1907, when, in the opinion of the author, the forces which made for war began to conquer the forces which made for peace.

If Sir Adolphus Ward knows more of the history of Germany from 1815 to 1871 than any man born beyond its frontiers, Mr Dawson possesses a many-sided acquaintance with the Germany created by Bismarck and destroyed by William II which he has already revealed in a dozen volumes, and which no living Englishman can approach. Though written during the war, like the volumes of Sir Adolphus Ward, his work is no less honourably free from the passions and even from the unconscious bias which render most recent books published by English writers on Germany and by German writers on England little better than scraps of paper. It is a striking testimony to the fair-mindedness and scientific method of British scholarship at its best that these two works, written in complete independence of one another, should reach approximately the same conclusions on the policy and personalities of modern German history. But though their standpoint is almost identical, the differences in treatment are so great as to render the two works complementary to one another. Sir Adolphus, the historian, writes mainly for students of history. Mr Dawson, the publicist, announces that he has had in mind less the limited circle of scholars and students than the 'general readers' whose numbers he believes to be steadily increasing. Sir A. W. Ward, except for a massive chapter on German culture, confines himself to the activities of the State, while Mr Dawson minutely explores the operation of social and economic forces.

Above all, while the elder scholar merely sketches the reign of William II, the younger devotes to it half a stout volume and brings his narrative both of foreign and domestic policy down to the outbreak of war. Both writers may be unreservedly congratulated on their achievements, and both works repay the most diligent study.

Now that Bismarck's work has been in large measure destroyed by the bungling of his successors, it is a tempting theme to enquire whether the wholly legitimate desire for the unification of Germany could have been realised except by 'blood and iron.' The attempt was made in 1848; but the more closely we study the problem with which the Frankfurt Parliament had to deal, the more clearly must we recognise that it was insoluble on peaceful lines. The modern history of Germany contains two periods which arouse the admiration or sympathy of men of other lands. The first, the reconstruction of Prussia after Jena, was brilliantly successful. The second, the attempt to win unity and liberty for the whole nation by peaceful discussion, was a tragic failure. In the 18th century the philosophic despots of Austria and Prussia were in advance of their subjects. In the first half of the 19th century the peoples were ahead of their rulers. The educated middle class looked with envy on the constitutional liberties of Victorian England and the France of Louis Philippe. The Professors, at all times the most influential factors in the formation of opinion, were almost to a man adherents of moderate Liberalism. But Frederick William IV hated the conception of responsible government as keenly, and for much the same reasons, as Charles I; while Austria, whether under Metternich or Schwarzenberg, was equally hostile to the spirit of liberty, and was irrevocably resolved to maintain her position as the predominant partner in the Bund.

The hopelessness of the task and the nobility of the effort of 1848 are fully recognised by Sir Adolphus Ward and Mr Dawson.

'The national movement as embodied in the National Parliament had failed,' writes the former; 'yet, though they could not command success, neither the Parliament nor the movement had laboured in vain. They had not prevailed, because the German population were still new to constitutional life.'

Yet even this obstacle might have been overcome now that Germany's ablest and strongest minds, the very flower of her intellectual life, were found ranged on the side of unity, had it not been for the resistance of the Governments. The German nation, though it had learnt to think, had not yet learnt to act without its Governments. Thus the great opportunity passed away, though not wholly without gain to the nation.'

'The fate of the National Assembly,' echoes Mr Dawson, 'will stand out always in national history as a supreme tragedy of foiled hopes and aspirations, of faith and confidence shattered and destroyed at the very moment of apparent fruition. Behind all the impracticable idealism, all the pedantry, doctrinarianism and wild theories that found expression in St Paul's Church, there was that elevation of spirit and that force of conviction which have been the sword and panoply of all earnest combatants in the struggle for human progress in every age. The German who can recall without emotion the large-spirited heroism of the foiled and broken deputies of Frankfurt, who in making a constitution were also trying to make a nation, confesses insensibility to one of the most moving passages in his country's history. The National Assembly seemed to have failed completely and ignominiously; yet they had in truth kindled in the German nation a fire which was not again to be put out. There is truth in the verdict of Hans Delbrück that the Professors' Parliament was more statesmanlike, and saw more clearly the needs of Germany than the sovereign who destroyed its handiwork.'

The failure of the Frankfurt Parliament cleared the stage for Bismarck and made his work both possible and necessary. 'Was die Professoren gewusst, das hat Bismarck gekonnt,' said Sybel in a speech at Bonn, on the occasion of the attempted assassination of the great statesman at Kissingen in 1874. British opinion sympathised with the unification of Germany, as it sympathised with the unification of Italy; and it was prepared to swallow, if not to approve, the forcible methods by which both tasks were accomplished. 'Qui veut la fin veut les moyens.' Neither country could call its soul its own till Austria was extruded; and, as she declined to go, she had to be expelled by force of arms. In the hurricane of rage which has swept over us owing to Germany's methods of waging war we have been tempted to extend our condemnation from William II to

Bismarck and Frederick the Great, and to credit them with a double dose of original sin. Our reputation for sanity and scholarship depends on resisting the distorting passions of war. Frederick the Great was no better and no worse than Catherine II or Joseph II or Louis XV. Bismarck's methods were no worse than those of Louis Napoleon or Cavour. The two greatest statesmen of the 19th century had to solve similar problems, and they solved them by similar means. The war with Austria in 1859 was prepared as deliberately as the war with France in 1870; and Cavour would have manipulated the Ems telegram without a qualm in order to force his antagonist to declare war. 'If we did for ourselves what we do for our country,' he declared with revealing frankness, 'what rascals we should be!' The makers of kingdoms and empires fight with different degrees of skill and success, but they employ the same kind of weapons.

To maintain that Bismarck was merely the supreme example of a prevalent type is not to admire that particular school of politics or to approve the tortuous intrigues by which he fomented three wars and gathered in the opulent harvest they were designed to yield. A nation rarely obtains more than one of its legitimate demands at a time. On the overthrow of the Directory France required order and liberty; but she obtained order alone. In 1870 Germany needed unity and liberty; but she received unity alone. Moreover, the effort involved in winning her unity not only diminished her chances of securing liberty but weakened her determination to obtain it. Nothing was more natural, and yet nothing was more pitiful, than the stampede of the majority in the Prussian Chamber into the Government camp in 1866. The needle-gun at Sadowa destroyed not only the army of Benedek but the liberalism of Germany. The bourgeoisie turned National-Liberal; and, when Sedan had confirmed Sadowa, it required strong nerves to oppose the Man of Destiny. There was nothing abnormal or discreditable in the transformation, which, indeed, would have occurred in any other nation that suddenly realised the dream of centuries and found itself, as the result of two great wars, the strongest Power in Europe. In millions of German hearts there was no

other feeling than that of proud thankfulness that their country was at last a nation, and that the civil wars and foreign invasions from which it had suffered throughout history were at an end. It was not till some years had elapsed that it became clear that Germany, like Italy, had been 'too quickly made,' that the easy victories were working like a subtle poison in the blood, and that the idealistic liberalism of 1848 was being displaced by a debasing worship of power and riches. Keen-sighted and patriotic men like Mommsen openly lamented that the accession of material strength was accompanied by a decline in spiritual values. The rapid growth of wealth resulting from the advance of science stimulated materialism in both hemispheres; but nowhere were its effects so disastrous as in Germany, where the combination of new-won power and new-found riches produced a more baneful result than either would have achieved alone.

Bismarck had played his cards with almost super-human success; and the skill with which he arranged that both Austria and France should fight alone when the moment arrived to settle accounts constitutes the most dazzling chapter in the history of modern diplomacy. But in the moment of victory he committed an error which in the light of subsequent events may be reckoned the greatest mistake of his career. After preventing the annexation of Austrian territory in 1866 by what he always described as the greatest struggle of his life, and thereby rendering possible the speedy reconciliation of the belligerents, Bismarck allowed the great soldiers to have their way in 1871. There is no ground for the notion commonly held during the excitement of the Great War that the annexation of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine was a work of almost unique wickedness. Outside France it was generally regarded at the time, no less in England than elsewhere, as the natural punishment of the Power which had declared war and had been defeated. And where is the Great Power which would have come empty-handed out of a sanguinary and victorious struggle, and would have left in the possession of its defeated enemy rich provinces which had formed part of its own vanished empire? Let us clear our minds of cant. It was an abomination to transfer masses

of human beings from one allegiance to another without consulting their wishes; but that was the common practice of mankind before 1870 and has been since.

Yet Bismarck was aware of the unwisdom of the territorial settlement which he was called upon to sanction. 'I do not want too many Frenchmen in my house,' he remarked. His plan was to content himself with Alsace, a province of German blood and language, to insist on the dismantling of Metz, and to exact a larger indemnity; and it was a calamity for France, for Germany and for the world that his scheme was not adopted. But he never fought for his policy, and he deserves even sharper condemnation for allowing the annexation of part of Lorraine than the soldiers whose horizon was bounded by strategical considerations. No one can be certain that Alsace might not have been gradually reconciled to the change by more generous and considerate treatment than she was destined to receive; but it may be asserted with the greatest confidence that a population so passionately French, not only in sentiment but also in blood and language, as that of French Lorraine was as indigestible as the Poles at the other end of the Empire.

When the wars were over, Bismarck was called upon to deal with the thorny domestic problems of the new Empire; and few careful students will deny that in home affairs his record is on the whole a failure. At a time when it was of vital moment to rally all the forces of national life round the new Imperial structure, he engaged in a struggle with the Roman Church which stirred millions of loyal subjects to passionate anger and from which he emerged not indeed completely defeated but badly bruised, and saddled with a powerful permanent *Centrumpartei* in the Reichstag under the leadership of the formidable Windthorst. His battle with the Socialists was equally unsuccessful; but in this case he is not open to the blame of provoking an unnecessary conflict. Socialism was a world-wide phenomenon, the child of modern industrialism; and to Bismarck belongs the honour of attempting to combat what he regarded as a national danger not by repressive legislation alone, but by a gigantic system of state-aided insurance against the dangers and trials of the worker's life. Though neither

kicks nor halfpence arrested the rapid growth of Social Democracy in the Protestant towns of the Empire, the social legislation of the eighties assisted the German working classes to attain a standard of life unknown in any other part of Central or Eastern Europe.

It is a harder task to pronounce judgment on the great change in fiscal policy in 1879 which broke up the National Liberal party and forced the Minister to depend henceforward on Conservative support. Was the economic condition of the Empire so unsatisfactory as to necessitate far-reaching changes, and did the return to Protection produce the beneficial result which he expected? Bismarck frankly confessed that he had never given economic theory a thought, occupied as he was with foreign affairs and satisfied with the general prosperity of the country; but the crash of 1873, followed by over-production in some of the staple industries, produced a demand for a reversion to the traditional Prussian policy of protecting the home market. There were, moreover, political considerations impelling the Minister in the same direction. Under the Constitution the Empire was entitled to meet any deficit by matricular contributions from its component States until its own income sufficed for its needs; but, instead of being a stop-gap, these contributions threatened to become the mainstay of Imperial finance. The system was irksome to the States and seemed to the Chancellor derogatory to the dignity of the Federal Government. The simplest method of rendering it independent was to raise the custom duties; and, once converted, he pushed through the Tariff Bill with his usual titanic energy.

'From the industrial standpoint,' writes Mr Dawson, 'Germany's first experiences of the new tariff were not in general encouraging, for the protection of one industry proved to the prejudice of another. But in 1884 Bismarck believed that Protection had freed the country from economic pressure. Even yet, however, agriculture had not lifted up its head. Before Protection was introduced there were far-seeing politicians who suspected that, though agriculture was brought last into the scheme of fiscal reform, it would end by taking the first place.'

The prophecy proved correct, for the Government became

henceforward, with a brief interval under Caprivi, subservient to the Agrarians. How much of the wonderful prosperity of the generation that followed was due to the tariff and how much to science, education and hard work, is still disputed by the champions of rival economic theories. But there can be no question that the change inaugurated in 1879 strengthened the political influence of the great industrialists and the Junkers, and placed fresh obstacles in the path of democratic advance.

In foreign affairs Bismarck's record was far more successful. It was the mark of true greatness that, when he had obtained what he set out to accomplish, he was never tempted to new adventures. 'Wir sind satt' (We have got enough), he declared emphatically. The great maker of wars became one of the pillars of European peace. He had no belief in unlimited liabilities, and was wholly unaffected by the new passion for overseas conquest and colonisation which gained possession of the Great Powers in the later decades of the century. Europe was his chess-board, on which he knew every move of the game and on which no rival could challenge him with any hope of success. When he ran up the German flag in Africa in 1884, he only acted in response to pressure which no other Minister would have resisted so long. In the literal sense of the word his policy was conservative. He had made Germany the strongest Power on the Continent, and he would do nothing which might jeopardise her proud position.

In his survey of the foreign policy of the Empire written in 1913, Prince Bülow frankly recognised that the hostility of France was ineradicable so long as Germany refused to return the Rhine provinces. But, whereas Bülow and his master calmly proceeded to create new enemies for the Fatherland, Bismarck was of opinion that one enemy was enough, in peace no less than in war. At Versailles in the winter of 1870, he remarked to Busch that he could not sleep for the nightmare of coalitions; and his horror of a hostile league remained with him till the end. Russia was to be kept friendly by allowing her a free hand in the Near and Middle East. Austria was to be won by the promise of support in the event of a Muscovite attack. Except for a brief duel with Granville, he never thwarted British

Colonial ambitions, remarking : 'In Egypt I am English.' Italy was brought into partnership when France, with the secret encouragement of Berlin, annexed Tunis.

The policy of keeping defeated France in quarantine was sound enough on the cynical principles of *Realpolitik*, however incapable of indefinite prolongation ; but it required, even for its temporary success, unfailing skill and unsleeping vigilance. No one except its author could have maintained it for twenty years ; but to avoid a slip was beyond the power of the greatest diplomatist of the century. When France surprised her conqueror and the world by her rapid recuperation and the creation of a formidable army, Moltke and his colleagues began to suggest that the war might have to be fought again. The Emperor William had had enough fighting, and was free from complicity in the war scare of 1875 ; but what was the attitude of Bismarck ? Neither Sir Adolphus nor Mr Dawson has any doubt that he was the real author of the crisis, though he had no desire for a fresh conflict.

'That he was bent on war is very unlikely,' writes Mr Dawson, 'but he was certainly willing to accept it if France were so disposed ; and the most charitable view of the situation is that the article in the "Post," Is War in Sight? was intended to take stock of the situation, with a view to making it either better or worse.'

In any case it was a warning to France to keep her armaments within bounds ; and, like most threats, it brought its own punishment. Europe was seriously alarmed, and Queen Victoria and the Tsar hastened to intervene with restraining counsels.

The brief crisis of 1875 is one of the most important events in the diplomatic history of modern Europe, for it was at this moment that the potential danger of the new Empire to the peace of the world began to be realised.

'I never dreamt that within three years after the conclusion of peace,' wrote Sir Robert Morier, 'a fresh danger to civilisation from the renewal of war would be directly traceable to Germany having learnt and exaggerated the besetting vice of the people she has conquered. For there is no denying that the malady under which Europe is now suffering is caused by German Chauvinism, a new and far more formidable

disease than the French, because instead of being spasmodic and undisciplined, it is methodical, cold-blooded and self-contained.'

The Powers instinctively resented the implied claim of Germany to the dictatorship of Europe.

'Before Bismarck had gone too far,' writes Sir Adolphus Ward, 'he had his answer from the Powers; and, though the words were not breathed, the notion of a Franco-Russian alliance for the first time dawned upon quick-sighted minds like Gortchakoff's.'

The later years of Bismarck are a record of his attempts to remain on good terms both with Russia and Austria. The anger of the former at the substitution of the Treaty of Berlin for the Treaty of San Stefano compelled the two Powers which were threatened by her ill-will to draw together. 'It cannot be denied,' declares Sir Adolphus Ward, 'that the Austro-German treaty, with its Italian extension, was a masterpiece of European diplomacy.' Mr Dawson's judgment is a little more reserved.

'If a choice was necessary at all, it was wisely made, and indeed the alternative was impossible. An alliance with Russia would have been, alike as to the risks to be covered and the responsibilities to be incurred by the two Powers, an alliance on unequal terms. If far stronger than Austria as an ally, Russia would have been immeasurably less safe and reliable.'

The necessity of taking sides was deeply regretted by the Chancellor himself. 'If only Russia would not compel us to choose between her and Austria!' he lamented. The Dual Alliance, transformed three years later into the Triple Alliance, rendered a *rapprochement* between Russia and France inevitable; and, though he re-established contact with St Petersburg by a secret treaty or treaties of re-insurance,* the character of which has not been fully revealed, the old trustful relationship of the three Emperors was never restored, and negotiations for a Franco-Russian Alliance began in the year of Bismarck's fall.

* This difficult question is ably and fully discussed by Mr Grant Robertson.

The greatest of realists would have scorned to be measured by any standard except success. But the world rightly judges men of action not only by their achievements but by the spirit in which they worked. The defect of the political realist is that he defines reality too narrowly, and tends to think more of immediate than of ultimate returns. The manipulation of the Ems telegram, like the invasion of Silesia, triumphantly successful as they were in their immediate objects, left a stain on German statesmanship and taught the world to be deeply suspicious of Prussian statecraft. The voluntary cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece, on the other hand, and the prompt acceptance of the Alabama award were examples of a higher and—when viewed in large perspective—more effective diplomacy. Neither an individual nor a State can live by bread alone. Nations need moral as well as material capital; and the more they possess the stronger they grow. Bismarck was content to work for his country alone and was satisfied with its applause. 'He was haunted by no ideas of a common European interest,' declares Sir Adolphus Ward with just severity, 'nor by visions of altering for the better the course of the world.'

'By the spirit and methods which he introduced into political life,' declares Mr Dawson, 'he did much to pervert the moral sense of his countrymen and to lower the standard of public right in Europe. It cannot be said that in the whole course of his career he contributed to the world a single idea that could lift mankind to a higher level of ethical perfection. He spoke often, indeed, of the moral *imponderabilia* which he held it to be folly in a statesman, regardless of public opinion, to ignore; yet, when he allowed for these impalpable forces, he did so because of the importance attached to them by others and not from any esteem felt for them by himself.'

The verdict of British historians was anticipated in a striking judgment of Caprivi.

'While entirely acknowledging the splendour of his person and of our heroic epoch, I thought, even before I became Chancellor, that I had perceived what serious blemishes were exhibited by the reverse of the splendid medal. What I thought ought to be my aim was to help the nation, without sacrificing any of its new national acquisitions, to return to

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an everyday existence in which it might again recover its old virtues. Prince Bismarck had conducted domestic policy by the method of foreign policy, and the nation was in danger of seeing its moral standards lowered.'

Now that so large a part of his material achievement has fallen into dust it will be easier for his own countrymen, following the lead of such critics as Prof. Förster, to form a more objective estimate of the greatest of their countrymen.

Bismarck's foreign policy was thrown overboard by William II, but his domestic policy was, in the main, continued. The Chancellor had drawn up a Constitution for the Empire which had frightened the Conservatives by the inclusion of manhood suffrage; but their alarm soon proved to be unfounded. The sole power of the Reichstag was in the sphere of finance; and in case of recalcitrance a majority could always be secured by dissolution on a patriotic appeal. All power was concentrated in the hands of the Government, which rested in the last resort on the solid foundation of an unregenerate Prussia. The only change which occurred in 1890 was that control passed from the Chancellor to the Emperor. No serious attempt was ever made to reform the antiquated constitution granted to Prussia by Frederick William IV; and, so long as the forces of reaction were impregnably entrenched in the Landtag, a national advance towards democracy was impossible. Despite her schools and her socialists, Prussia remained in essentials the military and bureaucratic State which had been created by Frederick William I.

In a striking volume entitled '*Regierung und Volkswille*,' based on lectures delivered in the University of Berlin in 1913, Prof. Delbrück argued with obvious sincerity that the Constitution of the Empire represented a perfect balance between ruler and ruled, avoiding autocracy on the one hand and the domination of numbers on the other. No foreign observer and no German publicist outside the conservative ranks rated the powers of the Reichstag so high as the Professor; and it was an ironical comment on his thesis that a few weeks after the publication of his book the Zabern incident advertised its impotence to the world. That

the power of the purse, wielded by resolute men and supported by a vigilant public opinion, may produce substantial results we know from English history. But since the disappointment of 1848, and still more after the wars of Bismarck turned it from the pursuit of constitutional liberty to the quest of national power, the German middle class left politics to the Government, and the championship of democratic ideas passed to the Social Democrats. Bismarck often complained that his countrymen were a nation of grumblers; but after 1866 the grumbling never rose much above a whisper, and the steady growth of Social Democracy at the polls failed to deflect the course of the Government by a hair-breadth. Herder bitterly described Germany as 'the land of obedience'; and the failure of the Reichstag to make fuller use of the limited powers entrusted to it and to ask for more confirms the justice of the verdict. The strongest brains went into the army or business; and the party leaders of the years immediately preceding the war were men of smaller calibre than Benningsen and Bamberger, Windthorst and Richter.

If William II was quite content to continue Bismarck's system of holding democracy at bay, he was ill-advised enough to reject the saving principles of his foreign policy. It was highly creditable to the young ruler as a man of honour that, in loyalty to Francis Joseph, he refused to renew the re-insurance treaty with Alexander III; but that is the only departure from the system he inherited which deserves commendation. The fundamental distinction between Bismarck and the Kaiser lay in the fact that the former was content to cut his coat according to his cloth, and was the sworn foe of unlimited liabilities. 'Of universal monarchy for Germany,' declares Sir Adolphus Ward, 'he dreamt as little as of universal peace for the world.' *Weltpolitik* was coming into fashion while William II was growing to manhood, and no one has a right to blame him for wishing to take a hand in the game. Germany, with her rapidly increasing industry and population, had as much claim to colonies and new markets as any other Power; and no one could expect a mighty Empire with colonies and a colossal oversea trade to remain without a navy in an age of armaments. The supreme condemnation of his

statesmanship—and of that of Prince Bülow, the ablest of his lieutenants—is that, while inheriting the hostility of France, he simultaneously antagonised Russia by competing for the hegemony of the Near East and alienated the British Empire by the rapid construction of a gigantic fleet. If he desired to trump Russia's card in Turkey, he should have retained the good will of England; and, if he decided to challenge Great Britain's dominion of the sea, he should have guarded his flank by friendship with Russia. Trusting in his army and navy, however, he failed to measure the magnitude of the risks that his policy involved; and, when the almost inevitable crash came, he discovered that even the gigantic strength of a drilled and disciplined nation, backed by subservient allies, was insufficient to overcome a world in arms.

The foreign policy of Germany since the fall of Bismarck is described by Mr Dawson in the last four chapters of his second volume with a fullness and fairness which no other British writer has approached. He is far too well informed to accept the ridiculous legend that Europe on the eve of the war was divided into two parts, the one peaceful and contented with its lot, the other stealthily preparing ever since 1870 to spring at the throat of its inoffensive and unsuspecting neighbours. Of the six Great Powers of Europe England alone was free from all desire for territorial aggrandisement. St Petersburg was as greedy and unscrupulous as Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. After twenty years of subterranean diplomatic preparation, Italy had swooped down on Tripoli. France made no secret of her unbending determination to recover the Rhine provinces whenever she felt strong enough to do so; and her resolve to obtain Morocco for herself was carried out, as Mr Dawson proves in one of his most illuminating chapters, with little regard for international compacts or for the treaty rights of Germany. Europe was honeycombed with intrigue and racked with suspicion.

The diplomatic history of the opening years of the 20th century will not become fully intelligible, and it will be impossible to pronounce how much justification existed for the bitter German complaint of *Einkreisung*, till the whole story of Russian Chauvinism is available.

Nor can we at present pronounce with certainty whether the Kaiser desired a world-war—and, if so, when he began to work for it—or blundered into a conflict which he had made no real effort to avert. Mr Dawson believes the latter hypothesis to be the more probable, and condemns the successors of Bismarck as incurable bunglers rather than conscious war-makers.

'To acquit them of deliberate design to disturb the tranquillity of Europe,' he writes in words of studied moderation, 'is not to condone the policy which had that effect. Germany was eager for power and prestige abroad, yet troubled little to consider how these might be most wisely obtained. She sought empire, and in seeking it gave the impression that she expected to enrich herself at the expense of other nations. In both of these quests her ruler and statesmen were wanting as much in discrimination as in patience.'

The passing of empires has been the familiar theme of the moralist in all ages; and the downfall of Germany, following the collapse of Austria and Russia, supplies warnings for the States which have survived the epic struggle. The victorious Allies will do well to imitate, if they can, the energy and thoroughness of their defeated foe. But the supreme lesson which the fall of the German Empire teaches, and which other empires will neglect at their peril, is that arms and wealth are after all but feeble bulwarks, and that it shall profit a nation nothing if it gain the whole world and lose its own soul.

G. P. GOOCH.

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Art. 8.—INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS: THEIR CAUSATION AND PREVENTION.

1. *Memoranda Nos. 1 to 21, Interim and Final Reports* [Cd. 8511 and 9065], and *The Health of the Munition Worker*. Issued by the 'Health of Munition Workers Committee.' H.M. Stationery Office, 1916-18.
2. *Annual Reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops*.
3. *Report of the Departmental Committee on Lighting in Factories and Workshops*, 1915 [Cd. 8000]. H.M. Stationery Office, 1915.
4. *Report of Committee on Fatigue from the Economic Standpoint*. British Association Reports, 1915.
5. *Safety*. By W. H. Tolman and L. B. Kendall. Harpers, 1913.

THE frequency with which industrial accidents occur is very much greater than published statistics would suggest. The annual reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops record all the accidents which are reported to them under the Notification of Accidents Act, i.e. accidents which are sufficiently serious to necessitate absence from work for seven days or, in certain cases, for one day. The records show that in this country over a thousand workers are killed every year and between one and two hundred thousand are injured; but these latter numbers are admittedly too small, owing to defective notification. It will be seen from the table below that, between 1907 and 1912, the number of accidents increased considerably. Doubtless they increased much more rapidly during the war, but the statistics are not included in the abbreviated reports now issued.

Year.	Fatal Accidents.		Non-fatal Accidents.	
	Total number.	Relative percentage.	Total number.	Relative percentage.
1907	1179	100·0	123,146	100·0
1908	1042	88·4	121,112	98·3
1909	946	80·2	116,554	94·6
1910	1080	91·6	128,470	104·3
1911	1182	100·3	147,763	120·0
1912	1260	106·9	154,972	125·8

These figures, however, tell one nothing as to the actual number of accidents occurring. In my own experience, which is limited to munition factories, minor and unreported accidents occur about thirty times more frequently than the notified and compensated accidents; and, though it is probable that in most industries the ratio of minor to major accidents is not so great as this, it would be safe to say that the total number of accidents is at least ten times greater than the figures quoted in the table. It is true that many of the minor accidents are quite trivial, and involve the loss of only the few minutes required for their dressing and re-dressing; but a considerable number of them mean the loss of several days' work, and others cause such pain or discomfort during work as materially to reduce the efficiency of the worker. Especially is this the case in the smaller workshops and factories, where not only is there no properly appointed ambulance room, but no surgical requisites of any kind are available. In consequence, small cuts and other wounds frequently become septic, and may lead to serious blood poisoning. The Home Office Inspectors * point out again and again the frequency with which septic poisoning follows on trivial accidents; and one of them states that 'not many months pass without an inquest on some workman who has died from blood poisoning following on a slight wound which, under proper care and immediate treatment, would probably have healed.'

To guard against septic cases, the inspectors continue to urge the provision of antiseptic dressings, so that injuries can be attended to without delay; and it is very desirable that such provision should be made compulsory, for the compulsion would be as much in the interests of the employers as of the employed. Thus an inspector reports that 'the manager of an engineering firm informed me that the number of days of absence from work by injured men had decreased, on an average, by about 70 per cent. since the provision of "first aid" (i.e. a first-aid outfit).' A Home Office order issued in 1916 requires that in blast furnaces, copper mills, iron mills,

* Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for 1912, p. 6. [Cd. 6852.]

foundries and metal works first-aid boxes should be provided in the proportion of at least one to every 150 persons, and an ambulance room where 500 or more persons are employed. It would evidently be a simple matter to extend this order to other industries.

Fortunately the importance of the adequate provision of first aid is becoming better recognised every day, and has received a special impetus during the war from the Ministry of Munitions, which initiated a special Welfare Department, and appointed the 'Health of Munition Workers Committee.' This Committee has issued twenty-one Memoranda and two Reports dealing with questions of industrial fatigue and hours of labour, and also a convenient handbook, 'The Health of the Munition Worker,' which summarises their conclusions, and deals at some length with the prevention of sickness and accidents. The development of welfare work in the munitions industry has induced rapid progress on similar lines in other industries, so that there can be no doubt that provision for the treatment of accidents is greatly improving all over the country.*

The question of the treatment of industrial accidents is a simple and straightforward one, but that of their prevention is a very different matter. It is true that in a small proportion of accidents their causation is quite clear, and the remedy no less obvious. Accidents arising from defective or insufficiently fenced machinery ought to be wholly avoided; and rapid progress towards this ideal has been made of recent years. Under the Factory Acts the inspectors are entitled to prosecute employers who offend in these respects, and they do not hesitate to take action when necessary. In 1912 agreements for the adequate fencing of machinery and the prevention of injury were made between representatives of employers, operatives and factory inspectors in regard to cotton-spinning, cotton-weaving, woollen and worsted mills.† If similar provisions are extended to other industries, so far as they admit of it, and if they are rigidly adhered to, a substantial reduction of accidents will be effected.

* Cf. Annual Report of Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for 1916, p. 10. [Cd. 8570.]

† Annual Report for 1912, pp. 75 and 94.

A further reduction of accidents can be brought about by the adoption of various safety devices. The practical importance of such mechanisms is recognised in many countries by the establishment of museums of safety appliances. Over twenty of these museums now exist, and one has been built in London, but its opening was stopped by the war. The Safety Museum at New York includes departments of industrial and social hygiene, as well as one dealing with accident prevention.

The subject of accident prevention has been taken up recently with great enthusiasm in the United States; and the measures adopted on its behalf are fully described by Tolman and Kendall in their book on 'Safety.' These writers quote a report to the effect that in 1907 there were no less than 35,000 fatal accidents and 2,000,000 cases of injury in the United States; and they even go so far as to say that in 'the wasted lives of our people we have been making ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the World Powers.' They quote a criticism to the effect that 'everywhere in America, in the railways, factories and building trades, we see how little regard is paid to human life'; and they state that 'it is the general opinion of the engineering profession that one-half of the accidents in the United States are preventable.' This statement is supported by the accident reductions effected in certain companies which have whole-heartedly adopted 'safety' methods. For instance, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in 1911 reduced their accidents 63 per cent. below those of the previous twelve months. The methods employed for accident reduction consist not only in the installation of mechanical safeguards and safety devices, but in the formation of 'Committees of Safety' at the individual factories. There is usually a central committee, a plant committee, and committees of foremen and workmen.

It is to be hoped that similar enthusiasm for accident prevention may be developed in this country, though it is not probable that such striking reductions will be achieved as in America. Thanks to the vigilance of our factory inspectors, it is very seldom that one comes across unguarded machinery, but there is still much scope for the introduction of safety devices. How great

a decrease of accidents could be thereby achieved is uncertain, but the published information available is not very hopeful. Out of 12,600 accidents—mostly due to machinery—reported in one division of the country to the certifying surgeon,* the inspector concluded that a remedy could be suggested in only about 700 cases. Again, of 1311 accidents recorded in 1911 by the North German Iron and Steel Association, for which compensation was paid, only 46 were attributed to lack of safety appliances and warning notices, while 37 were the result of the men not using the safety appliances installed, and disobeying notices. Of the remaining accidents, 484 were attributed to carelessness, and 693 were recorded as 'pure accidents from unknown causes.'

Can nothing be done to reduce the number of accidents for which no definite remedy has yet been offered? Before attempting to answer this question, it is important that we should discover their causation. The problem is an exceedingly difficult and intricate one, as it seldom happens that there is a clear relationship between cause and effect. As a rule there are many different factors operating at the same time, some tending to increase the accidents and others tending to diminish them; and it is necessary to disentangle the effects of these opposing factors from one another, and allow for their relative degrees of importance, before arriving at a provisional conclusion. It has generally been assumed that fatigue is the weightiest factor of all, for it was noted † that as a rule accidents were at a minimum at the beginning of the day when the workers were fresh, and increased rapidly during the course of the morning's work. In the afternoon spell they sometimes varied in a similar manner, and sometimes kept nearly constant at a fairly high level. Such a result could be explained by supposing that in some cases the workers were completely restored from their morning fatigue by their mid-day rest from work, while in other cases they were too tired to undergo

* Annual Report for 1912, p. xvii.

† Cf. Report on Fatigue from the Economic Standpoint. British Association Reports, 1915, p. 283.

much recuperation. However, the existence of much fatigue in the workers was quite unproved; and other possible factors were not fully considered, simply for lack of evidence about them.

The conditions obtaining in the munitions industry during the war afforded opportunities for investigating the causation of accidents which never occurred previously in peace times, and are not likely to occur again. In many factories huge numbers of men and women were working steadily month after month and year after year on the production of shells, fuses, cartridges and other munitions, or were engaged on repetition work in which the conditions of production, such as type and speed of machinery and the character of the article produced, remained unaltered. Often a change in the hours of work was the only condition which has been affected; hence the influence of such a change on the frequency and incidence of accidents could be clearly identified. Again, most factories ran night shifts as well as day shifts; and the differences in the conditions of day and night work induced remarkable differences in the incidence of accidents, which throw a flood of light on their causation.

At the instance of the Health of Munition Workers Committee, I made a prolonged study of the causation of accidents under war conditions, and have endeavoured to track down the various factors concerned.* The accidents occurring in four large munition factories were examined for continuous periods of from 9 to 25 months; and the ambulance room case-books, in which every accident treated was recorded by the nurses, were systematically worked through and the accidents sorted out into various categories and tabulated. The frequency of minor accidents in most munition factories is very great; at a fuse factory of 9000 workers the fresh cases averaged about 50 a day, while the redressings were three times as numerous. Altogether some 50,000 accident cases and nearly 4000 medical cases were classified.

The records in the case-books were for the most part

* Memorandum No. 21 of the Health of Munition Workers Committee, 1918. [Cd. 9046.]

very brief and matter-of-fact, but some of them formed interesting and often amusing human documents touching the habits of munition workers. One was first struck by the number of occasions on which injuries from bicycle accidents were treated. The records almost suggested that some workers made a point of falling off their bicycles when coming to the factory. The workers, having reached their destination and settled down to work, soon began to experience small accidents from their lathe and drill tools, especially cuts on fingers and thumbs; and these cases came to the dressing-station in rapidly increasing numbers as the morning wore on. Women were especially liable to sprains of the wrist; and lathe-workers often got hot metal turnings jumping up into the face and making small burns, while smaller turnings might lodge in an eye. An attempted removal of an object from the eye was often made in the machine shop by a friend of the worker, sometimes with the help of a penknife (as the case-book recorded), and the dressing-station was resorted to only in case of failure. Burns and scalds sometimes arose from carelessness in the employment of strong acids, but by far the most prolific cause of scalds was tea-making. Every self-respecting munition worker took tea at least twice a day at the works; and this tea was made for them in tins, teapots and other receptacles by properly accredited representatives, for whom a free supply of hot water was available. This water they appeared to pour on their hands and arms with extreme frequency; and even the workers, when they had got their tea, often upset it over themselves and got scalded. The catching of hair in machinery is by no means uncommon, in spite of the rigidly observed rule compelling women to wear caps; but fortunately very few severe accidents seem to have been caused thereby.

Many other accidents had no direct relation to munition work. One read of a man on night shift who 'strained right wrist by falling asleep with head on hand,' and of a woman on night shift who 'fell from table while sleeping.' Most of the workers, especially the women, seemed full of good humour and high spirits, but even they lapsed occasionally, for one read of a girl with 'right eye bruised by blow from hair brush'; of

another with 'right eye painful, struck by another girl'; of another suffering from 'bite on arm by another girl.' The entry relating to a male worker, viz. 'finger severely bruised by hit of hammer by girl,' suggested the query as to whether the girl did it of malice aforethought, or by mere clumsiness in some legitimate combined operation. Examples of indulgence followed by natural penalties were revealed in two consecutive cases of 'boy, sickness, cigar.' As may be imagined, the workers found occasional relief from the monotony of munition work in throwing things at one another, sometimes with dire consequences, as was shown by the record of 'boy hit on nose by primer thrown by another boy, who was suspended six days in consequence.' As a rule this horse-play met with no further punishment than that entailed by the injury; and one read not infrequently of a man 'hit by aluminium bar (or other object) thrown in play,' but with no mention of a consequential suspension of the offender. Many munition factories included a number of Belgian refugees among the workers; and, owing largely to ignorance of one another's habits and customs, the feeling between them and the British workers was not always as cordial as it might have been. It might even extend to blows, as is shown by the record of 'cut beside left eye; struck on head with shell case by Belgian.'

The medical cases treated were not much less numerous than the surgical, especially in respect of the women. Hysteria and 'nerves' were very frequently treated, and sal-volatile was administered in vast quantities. Most cases of hysteria were briefly described as such, but occasionally a little more detail was given. One record mentioned a girl 'carried over in hysterics; upset; had quarrel with aunt to-day': another, a girl who had a 'fainting attack; has been upset over young man. Cases of indigestion were numerous, and it appears that, when any cause of the malady was specified, it was almost invariably tinned salmon. 'Sickness after salmon' occurred over and over again, an occasional variant being 'pain after pork.' Tinned fish appeared to be eaten freely in munition circles at all times; and in the works canteen I have seen more than one night-shift foreman consume a whole tinned lobster at 3 a.m.

To return to the more serious side of our problem. The accidents were tabulated during each hour of the working day, with certain precautions to keep separate the accidents occurring at the beginning and end of the spells of work, when the employees had either not started work or were knocking off, and so were not subjecting themselves to the same risk of accident as in the hours of full work. Taking first the accidents occurring in the day shift at the fuse factory, it was found that they were comparatively infrequent at the beginning of the five-hour morning spell, but showed a rapid rise during its course, and attained a maximum in the last hour. During the two years (1916 and 1917) for which the employees were working a ten-hour day, the number of cuts increased during the morning rather more than twofold in the men, and more than threefold in the women. In the afternoon spell the cuts were rather more numerous, on an average, than in the morning, but they remained fairly steady throughout, though with some tendency to diminish towards the end of the afternoon.

The difficult question to decide was: How far is the rapid rise of accidents in the morning due to fatigue, and how far to other factors? Striking evidence on the point was obtained from the accident data at the factory in the latter part of 1915, when a twelve-hour day was being worked, instead of a ten-hour day. Shorter hours than twelve were worked on Saturdays and Sundays, and work was remitted on one Sunday a month; but nevertheless the hours of actual work, exclusive of meals, averaged 75 a week during this period, as compared with $64\frac{1}{2}$ to $58\frac{1}{2}$ in 1916, and $58\frac{1}{2}$ to $54\frac{1}{2}$ in 1917. In consequence of these long hours, the women's accidents were nearly three times more numerous than in the subsequent ten-hour day period, or, if due allowance be made for the longer hours of work, they were two and a half times more numerous. During the first hour of morning work they were rather less numerous than in 1916 and 1917, but they increased so rapidly that in the last hour they were five times more frequent than in the first hour. They were very numerous in the afternoon spell, but diminished towards the end; and in the evening spell, which lasted from 6.15 till 8.30 p.m., they were much less frequent, as many of the women were so tired that they

sat about, doing little or no work, and so exposed themselves to less risk of accident.

How did the men stand the twelve-hour day? In contrast with the women, their accidents were not affected at all. They were no more numerous in 1915 than in 1916, and they did not increase any more rapidly during the course of the morning spell. Evidently the men doing twelve hours did not suffer at all from over-fatigue, and distinctly less from fatigue of any kind than did the women when working a ten-hour day. The extreme fatigue of the women during the twelve-hour day period was well shown by some of the medical data. They were treated at the ambulance room for faintness nine times more frequently than the men, whilst in the subsequent ten-hour day period they were treated only three times more frequently. Again, the women were given sal-volatile—almost always as a restorative—no less than twenty-three times more frequently than the men during the twelve-hour day period, but only three times more frequently during the subsequent ten-hour day period.

It follows that the rise of accidents experienced by the men during their morning spell of work was not due to fatigue, though probably a part of the greater rise observed in women is attributable to this cause. It was, in fact, due partly to increasing speed of production, and partly to a psychical factor, viz. the increasing carelessness and inattention of the workers resultant on thoughts of the approaching dinner-break.

The frequency of accidents must naturally be affected by the speed of production, for if, in the production of a certain article on the lathe or other machine, the worker has to perform one or more processes by the application of sharp tools, he experiences every time the risk of cutting himself against his tools, or of injury from hot metal turnings. If he produces the article twice as fast, he has to make all the essential movements of his hands and body in close proximity to his tools twice as often as before, and for this reason he would run twice the risk of hurting himself. As a matter of fact, he generally experiences considerably more than twice the risk of an accident. In most lathe operations it is impossible to speed up the actual cutting or boring of the metal object

beyond a certain point; and increased speed of production is mainly effected (a) by wasting less time in standing about idly, and (b) by changing the tools more quickly and bringing them more rapidly into contact with the metal surface. It is in these movements of tools that the worker experiences the greatest risk of cutting himself; consequently a moderate increase in speed of production may mean a much more than proportionate increase in speed of movements, and a still greater risk of accident.

The speed of production at the factories was as a rule ascertained indirectly by measuring the electric current consumed in driving the machinery, though direct enumerations of the articles produced were made as well. At the fuse factory the output of the lathe sections, where most of the accidents were experienced, increased steadily during the morning spell, and reached a maximum in the last hour just as the accidents did; but this maximum was only 10 per cent. greater than the output in the first hour, whereas the accidents were twice or three times as numerous. In the afternoon the output was large in the first hour, and then fell away, or again showed a fair resemblance to the accident variations. At the shell factories, where 6-inch to 15-inch shells were being made, little variation was possible in the speed with which the cutting tools were changed and applied to the shell; and, in correspondence with this fact, it was found that the variations in the number of accidents during the course of the day was much smaller than at the fuse factory.

Passing on to the daily variations of output, it was found that there was a gradual increase during the first three or four days of the working week, followed by a gradual decline; and that in correspondence therewith the accidents generally—though not invariably—showed a similar rise and fall. Again, it was found that, during the course of the two years for which the observations were made, the hourly output of certain selected and typical articles produced at the fuse factory gradually rose by about 30 per cent.; and that coincidentally with this rise, the frequency of accidents increased some 40 per cent. For these and other reasons it was concluded that varying speed of production is largely, though by

no means wholly, responsible for the variations of accident frequency, especially those occurring from hour to hour during the course of the day.

The importance of the psychical factor in accident causation was demonstrated by investigating the incidence of accidents in the night shift. I found that, at all the factories, the accidents, both to men and women, were at a maximum in the first hour of work, and steadily diminished during the course of the night till, at about 4 a.m., they reached a minimum which was not much more than half the initial number. Then they either kept steady at this minimum till the workers knocked off at 6.0 or 6.30 a.m., or they showed a slight rise. That is to say, the hourly incidence of night-shift accidents was almost the reverse of that observed in the day shift. This reversal was not due to reversal of output, for this varied in the same way as the day-shift output, and at the fuse factory reached its maximum either at about midnight or at 4 a.m., and then fell away. It was due to the differences in the mental condition of the night-shift and day-shift workers when starting work. The night shift, who began at 6 or 7 p.m., generally got up three or four hours earlier, and spent these hours in household work, shopping, or amusements such as a visit to the cinema, and in having substantial meals. Hence they came on to work in a lively and sometimes an excited state, but they gradually calmed down in the course of the night, since they had only an unexhilarating breakfast and bed to look forward to. The day shift, on the other hand, got up as late as possible, almost always by artificial light, and, after a hurried breakfast, arrived at the factory in a lethargic and depressed condition. They brightened up gradually in the course of the morning, as they generally had some tea at about 9 a.m., and had their dinner-break to look forward to. In consequence, their inattention increased, and accidents multiplied correspondingly.

The criticism will naturally be advanced that, if the hourly variations of night-shift accidents are almost the reverse of those of output, speed of production cannot be a factor of much importance in accident causation. To counter this criticism, one is driven to conclude that the psychical factor is powerful enough

to overpower the effects of the speed-of-production factor. The validity of this conclusion is supported by the fact that at the shell factories, where the speed-of-production factor was much less important than at the fuse factory, the decrease of accidents observed during the course of the night was considerably greater.

A contributory cause to the psychical factor was the consumption of alcoholic liquids. Most day-shift workers who took alcohol at all did so after their day's work was ended, as they had very little time to spare in their mid-day dinner-break; and many of them got their meals at the factory canteen, where alcoholic refreshment was strictly forbidden. The night-shift workers, on the other hand, if they wished to take alcohol, did so shortly before they came on to work; and therefore the influence of the alcohol, if it existed at all, would be much more likely to reveal itself in them than in the day-shift workers. It was out of the question to examine the individual workers as to their habits of drinking, for it would have been impossible to extract the truth. Hence the evidence to be adduced is only indirect, but it is none the less convincing.

In the first place, it is well known that the average sobriety of the nation greatly improved during the war. The total convictions for drunkenness in England and Wales gradually fell to about a third; while the convictions in the towns in which the factories under observation were situated fell, between 1913 and 1917, to about a seventh. This improvement was due largely to the restrictions in the sale of alcoholic liquor. In the latter half of 1917 consumption was only about two-fifths of its pre-war level; and it may be assumed that, in a large group of individuals such as the 9000 workers at the fuse factory, the average sobriety varied more or less in the same way as that of the other inhabitants of the town.

Had this increasing sobriety any parallel variation in the frequency of accidents? This question was tested by enumerating the accidents (cuts) which occurred in the three spells of work of the night shift. Any effects due to alcohol consumption would be greatest in the first spell and least in the last spell; and the effects would presumably be greater in men than in the women, for

men drink more alcohol; at all events, their convictions for drunkenness are three or four times more numerous than those of women. In correspondence with the drinking habits mentioned, it was found that, if the average number of accidents per hour in the men during the first spell were taken as 100, it fell to 75 in the second spell, and to 62 in the third spell. In the women the relative number of accidents in the three spells varied as 100, 89, and 72, respectively. As already stated, this diminution of accidents during the course of the night was due largely to the increasing calm of the night-shift workers; and such recovery of mental equilibrium could not have been due wholly to the disappearance of the artificial excitement produced by alcohol consumption. That it was due partly to this artificial cause appears to be shown by the fact that, as the sobriety of the workers increased, the number of accidents in the first spell grew relatively less and less. In the men the proportions of accidents changed even more than in the women.

In the day-shift workers there was no evidence of any alcoholic effect except at the time when they were working a twelve-hour day. The number of accidents was then at a maximum on Monday, and dwindled rapidly during the course of the week till it reached a minimum on Friday, some 30 per cent. smaller than the Monday maximum. On Saturday it suddenly shot up again and nearly reached the Monday maximum; and the entire disappearance of this week-end excess of accidents when the ten-hour day was substituted for the twelve-hour day seems to point to week-end drinking as its cause. Wages were paid on Friday evening, and it seems probable that the over-fatigued workers were inclined to indulge themselves then, and on the next two days. On most nights of the week they did not stop work until 8.30 p.m., and so had not much opportunity; but in the ten-hour day period they stopped work at 6 p.m., and so they presumably took their alcohol in more moderate quantities, and distributed it evenly throughout the week.

Assuming the substantial correctness of the conclusions so far arrived at touching the causes, do they

suggest any means for reducing the number of accidents? Can one do anything to diminish the inattention of the night-shift workers when they first come to the factory, and bring them into the condition of mental calm into which they pass in the small hours of the morning? It is even more important to bring the day shift to a similar mental state. Thus it was found that, in all the factories, the accidents were more numerous in the day shift than in the night shift, the average excess being 19 per cent. This excess of accidents occurred in spite of the fact that the alcohol factor operates more powerfully on the night shift than on the day shift. It is probable that the difference is due chiefly to the psychical factor. Though the day-shift workers are in a dull mental state when they first come on to work, yet for most of their working hours they are in a greater mental ferment than the night shift. Thoughts of home life and its troubles, of friends and relations, of pleasures and amusements, all take attention from the work in hand. The simplest way to increase the mental concentration of the workers would be to forbid all conversation in the shops, except that relating to the work in hand; for even a minute's talk with a friend on matters not related to the work may initiate a vigorous chain of thought, and much mental unrest and distraction. The hardship, if hardship it be considered, could be mitigated by reducing the hours of work, and by the provision of comfortable canteens, rest-rooms and reading-rooms in the factory. In other words, let the employees concentrate all their energies on their work during shortened working hours, but let them have every comfort and convenience possible during non-working hours.

The system of posting 'safety bulletins' and other information relating to accident prevention at the entrance to each of the workshops is certainly worth trying. As it has proved useful in the United States it might be expected to do some good in this country, though the innate conservatism of our average working man is difficult to combat. It would be essential that the bulletins should be changed at frequent intervals, as is done in the States, for otherwise the workmen would glance at them once, and ignore them and their suggestions for ever after. One knows that, of men

engaged on the same kind of work, certain individuals frequently suffer accidents, whereas others almost invariably avoid them; in other words, some men are inherently clumsy or careless, while others are the reverse. Suitable education may at least teach the inherently clumsy man to exercise more care.

The harmful effects of consuming alcoholic liquids can be combated in several ways. In the day shift, the temptation for the workers to drink during the mid-day meal hour could be diminished by offering them inducements to take their meals in the factory. The number of workers catered for in munition-works canteens increased rapidly during the war; in 1917 it amounted to 800,000, in 1918 to nearly a million.* The canteen system is extending to other factories; and the more general it becomes the better will it be both for employers and employed. It would be quite worth while to provide food at slightly under cost price, as the expense would be more than repaid by the increased vigour of the workers. The workers would be able to rest for the whole of their break, instead of having to hurry to and from home; they would get better-cooked food; and they would be relieved from the temptation to get a drink. Moderate drinking in the evening, when work is finished, would have little or no influence on the chance of accidents, or on the quality and quantity of the output, as its effects would have passed off before work began next morning. The temptation for night shifts to have a drink just before coming on to work can be reduced by arranging that the shifts start shortly before the time at which the public-houses are opened. This was usually done at all the factories investigated; but in two of them, for certain periods, work did not start till after opening time, and the relative number of accidents in the first spell of night work increased, presumably in consequence.

The preventive measures thus far suggested are not very striking or original, and the sceptic may consider their probable effectiveness to be very small. What it would be in actual fact one cannot tell without direct

* Fourth Report of Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic), 1918, p. 11. [Cd. 9055.]

experiment. But certain other preventives will now be discussed, the efficacy of which is demonstrable by actual figures. The first of these is temperature. Every one knows that in very cold weather the unprotected hands are liable to get numb; and such numbness means loss of manual dexterity or increased liability to accidents. One would imagine that the effects of cold would be specially great in engineering shops, where the hands are constantly in contact with cold metal tools and other metal objects, and are frequently wetted the whole day through by the stream of soapy water in which many metal articles are turned. Yet, curiously enough, no direct observations appear to have been made hitherto upon the relationship between temperature and liability to accidents.

In order to acquire such information, I determined the temperature variations at the fuse factory continuously for six months by means of a recording thermograph. The instrument was placed in the centre of one of the large shops (200 × 200 feet), and, by comparisons with thermometers placed in other shops, it was found to give a fairly accurate idea of the mean temperature of most of the factory. On an average, accidents were at a minimum when the factory temperature was about 67° F., though they were only slightly more frequent so long as it lay between 60° and 70°. At temperatures above these limits they began to increase more rapidly in number, and at 77° were 30 per cent. more numerous. At lower temperatures they likewise increased, being 18 per cent. more numerous at 56°; but the artificial heating of the factory was so good that I had no opportunity of observing the effects of real cold. I was, however, able to make observations of this kind at the shell factories, which were situated in a more northerly and bleaker district than the fuse factory.

In these factories the heating was only moderate; and, as large doors had frequently to be opened to admit trucks of shells, the temperature in parts of the shops temporarily fell almost to that outside. I did not record the temperature in the factories themselves, but obtained complete records of the external temperatures; and it was instructive to see how the proportion of accidents rose steadily on passing from

the autumn to the winter months, and fell again with the advent of spring. It was found that at one factory the women experienced on an average nearly two and a half times more accidents when the external temperature was at or below freezing-point than when it was above 48°, while the men experienced twice as many accidents. At intermediate temperatures the accidents were intermediate in number, or there was a clear and close relationship between accident frequency and temperature. Hence, there can be no doubt that low temperature is one of the most important causes of accidents. Moreover, it is a cause which can be and ought to be avoided in practically all indoor industries. Glaring instances of its occurrence are often noted by factory inspectors. We read * of a clothing factory with a temperature of 39°, of a large provender mill with one of 28°, and of the carding room at a flax mill with one of 35·5°. Abnormally high temperatures are likewise not infrequent. Temperatures of 109° and 113° are recorded in cotton mills, and of 106° and 111° in print works.

Another well-known cause of accidents which can easily be remedied is defective artificial lighting. The Departmental Committee on Lighting in Factories and Workshops, in the weighty report issued by them in 1915, adduced indirect evidence to show that inadequate lighting is a contributory cause of accidents; and their conclusions were confirmed by the evidence of witnesses regarding accidents in foundries, shipbuilding yards and cotton mills. I myself did not obtain very striking data, as the factories in which I worked were all well lit. The only type of accident which was considerably affected by artificial light was that of foreign bodies in the eye. Apparently the workers bend more over their work when the lighting is artificial, and so get more metal turnings and particles of emery jumping into their eyes. Though, as already stated, night-shift accidents, taken as a whole, were distinctly less frequent than day-shift accidents, eye accidents were 30 to 60 per cent. more numerous in the worst-lit factory. At two of the other factories they showed a smaller excess than this, but at

* Annual Report of Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops, 1912, pp. 81 and 124.

the best-lit factory they showed very little excess at all; so evidently there is no inherent difficulty in providing an absolutely effective system of artificial lighting.

Other simple preventive measures were suggested by making a comparison of the frequency with which the various types of accident occurred in men and women, and in the different factories. An excessive frequency implies some special cause; and, by identifying the cause, it is generally possible to abate or abolish it. For instance, women were found to be much more liable than men to sprains. Taking the relative number of cuts as a basis, the women at the fuse factory experienced between two and three times more sprains, chiefly sprains of the wrist. These sprains were mainly suffered in pushing home the clamping lever of the lathes. The lever was designed to suit men's stronger wrists, but it would be quite a simple matter, by lengthening or otherwise altering it, to render it suitable for women. At the factory where 6-inch shells were made, sprains were more frequent, both in men and women, than at the 9-inch shell factory. The reason of this was that the workers, in order to save time and trouble, frequently moved the shells about by hand, instead of with the tackle provided. The 6-inch shells weighed 80 to 100 lbs. each, and so were just within their lifting powers; but 9-inch shells, which weighed 360 lbs. in the rough, necessitated the use of tackle, and so threw no abnormal strain upon the muscles.

Again, the women at the 9- and 15-inch shell factory suffered about eight times more frequently from burns, and four times more frequently from eye accidents, than the women at the fuse factory, though their cuts and sprains corresponded in number. This excess of accidents was due chiefly to the steel turnings from these big shells being much larger and hotter, and more liable to jump out from the object turned, than the aluminium and brass turnings met with in fuse manufacture. But it is self-evident that the hands could easily be protected from burns by wearing gloves, and the eyes from foreign bodies by wearing protective spectacles.

The frequency with which septic cuts were treated varied greatly at the different factories; and, as a septic wound is much more likely to interfere with work than

a fresh wound treated immediately, it is important that everything possible should be done to induce the workers to attend the ambulance room directly they experience an accident, even if only a slight one. The method of suasion adopted at one of the factories was to allow a pass out of the works for the rest of the day (without loss of time-rate wages) for such of the freshly-treated accident cases as were thought to require it, but no such pass for the septic cases. Somewhat unexpectedly, the women were found to be more careless in attending the ambulance station than the men.

As already stated, the evidence regarding the causation of accidents which I have myself been able to collect relates to four munition factories only. It is brought forward, not as a complete investigation of the subject, but as a sample of what can be done at any factory possessing an ambulance room and adequate records of cases treated. At all large factories the accident data should be classified and tabulated regularly by one of the nurses, or by an intelligent clerk, acting under the supervision of a medical man. Thereby invaluable evidence as to the causation of accidents would gradually be accumulated; and in course of time preventive measures would suggest themselves. The accidents occurring in different industries vary greatly in their frequency, their severity, and their type; consequently, preventive measures adapted for accidents in one industry would not necessarily suit those met with in another industry. Hence, the more widely the examination of accident records is extended, the more successful will be the efforts to prevent them. Though many of them may prove unavoidable, it is probable that even in the best-managed factories they may be reduced by 30 per cent., and in badly managed factories, by 60 per cent. or more.

H. M. VERNON.

Art. 9.—TURKISH RULE AND BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN MESOPOTAMIA.

IMPATIENT critics of the Peace Conference have not always made allowance for the immensity of its task and the need for careful discussion of its innumerable problems. Delay was inevitable; but it is unfortunate that the country to suffer the longest delay in the decision of her affairs should be Turkey. To the Oriental, delay betokens weakness; and weakness is the quality he most abhors. Justice he commends, but it is action that he respects. The indecision of to-day will embarrass whatever Government is eventually entrusted with the task of reconstruction.

While the war continued, it was vitally important that the resources of Mesopotamia should be developed for the maintenance of the troops in the country; and, thanks to the War Council, rapid progress was secured. But money that in war was available for the stimulation of production as a military resource cannot during an armistice be applied for the development of an occupied enemy country. Affairs in Mesopotamia are therefore at a standstill, a standstill the more disappointing because of the successful reconstructive work carried out during active operations and dating back to the earliest phases of the campaign. When the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force left India in the autumn of 1914, Sir Percy Cox was attached to the Staff of the G.O.C. as Chief Political Officer. He was joined in January 1915 by Mr H. Dobbs, I.C.S., as Revenue Commissioner. On them fell the burden of setting the administration of the newly occupied territories in order. It is difficult to appreciate their work without some understanding of the political and economic condition of Irak under Turkish rule.

I. *Irak under Turkey*.—Basra and Baghdad, the two vilayets comprised in 'Irak' were not treated by the Porte as a part of Turkey proper but as an alien conquered territory, the inhabitants of which were subjects of the Empire, not citizens. This distinction in status was most obvious in the land laws. In Turkey rights somewhat similar to 'squatter's rights' in English law could be acquired against the State by continuous

possession of land, and converted into title on registration and payment of a small fee, with the result that practically all arable land became the property of individuals. Irak, on the contrary, was a conquered province and its soil the booty of the victors. The only exceptions were sites of towns and villages together with their immediate precincts, and land given by the Sultan at the time of conquest in reward for services rendered. No other land could be owned privately; and all encroachments were jealously contested.

The Ottoman conquest left the country almost waste; and, as no one will reclaim land in which he is to have no sufficient interest, Irak, for all its fertility, remained undeveloped. In 1871 Midhat Pasha, the one statesman-like Vali Baghdad has seen, endeavoured to remedy this evil, and obtained a decree sanctioning the sale of land on a tenure known as *tapu itassaraf*. Under this decree purchasers acquired a transferable right of undisturbed possession of defined areas for purposes of cultivation; but the right fell short of full ownership because of certain limiting conditions. It was the hope of Midhat Pasha that Arab possessors would be attracted by this opportunity of obtaining on easy terms a legal title to the land they occupied. But the Arab saw in it a subtle design to circumscribe his liberty. He believed he was being tempted to forsake the freedom of the tent for the cramped atmosphere of the town, and to become thereafter liable to conscription and service away from his beloved desert. In despair Midhat Pasha extended his offer to the public, and succeeded in attracting a certain number of investors, of whom a few only were Arabs, the majority being Jews or Armenians. The new proprietors made such terms with the Arab occupiers as they could, advanced money, dug canals, and extended cultivation. But Midhat Pasha's career came to a tragic end; and difficulties arose. The Arabs, accustomed from time immemorial to occupy these newly formed estates, resented the payment of rent to the proprietors; while the authorities at Constantinople were suspicious that, under cover of the new law, land might be improperly lost to the State. So it came about that further sales were stopped, and the State has remained the owner of almost all the soil of Irak. Yet though dominion has

remained *de jure* with the Turk, possession for the most part has continued *de facto* with the Arab; and between Turkish officials and Arab tribesmen there has been continual conflict. The immediate neighbourhood of settled towns such as Baghdad, Hillah, and Basra was quiet enough, but beyond were the agricultural tribes, and beyond them the desert where passage was not always safe and payment of revenue was always insecure.

Irak was thus no part of Turkey, either in legal status or popular sentiment. Nevertheless the administrative machinery employed was that which was universal throughout the Empire. For the purposes of executive government, the vilayet, or province, presided over by the Vali was divided into mutassarifliks (divisions) under a Mutassarif, or Commissioner; and these divisions were subdivided into districts under Kaimmakams, or deputy commissioners, the districts again being partitioned into mudirates. The Turk, however, never grasped the principle of decentralisation; and each high official combined in himself all the lower offices for the immediate locality in which he resided. A petition presented in the mudirate of Nil, in the district of Hillah, in the mutassariflik of Diwaniyah, would have to pass through each of the offices named before it reached the Vali; a similar petition originating in the suburbs of Baghdad would be entertained both originally and finally in the office of the Vali himself. For the maintenance of order the Vali controlled a gendarmerie, of which there were scattered posts throughout the province; and troops were stationed at Baghdad. Village policing was arranged usually by the villagers themselves, the practice on the Euphrates being to ensure against theft by bribing the chief of the most notorious tribe of thieves. On paper this appeared as a contract entered into between the chief and the village for watch and ward, the chief undertaking to make good any loss. There was a fixed levy on buildings, and this was collected by the chief, who saw to it that burglaries took place if his 'dues' were not paid. The system was simple and worked on the whole satisfactorily.

The power exercised by the Executive used to be despotic, but the revolution of 1908 affected to secure a

measure of self-government. In each province there was established an advisory Council to the Vali, and also a Special Department, the members of which were elected and were intended to exercise real control over offices of local concern, such as communications, public works, sanitation and education. The Department was nominally given control over specified sources of income, but sums placed at its disposal were on occasion 'borrowed' by the Imperial Government; and grants voted by it often failed to reach the intended recipients. Education was said to have received a great impulse; and the map was dotted with flags showing where new schools had been created. But in choosing teachers greater regard was paid to the relationship of the candidate with a member of the Committee than to his proficiency or even his morals; and the percentage of those who had more to recommend them than a knowledge of caligraphy and some acquaintance with the Koran was small indeed. There was, however, a liberally endowed Arts and Crafts School at Baghdad; and the merits of several private schools, notably those of the Alliance Israélite (which in addition to its Boys' Schools had a Girls' School accommodating a thousand pupils), the Convent School, and the Schools of the Latin and Armenian Churches, were recognised by annual promises of monetary assistance, and encouraged on rare occasions by part payment. As usual in Turkish practice, a sound theory of political science was expounded by commendable regulations execrably administered.

Another misapplied means of popular control was the Municipality. Villages whose gross communal income was only a few pounds boasted municipal offices; but almost the whole of the income was spent on the office, the balance remaining for works of public utility being ludicrously small. The villagers themselves looked on the Municipality rather as a permanent committee for raising funds for occasional demands, such as the entertainment of touring officials, than as a stepping-stone on the path to responsible government. In short, machinery whereby self-government could be realised was created, but power remained in the hands of the Vali and his staff, under the supervision of the Central Government at Constantinople.

Justice was administered through Civil, Criminal and Religious Courts. Courts of first instance were established at the head-quarters of districts, and Courts of Appeal generally at provincial capitals; the Courts of Revision were at Constantinople. The modern tendency was to circumscribe the jurisdiction of religious courts, in which the kadi administered Shara' law, in favour of the secular courts; but in practice the judge in the Court of first instance was often the Kadi, and his secular decisions were often influenced by koranic principles. The Courts were notoriously corrupt, but they enjoyed a certain independence of the Executive; and the establishment (shortly before the war) of Peace Courts with a special summary procedure showed a commendable recognition of the evils of delay in the disposal of litigation. But reform was difficult, capable lawyers were few, and the standard of public morality was low.

Equally with the Courts, the Revenue Department was independent of the Executive. Public accounts fell under three heads—provincial, imperial, and the Public Debt. The daftardar in the province was responsible to the Minister of Finance in Constantinople for all provincial accounts and for the collection of all such revenues as were not managed direct from Constantinople. In addition to a large accounts office at head-quarters, he had under him revenue officials in each mutassarifik. So far as possible he farmed the taxes, thus reducing subordinate staff and centralising control. War taxes, land revenue, *temettu*, and *koda* were the more important items for which he was responsible.

War taxes were mostly additional cesses levied on existing taxes; but a specially profitable measure was the provision permitting payment in exemption of military service. This was so construed as to penalise the same individual over and over again. Conscripts were called out by classes, the younger class being called out first, and each time a fresh class was called out fresh payment had to be made. For example, an Armenian of nineteen who had secured exemption when the class 'over eighteen and under twenty' was ordered to the colours had to pay afresh when the class 'over eighteen and under twenty-two' was called up. In the year before the occupation of Baghdad by the British, nearly 250,000

liras, approximately one-half of the gross revenues of the province, were raised thus.

But in normal times land revenue was the most important of the taxes in charge of the *daftardar*. The claim of the State on arable land was to a percentage of the crop, fixed most commonly at 10 per cent. on land unirrigated or irrigated by lift, and 20 per cent. on land irrigated by flow, often with an additional charge, in some cases as high as 32 per cent., as rent. But there were many exceptions; and the rate varied with the locality and the crop, often without any apparent reason. In a few instances only the claim was converted into a cash demand. Usually the crops were inspected, and the anticipated Government share was sold by auction. The estimate was used as a guide only. The successful bidder paid cash, but became entitled to the actual amount of the State's percentage in kind. This he would collect by making arrangements for watch and ward during harvest and for actual division after threshing; or, more usually, he would bargain with the individual revenue-payers for the amount due from them, or its value. Should the cultivators refuse payment, gendarmes might be called in; and they would be quartered on the village at the village expense until satisfaction was given. At every step there was opportunity for corruption. The assessment committee would be induced to cook the estimate, the bidders would endeavour to have the auction arranged in their favour, the Sheikh would be bribed to permit the revenue to be collected without hitch, or, if recourse to force became necessary, the wheels of the machinery of the executive had to be greased before they would revolve. There was no remission for the cultivator whose crop barely returned seed for seed sown; he still had to pay his tenth or whatever the share might be. There was no encouragement to experimental or adventurous husbandry, no sympathy between official and peasant. The taxes themselves were collected by a profiteering middleman.

Estates which paid rent were of two classes, *Sanniyah* and *Amiriyah*. *Sanniyah* estates had been the property of the Sultan, and before the revolution were administered by a special Civil Service. It is customary to consider Abdul Hamid as tyranny personified, but as a landlord—

and he had acquired most of the best estates in Irak—he was something of a success. The managers of his farms were strictly supervised, and their treatment of their peasantry was more generous than was customary elsewhere. Deserving tenants who had suffered from a bad season were financed; canals were properly maintained; and a good stamp of cattle and a good breed of horses were encouraged. At the revolution all Sanniyah estates were confiscated by the State, and re-christened Mudawwarah, or 'converted'—converted to the apathy and stagnation which characterised the administration of other State lands. Amiriyah estates were lands which belonged to the State by virtue of conquest and had not been expropriated or leased. Sanniyah estates paid almost invariably 36 per cent. of their produce as combined rent and revenue; but the treatment of Amiriyah estates was strangely inconsistent. On the Tigris they paid no rent but only revenue; on the Euphrates they paid one-third of the gross crop if it was wheat or barley, and more than half if it was rice. Tenants were left to arrange their own finances and dig out their own water-courses; Government, to them, meant only a visit from the tax-collector.

Temettu was an imposition that has no exact equivalent in England. It is something between a tax on professions and an income tax. Villages containing less than 3000 inhabitants were exempt; but, where collection was made, the *temettu* net ringed in every one from the donkey-driver and potter, who paid a fixed sum because he was a donkey-driver or a potter, to the wealthy merchant who was assessed according to his income, subject to a maximum assessment of £T50. *Koda* was a tax levied on sheep, camels, and buffaloes at a fixed rate per head. Counts were made each spring; and, in spite of the difficulties of this system of assessment, the tax yielded in the Baghdad province alone as much as £T80,000 per annum. There were other minor taxes—*vergu*, an annual tax on house property, and *bedel al tariq*, a poll-tax, nominally for upkeep of roads, levied on all residents in the Empire; but these yielded little in Mesopotamia, where indeed the poll-tax lapsed because of the difficulties of enforcement.

Completely removed from Government interference

was the Administration of the Public Debt. It owed its origin to the financial crisis of 1881 when the Porte failed to meet its obligations to its bondholders, of whom the majority were foreigners, many being English and French. International complications threatened; and, to avoid these, the Porte and its creditors assented to a compromise whereby not only were the revenues from certain sources of income assigned to the creditors, but also the actual recovery and administration connected therewith were, with a few exceptions, entrusted to them. The revenues so pledged were those derived from tobacco, salt, revenue stamps, liquor, fish, skins of wild animals, and silk. The Ottoman Debt also received a proportion of custom receipts. Thus there came into being a Civil Service within the Empire, distinct from the Government; and under it was maintained a preventive force for the detection of smuggling and contraband. The Service was better paid and managed than any of the Government Departments in Mesopotamia.

The most profitable of their sources of income were tobacco and salt. The tobacco administration was leased to the Régie, a commercial company in which the Ottoman Government had an interest. The Company worked on lines similar to those followed by the Debt Administration, and maintained a well-paid and efficient staff. With the aid of the Porte they were able to promote the cultivation of indigenous tobacco both by tariff protection against Persian competition and by a policy of advances on easy terms to tobacco growers. The *taccavi* work that is done in India by revenue officials was, in respect to tobacco, carried out by the Régie. The most important centres in the Eastern Empire were Keui Sanjak and Sulaimaniyah, the receipts from the latter district alone being valued at £T100,000 per annum. The crop was inspected in its early stages; and throughout its progress en route to the consumer, while it was being harvested, dried, stored and sold wholesale and retail, it was under the supervision of the Company's officials.

The Salt monopoly was worked by the Debt itself. Warehouses were established at frequent intervals for the sale of salt; and the stores were obtained by contract, supplies being brought in from salt deposits, such as

those at Samawa, or collected from salt-pits, such as those at Kifri and the Jabal Hamrin, and priced to the public at the cost under the contract plus the authorised tax. A preventive establishment against contraband existed, but was hardly effective except in towns and large villages. The deserts of Irak are sufficiently abundant in salt for the rural population to arrange their own supplies; and the Debt Administration was unable to do more than prevent sale in the open market.

The liquor trade was in the hands of Jews. The favourite intoxicant was spirit (*arak*) distilled in Baghdad and Basra from dates, in Mosul more frequently from raisins, or a mixture of raisins and dates. Wine was not infrequently made in Mosul, rarely in Baghdad. There was no limit either on the number of shops licensed or on the quantities brewed. Distillers were also allowed to sell by retail. The refinements of an excise policy were unknown. Shop licences were assessed on the rental value of the premises; the fee for distillation was based on the length of time occupied by the process. The unauthorised possession of a retort was an offence; and persons desiring to distil hired this apparatus from the Debt at so much an hour, time being calculated from the moment the retort left the office to the moment of its return. The distillery was usually at some distance from the office building; and the spectacle of an avaricious taverner, the retort clasped eagerly to his bosom, speeding on his outward and his homeward run in the effort to reduce the number of wasted minutes, was an occasional delight even to the bazaar's most stolid coffee-drinkers. The system was bad, but the officials were concerned not with government or morals, but with cash. The general welfare was beyond their purview; and the relation between the proceeds of a tax and the annoyances which the collection of it entailed to the trade in general or the taxpayer in particular were no concern of theirs.

The Public Debt has administered effectively the fiscal measures of which it has been given control, but the institution of its administration has made reform of these measures almost impossible. The educated Turk must have found in the presence in his country of a foreign service exercising some of the most important functions

of sovereignty at once an irritating monument to his country's inefficiency in the past and a great obstacle in the way of future progress.

Such in brief was the machinery of Ottoman government in Mesopotamia. The extent to which it interfered with the individual differed with the community to which that individual belonged. The dweller in towns could not escape the multifarious taxes; and village life repeated on a smaller scale town conditions. But in tribal areas such as the marsh lands between Nasiriyah and Kurnah, and the tract from Rumaitha to Samawa, the tax-collector hardly dared to appear. The district of Diwaniyah was a series of bullet-pocked forts, and life was cheap. Inter-tribal fighting was common; and casualties, mostly killed, would run into three figures. In quarrels such as these the Turkish official did not interfere. So long as enough revenue was paid to make it not worth while to set troops in motion to recover the balance, the district officer was content to leave matters to themselves. He found it politic to stimulate inter-tribal discord, and to set members of the same family at variance with one another, but, for the rest, the less he was bothered the happier he found himself. There was no attempt to improve conditions; canals which had silted up were abandoned; where marshes had formed, no attempt was made to drain them. The district officer coveted town life, and the eyes of the urban official were fixed on Constantinople; and all Constantinople asked for was surplus money for immediate spending.

There is one work in Irak to which the Turkish Government can point with some satisfaction. Shortly below the headworks of the canal which runs to Kerbala the Euphrates divides into two streams, one passing by the village of Hindiyah to Kufa and thence through the expanse known as the Sea of Shinafiyeh to Samawa; the other, known as the Hillah Canal, passing to the west, washing the skirts of deserted Babylon and flowing past the town of Hillah down to Rumaitha, whence it turns westwards till it meets the main stream just below Samawa. It was from this canal that most of the land taken up by private enterprise under Midhat Pasha's scheme was watered; and the area was the most thriving of all the scattered cornlands of Irak. But the

canal depended on a barrage across the Euphrates ; and in the last quarter of last century this burst, and the canal ran dry. Local efforts at repair proving fruitless, Sir W. Willcocks was consulted by the authorities at Constantinople ; the land of the two rivers was surveyed ; and a project was drawn up for barraging both the Tigris and the Euphrates and constructing main and feeder canals, etc.—in short, for irrigating the 12,500,000 acres for which water is available. By the autumn of 1914 the barrage itself and the headworks to the Hillah Canal had been constructed, one of two feeder canals necessary to make the barrage fully effectual had been aligned, and other work was proceeding. Progress was slow, but at least the project was complete and the work begun.

II. *Irak during the War.*—Our advance on Basra followed so rapidly on the declaration of war that this sketch is a sufficiently accurate picture of government and governed up to the moment of occupation. With the retreating Turkish armies fled all the officials, including those of the Public Debt ; but so rapid was their flight that the records were left undamaged, and the public buildings untouched. It was the season at which the revenue on dates is collected ; demand statements had been prepared by the Turks and preparations for collection completed. The orderly assumption by an occupying force of the normal privileges and duties of government has a steadying effect on the civil population of an enemy territory ; and in Basra within a few days of the fall of the town the collection of revenue began. Then came the advance to Nasiriyah on the Euphrates, to Amarah, Kut, and Ctesiphon on the Tigris. Towns, as they were occupied, were at once placed under military governorship ; districts also began to take shape, guarantees were exchanged with Sheikhs, revenue contracts were considered and where necessary revised, and Courts of Civil Justice were opened at Basra. So smoothly were things working that the Revenue Commissioner was busy in Kut shortly before it was invested. Then followed the efforts to relieve the beleaguered garrison. That season was a bad one for the dates. Floods did much damage ; and remissions and suspensions of revenue were made where necessary. The sympathetic

but firm handling they received went far to establish the confidence of the agricultural tribes. By the summer of 1916, when Mr Dobbs was invalidated, the province of Basra was comparable to a section of Northern India. The business of government was in full swing. Oppressive taxation was disregarded or mitigated; otherwise, as the law of nations demands, the fiscal law of the country was maintained. Courts were busy, and the office of land registration, its papers intact and in order, was reopened. Towns such as Basra and Nasiriyah were still under military governors; Suq-al-Shaiyukh, which had long defied Ottoman rule, was kept quiet by the presence of a political officer. Kurnah, Kilat Saleh, and Amarah were districts with an organisation like that of the Baluch tumans.

The Sheikh was held responsible as well for the law and order of his tribe as for the payment of revenue, but was himself under the supervision of a political officer in charge of the district, who acted as town magistrate, president of the municipality, and representative of Government in all its branches. Justice was summary, and sentences were more varied and effective than those found in the code. A policeman who deserted his officer when attacked by hostile Bedouin was paraded through the bazaar of his native town bearing the placard: 'I am the policeman who deserted his Sahib in the hour of danger.' A public servant found stealing Government property was sentenced to carry through the bazaar an inscription in either hand, the one reading, 'With this hand I receive from Government,' the other, 'With this I steal from the Government I serve.' Dispensaries were opened; and much of the ophthalmia that curses Mesopotamia even more grievously than India was relieved. Government schools in Turkish times had fallen into disrepute, and competent teachers were not to be had. Arrangements were made with the American Mission School for the training of pupils for the teaching profession; and, as these became available, schools in which Arabic was the medium of instruction were opened.

Early in 1917, when it was certain that Mr Dobbs would not return, the post of Revenue Commissioner was abolished and a Revenue Board substituted. The

Board consisted of two members of the Indian Civil Service, styled First and Second Revenue Officer respectively, and was entirely subordinate to the Chief Political Officer. In the spring of 1917 General Maude recaptured Kut and marched on Baghdad. Sir Percy Cox left the Second Revenue officer in Basra, and ordered the First Revenue Officer to join him at Baghdad. Our advance on Baghdad, unlike our occupation of Basra, had been expected; and all the records considered valuable had been destroyed or removed by the Turks. The Arts and Crafts School had been deliberately bombed, and fires had been started in the city. What furniture the Turks left was ransacked by the mob in the interval between the departure of the Turk and the arrival of the British; and the Government offices were a filthy confusion of broken furniture, dirt and piles of paper. Order was at once restored by the Military Governor; but for some time it was difficult to obtain open assistance from the inhabitants. Too vivid was the memory of the butcheries at Kut, when those who had assisted the British were brutally massacred, with their families; and it was only those who were prepared to throw in their lot with us at all risks who came forward in the early days. The Public Debt Officials, it was true, remained at their posts, but each office was prepared with a formal protest against interference; and the staff, while passively submissive to orders, were disinclined to assist actively the reconstruction of government.

The agricultural situation in March and April was very gloomy. The country-side was in the grip of famine. In 1915 and 1916 the harvests had been bad, while the floods had breached the embankments, swamped Baghdad itself, and caused great distress. The 1917 harvest was ripening, but it too was a poor one. On the Euphrates the tribesmen had defied the authorities. Government tenants had been unable to go near their estates. The canals had not been cleared of silt, and cultivation had been restricted.

On the Tigris matters were worse. In anticipation of a reverse the Turks had driven all cultivators off the river between Baghdad and Amarah; and there were literally no crops. The fighting between Baghdad and Samarra destroyed almost all the crops on the right

bank north of Baghdad; and the advance to Deli Abbas was similarly destructive of what had been sown on the Khalis Canal on the right bank of the Diyala. At a generous estimate there could hardly have been fifty thousand acres of matured crop in the vilayet; and what there was was in the least accessible districts. It is to be remembered that south of Kut the area under wheat and barley is small. The rich district of Amara is more suitable for rice, while throughout Irak the amount of barley grown is five times that of wheat. In normal years Baghdad itself depended for its wheat supply chiefly on the Erbil district of Mosul; but Erbil was in the hands of the Turks. No help was obtainable from Persia, which was indeed in worse plight than Mesopotamia, the passage of four armies, Turks and Russians in succession, having devastated it. Wheat, which had cost 3*l.* to 4*l.* a ton in pre-war days, fetched £T100 at Khanikin; and Khanikin was only on the border. Only at the lower end of the Hillah Canal had there been good crops, but these were insufficient to meet the scarcity elsewhere; and there was grave danger that even the seed grain would be consumed.

There was also a general feeling of insecurity. Kerbala and Hillah had openly risen against the Turk, and there had been pillage and massacre. Nejef was raw with irritation. It was stated that Turks had invaded harems on the plea of searching for men in hiding to evade military service. The populace was nervous of all authority. Our military situation, too, was none too secure in the eyes of the calculating Arab. The British were indeed in Baghdad, and their forces were established at Falujah on the Euphrates and at Samarra on the Tigris; but Turkish guns commanded the head-works of the five canals that take out of the Diyala, Ramadi held out, and there was an unsubdued little garrison in Diwaniyah.

The influence of the Chief Political Officer, however, rapidly made itself felt. Political offices were opened at Aziziyah and Bughailah south of Baghdad, also at Kadhimain and Baghdad. Troops were sent to take over the Hindiyah barrage; and week by week fresh Sheikhs came in to make submission. In May a deputation of chiefs from the Hindiyah district pressed for the

recommencement of the canals which were required to complete the barrage scheme. Funds were provided, tribal labour was arranged, and earthwork was started on the one which had been aligned, even before the appointment of the irrigation officers, who eventually took charge of the scheme. In the fourth week of May 1917, a political office was opened at Hillah, and it became possible to appreciate more exactly the future possibilities.

Between Falujah and the barrage there are, besides the remains of ancient canal systems, five existing canals, two the property of individuals, the other three belonging to the State. Below the barrage some ninety-five water-courses, with a command varying from 200 to 15,000 acres, and one, the Dagarah, commanding 80,000, took off the Hillah Canal. The banks were lined, in some places continuously, in others sparsely, with lifts irrigating land on levels too high to be reached by flow. But none of the canals had received attention since the outbreak of war; the masonry of many was in a ruinous condition; half the headworks of the largest canal had been deliberately blocked up.

On the main Euphrates, from the barrage downwards, there was little wheat and barley cultivation except on lift lands. The canals designed by Sir W. Willcocks for the Hindiyah district had not been dug; Sanniyah canals had been neglected till they ceased to flow. From Kufa down to Samawa it is rice country. Between Nasiriyah and Hillah there was no British officer and no authority except such as resulted from our prestige generally and the influence of Sir Percy Cox in particular.

On the Tigris irrigation depends on the winter flood. This is usually sufficient to mature the wheat and barley and irrigate an early summer crop of short-day maize and panicum; but the harvest depends both on the moderation and opportuneness of the flood, and is therefore precarious. The only canals are one on the right bank north of Baghdad, and a few small ones in the neighbourhood of Bughailah. All were out of repair; while above Bughailah there had been, in the previous year, a bad break in the embankment so close to the canal itself as to threaten destruction to all cultivation in the neighbourhood.

The requirements of the army in the area forward of Kut were estimated at 90,000 tons of cereals, mostly barley. The country was in 1917 not only unable to contribute thereto but the needs of the civil population were being met by imports from India. Yet India is a famine-threatened country, whose surplus in a bad year is very limited; and, in any case, the submarine campaign was making the reduction of tonnage imperative. It was more than prudent, it was necessary, that the force should become as far as possible self-supporting.

III. *The Agricultural Development Scheme.*—A scheme put forward by the First Revenue Officer, sanctioned by General Maude and approved by the War Council, was designed to secure a harvest sufficient to provide a total crop of 250,000 tons in the year 1918-19. Data were scanty, but it was calculated that 160,000 tons would suffice for the civil population, and the balance would be available for the force. Of these 250,000 tons the revenue share was estimated at 50,000 tons. The intention was to collect the revenue directly in kind, and to employ an Arab revenue staff under political officers in charge of districts, on what would be recognised in India as a gigantic *taccavi* project. Time was short; and, if the scheme was to prove a success, not an acre fit for ploughing could be disregarded. The co-operation of irrigation officers, and transport and labour directorates, was essential; and accordingly the First Revenue Officer was placed under the orders of the Deputy Quarter-Master General, Major-General Sir R. Stuart Wortley, who alone could co-ordinate the various departments concerned. Military money was being spent by Sir Percy Cox's Staff, but the spending was thus brought directly under military control.

If the scheme was to succeed, it was necessary that the cultivators should be secure from the harassment of war, that they should have confidence in our government, and that they should be provided with such essential ways and means as they could not find for themselves. Diwaniyah was occupied in August; in the early autumn Ramadi fell; and the Turks were also driven from their positions commanding the Diyalah canals. The Arab was at length satisfied that the Turk

would not return to deprive him of the fruits of his husbandry, but he had still to be assured that it was worth his while to work for us. The Arab of the Euphrates had never been very much governed; and it was not till the Sheikhs had come to Baghdad and been personally received by the chief Political Officer, and had seen and heard what was being done under British rule, that real progress was possible.

There was much to give them confidence. Baghdad was now an orderly city, with clean streets, electric lighting, and busy with traffic. Trade was reviving; municipal government was firmly established under the Military Governor; and all the necessary machinery of law and order was in evidence, including municipal police, night watchmen, a gaol, a hospital, even a fire brigade. A Kadi was appointed, and a Shara' court under his control opened for the disposal of such business as pertained to the personal and religious law of Islam; a peace court, under an Arab judge of proved ability and reputed honesty, was established for the disposal of petty causes; and preparations were made for the re-establishment of a department of civil justice. This was accomplished by the end of the year 1917; and tribunals on which British and Baghdadis sat jointly were set up.

There was now no divided control. The functions of the Public Debt had of necessity been assumed by the Government of the occupied territories. At the prices at which spirits were sold under the old régime, six pennyworth of liquor would suffice to intoxicate the hardest-headed drinker. The control of the trade and the licensing of the shops were therefore at once taken over. The chief salt-pits were in the hands of the Turks; and a famine in salt threatened. The salt monopoly had to be suspended. The tobacco centres were mostly behind the Turkish lines; and the supply of tobacco, which is not a luxury but a necessity to the Arab, had to be regulated officially. Bold measures taken with regard to tobacco and liquor at once enhanced the revenue and secured the supply. While accounts were kept to facilitate post-war adjustment with the Debt, the administration was absorbed to the benefit of the Debt and the people, and in such a way as to increase confidence.

Baghdad prided itself on its learning, its libraries, and

its past tradition; and education was a problem which demanded immediate attention. An Education Committee was appointed consisting of five of the notables: the Kadi, a man of education and travel and a staunch Mahomedan; with him his cousin, a learned savant and head of one of the oldest Arab families; the third, a liberally-minded literary man, famous for his knowledge of Arabic and his clever writing; the fourth, the scholarly Father Anastase, representing the Christian community; and lastly, a prince of Kurdistan, a cosmopolitan of modern education and progressive thought. There were eighty schoolmasters who applied for work, in the hope that, as there were no schools, they would be granted pensions. All were examined, but only five were found qualified to teach; and these five were ex-head-masters. A primary school was opened at once under these five, while for the remainder an advanced class was started, and lectures, in Arabic, geography, history, and the science of teaching, were arranged. Fifteen teachers declined to attend the course, and of the remaining sixty only twenty-seven passed the examination held at the end of the first three months. With these twenty-seven, five other primary schools were opened. Another course was commenced at the Normal School; and, as teachers qualified, the districts were supplied. Private schools closed during the war were encouraged to re-open, and on passing inspection were granted substantial assistance in cash. The Boy Scout movement was inaugurated. Arabic was made the official language and the vehicle of instruction, but the inhabitants wished to learn English and to have their children taught it; and, as text-books were not forthcoming, a small Arabic-English reader was actually compiled and printed in Baghdad. In the Armenian community a knowledge of English was more precious than a dowry among brides elect; and young spinsters flocked back to school. Later a special class was opened for clerks, at which typing, shorthand and book-keeping were taught. By the summer of 1918 the work had become so heavy that an Education Department under a Director was established, and the Revenue officer was relieved of what had till then been an additional duty.

There were no revenue maps of the province, and

there was no one qualified to make them. With difficulty teachers were found; and within six weeks of the occupation a class somewhat similar to the Patwari classes in India was started. In the first twelve months this class turned out eighty students qualified in the computation of area, elementary survey, and revenue work. They were nearly all employed as student engineers by the irrigation officers, whose need of staff was most pressing; and very few proved unsatisfactory. Some showed exceptional ability and rose in a short time to the post of Assistant Engineer.

All this was not without influence on the Sheikhs of the agricultural tribes, but what appealed still more to them was the attention which was being paid to the agriculturist. The oil-driven pumping plants, of which there are over three hundred in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, were again busy on the banks. The oil fuel, of which the natives had been deprived for the past two years, was provided by military transport; stolen parts were traced and recovered; assistance was given; and eventually a separate branch of the military workshop was established for the repair of agricultural machinery. Seed, even of strange plants such as the potato, was distributed, and advice on cultivation afforded. Side by side with these tangible evidences of our good will was the ever-widening influence of Sir Percy Cox himself. 'Kökus' had become a hero; songs in his honour were being sung at the camp-fire; and a mythical Saga of his doings and the motives therefor was passed on from Arab to Arab and repeated by those who had never even seen him.

This point had been reached when the Agricultural Development Scheme was put forward. It was therefore possible to assume the existence of such relations between the British and the Arab that the latter would work trusting to the promises of the British, and the British would provide ways and means with a reasonable certainty of honourable repayment in due season. Ways and means resolved into the provision of water, seed and cash advances.

Work had been commenced on the Bani Hassan Canal, the feeder canal designed by Willcocks and aligned but abandoned by the Turks; it remained to carry it through.

The irrigation staff now working under the Engineer-in-Chief were in charge, and they also designed and obtained sanction for the parallel project, a canal eventually christened the Georgeiyah. These two canals were finished by November 1917, and actually provided 50,000 acres of new cultivation, and some 20,000 tons of crop in the spring of 1918. The old canals required to be cleared of silt. Those that were State property were put in order at once; private owners were required to see to their own estates. Some pleaded inability, and their work was taken over by 'Scheme' and charged against the proprietor. In November there was a set-back. Tribal disturbances in the area north of Musaiyib arrested work on the canals there, and they had to be abandoned for the season. But at the same time General Maude advanced up the Diyala, and the 100,000 acres lost on the Euphrates were made good on the Tigris and its tributaries. The Hindiyah barrage was managed by a British officer, but the distribution of water was left so far as possible in the hands of the Arabs themselves, irrigation officers interfering only on occasions when rotation was necessary.

More difficult was the supply of seed. The harvest of 1917 was sufficient to provide all the requirements of the local civil population on the Hillah Canal and adjoining districts, and also to furnish seed for the extended cultivation which was in contemplation in that area. The danger was that the cultivators might be tempted by the high prices prevailing at Baghdad and beyond to sell what they should have retained for their next sowing. Agreements were therefore made with the Sheikhs whereby, on the promise of a small percentage of the future revenue, they undertook both to guarantee the reservation of seed and the prompt payment of the demand when it should be made. These measures were successful; and, except for some of the virgin soil on the new canals, advances of seed were small from Musaiyib downwards. But on the more northerly canals, as also on the Tigris and Diyala, there was literally no seed; import was therefore necessary. Over six thousand tons were obtained from India and distributed to several thousand peasants. This involved the preparation of revenue accounts in Arabic, and the

recruitment and training of a granary and clerical staff. The purchase of the seed and its arrival at distribution centres was arranged by the military. The scheme was sanctioned in August 1917; by the end of January 1918 the seed was in the ground.


There was one other requirement—money. The practice in Irak is for a tenant, whether holding from Government or from a proprietor, to apply for permission to cultivate a particular area, usually watered by at least one complete branch of a canal. He collects labourers; and each labourer brings a yoke of oxen, a plough and seed sufficient for ten acres. Should he fail in any of these requirements—and he usually does—the tenant supplies them on credit against repayment by the labourer out of his share at harvest. The labourer is not paid wages, but is given a percentage of the crop, usually one-third. Out of this he has to repay advances, and very often is left with nothing more than a handful of grain to carry him on till next harvest. The labourer was thus kept in perpetual serfdom, so much so that, if he wished to leave his master, the new master was compelled to pay his debts to the old. When labour is hired for the first time, the master usually makes a cash advance; in pre-war days it was about thirty rupees, now it is generally double. Provision had to be made for these advances, as also for the purchase of cattle and the clearance of canals owned by private individuals. Cash advances cost, in round figures, 20,000*l.*; canal clearances, 30,000*l.*; the value of seed advanced was 150,000*l.* All advances were subject to interest. As the bulk of the work was done by the civil staff employed under the political officers, the expenditure on management was small.

The success of the Scheme exceeded expectations (see above, p. 416), for it produced 253,000 tons of crop and 50,400 tons of revenue. By October 1918 49,000 tons of revenue corn had been handed over to the army; by February 1919 approximately 80 per cent. of advances had been repaid. The few debts to the Scheme which had to be wiped off because of damage by drought or flood were made good by the interest received on debts paid; and, as most of the expenditure was in the form of advances, the net cost of the advantages secured was small.

The Scheme was concerned only with production. The produce, however, had to be cleaned, crushed, sacked and transported; and the straw had to be stacked, baled and carted. An added difficulty was that transport had always to be upstream. All this was undertaken by the Department of Local Resources, in conjunction with the transport directorate. Machinery for cleaning, crushing and baling was imported from India. The railway reached Hillah by the end of May; by the first week in July grain was being received almost more quickly than it was possible to dispose of it.

In the meanwhile developments had taken place at head-quarters. At the end of November 1917 orders were received to extend production to its maximum. Every measure that could be provided for the next ensuing crop had already been taken; it was now required to prepare for still further expansion. A Directorate of Irrigation was therefore formed, and a staff of agricultural experts collected. In the spring of 1918 Mesopotamia was visited by a commission consisting of the Director-General of Irrigation in India and the Imperial Agriculturist. They made certain recommendations, the most important being the establishment of a Board of Agriculture, the formation of the agricultural staff into an Agricultural Directorate, and the creation of large Government farms. A rough estimate was prepared for the 1918-19 cultivation; and a Board of Agriculture was created under the presidency of the D.Q.M.G., with the First Revenue Officer as Secretary and member. The total area under cultivation in 1917-18 was calculated at 1,000,000 acres, of which 600,000 were in the Baghdad vilayet. It was proposed to increase this to 1,500,000 acres, the maximum for which water could be made available, population found, and cattle provided.

Thirty-two minor schemes were also considered. Of these the most urgent was the provision of a new head to the Khalis Canal. This engineering feat, which involved the driving of a passage through the rocks of the Jabal Mansuriyah, saved a valuable cereal and garden area of over 100,000 acres from a precarious situation, a bend of the river having dangerously threatened the old headworks. Equally valuable was the construction of one new and the revival of another



[To face p. 422.]

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long disused but well aligned canal on the Euphrates—these two canals bringing 60,000 new acres under cultivation. The shortage of plough oxen was met by importation from India, the difference in prices making the transaction profitable. Scientific experiments in cotton had already been commenced, and valuable results were obtained. Tests of sugar, beet and various types of wheat were made, and disease in plant life generally and dates in particular examined. Cattle breeding was receiving attention, and the surplus stock in military grass and dairy farms was made available for the civil population.

It was at this point that the war ended. The future of Mesopotamia is still undecided; and, till the political situation is clear, it is hazardous to predict its economic future. Immediately after the armistice we occupied Mosul, a province which is even richer than Irak. Its soil is better suited to wheat; irrigation is necessary for summer crops only; and it abounds in springs. Irak itself comprises 12,000,000 acres of irrigable land of amazing fertility, of which at least 10,000,000 remain to be developed; it produces the finest dates, except those of Tunis, in the world; it is rich in salt and abundant in oil. There are sulphur springs and bitumen and gypsum deposits. The climate in the plains even in the hot months is not unbearable; if hill stations were provided on the vine-clad slopes of Kurdistan, living would be delightful. The population at present is scant but prolific, and would rapidly expand under healthy conditions. Mesopotamia is a land of great promise. The difficulties in the way of reconstruction are considerable; land problems and the adjustment of rights between Arab cultivators and city proprietors call for skilled handling; but, given good government, the future of this portion of Arabia may quickly develop a prosperity no less complete and much more profitable to the world at large than that which it enjoyed in the days of Haroun-al-Raschid.

Art. 10.—THE BATTLE OF THE MINES.

WHEN Parliament reassembles for the autumn session, the battle of the mines will begin in earnest. Hitherto there have been only preliminary skirmishes. The mischief of it is that it will almost certainly be a battle, a conflict of interests and prejudices and theories, fought with a determination which may well lead to violence before it is over. It ought not to be so. If ever there was a question for calm and dispassionate deliberation, for sane counsel, for sincere and concerted effort to find the best solution, it is this. For it is an economic question, proper to be decided by cold facts and calm reasoning, but incapable of being rightly decided by passion or prejudice or force. There is no need to dwell on its importance or its difficulty. Every one is by now fully conscious of the first, and the discussion that has already taken place demonstrates the second. But the more important it is, the greater the need for a right settlement; and the more difficult it is, the greater the need for calm counsel. Nor does the real object justify any other way of reaching a decision. It is single and clear—the best way of conducting the mining industry in the national interest. If the national interest is realised and kept in view as the true object, the impossibility of attaining it by a trial of strength or by any other road than reason and agreement becomes obvious.

It is not too late yet, and the assumption of an inevitable battle may prove erroneous. If so, it will be only through a strong and general conviction that fighting is folly, and that an agreed solution, which alone can be lasting, is best in the end for all parties. Such a conviction necessarily produces a desire to avoid fighting and reach agreement. In a sense it exists already. The general public have it, being sick of these struggles in which they are the sport of sectional antagonisms. And probably no one would deny the proposition in so many words. Even those champions of peace who saw in the cessation of the great war merely an opportunity for 'getting on with the only war that really matters,' even these excited advocates of strife are by way of deprecating violence, though their policy infallibly leads

to it. The out-and-out inciters to violence are few and of little account—just tub-thumpers, or mentally unbalanced fanatics or slinking knaves. There is therefore an atmosphere in which settlement by reason is possible; and such change of opinion as has recently occurred is in that direction. Prudence has made some way against pugnacity.

But all this, though it opens up a possibility, is wholly insufficient for realisation. Its negative influence will disappear in a moment when matters come to a practical issue, unless it develops into a positive and strong determination to seek a settlement by united counsel; and of such determination there is no sign. The notes of defiance may be a little less loud, but there is as yet no thought of anything but fighting. The idea of sincere co-operation between opponents in finding the best solution has never entered their heads or any one else's, so far as one can see; and the insatiable pugnacity of human nature, which has been illustrated throughout the civilised world every day since the war, will certainly assert itself once more unless a great effort is made to check it.

In these circumstances and with this dire prospect before us I suggest that all parties make an effort to approach the question in a less combative and more accommodating spirit; for, if it be fought out, none will emerge unscathed from the conflict. It is quite useless for them to protest that they do not want a conflict when what they mean in their hearts by that is that some one else should give way to them. On those terms every one desires peace; and in that sense the German Kaiser could lay his hand on his heart and swear that he did not want war. It is quite certain that the coal industry will be carried on upon some system or other in the end; and any system that is adopted after a conflict can obviously be adopted before it.

What is the obstacle? Nothing but the state of men's minds. They hold tenaciously by their prepossessions and will not yield until compelled by force of circumstances. The frequent use of the fatal word 'principle' reveals their determination. There are such things as principles of conduct which ought to over-ride immediate expediency; but they do not apply to a purely

economic question such as the organisation of the coal industry. The word 'principle' in this connexion means nothing but a preconceived opinion; and its use denotes a particularly obstinate determination to stick to that opinion. It suggests high moral ground and fortifies resolution. When men do or refuse to do something 'on principle' they slap themselves on their moral chests and feel very fine. So the demand for nationalisation and the opposition to it acquire a seeming moral value by being referred to principle, and the hearts of the antagonists are hardened. But there is no principle in the matter, which is entirely one of expediency. There is only opinion for and against, which can be changed without any sacrifice of principle. If men would divest themselves of preconceived opinions for a moment and approach the question with open minds, it would look quite different to them, and agreement would be marvellously facilitated. If the dominating thought in their minds was the imperative need of agreement, and if they would set before themselves the idea of going as far as possible towards it instead of yielding as little as they can, the thing could be done.

There is some common ground which may serve as a starting-point. It is recognised all round that the old order is gone for good, and that there must be a large change. All sections of the Coal Commission either demand it or virtually accept it; the Government have recognised it, and the public expect it. Some persons may deplore it, but no one openly opposes it or urges that the coal industry should be carried on precisely as before—which is, indeed, plainly impossible. This is something to go upon, though not very much. Divergence begins at once in the attitude towards change in itself; some grudge it and want it to be as small as possible, others clamour for the most violent transformation all at once.

These extremes represent the elements of conflict in its most acute form; if they would modify their respective attitudes the tension would be lessened all round. I suggest that the first would lose nothing and gain a good deal by a fuller and franker acceptance of the idea of change. Such changes are inevitable; History is a record of them; and, as we look back on it, we see how futile and foolish a dogged resistance was.

The process is not continuous; there are intervals of stability in which the next active change is matured; but, when the time comes for consummation, the step must be taken. Resistance only stimulates the forces at work and makes the process more violent and painful; co-operation smooths and modifies it. We are in the throes of a great change now, as every one can see; and the way to make it as beneficial and as little harmful as possible is to take a frank part in it.

On the other hand, those who are demanding an extreme form of change are making an equal mistake. They are running the risk of failure by their violence. They excite opposition and turn the general readiness to accept change into hesitation and doubts of the outcome; they alienate sympathy by imperatively demanding too much and overstating their case. The change will in any case be a great experiment; and the less violent it is the better its chance of success. The economic structure of society is not like a political system and will not bear the same treatment, because it is not a system but an organic growth. Yet changes even in a political system are best accomplished by successive steps; a too violent revolution is followed by reaction and restoration. Much more is gradual change necessary in the economic sphere. Too great a shock paralyses the organism, as they have discovered in Russia. The Bolsheviks have had to take several retrograde steps, according to no less an authority than Lenin himself; and they will have to take more or perish. The lesson has not been lost upon the public here; and, though nationalisation of the mines is a small matter compared with the Bolshevik revolution, the most ardent advocates of the one are persistent eulogists and defenders of the other. If the British public connect the two, it is chiefly their doing. The result is a well-grounded fear of going too far and inaugurating too large a change with disastrous results.

To put the matter on the lowest plane, a stiff-necked attitude is bad tactics. For this thing will eventually be decided not by miners or mine-owners or Government or even Parliament (except formally), but by the weight of public opinion; and its suffrages will incline to those who show themselves the more moderate, the more

conciliatory and the more mindful of the public good. The public do not love either miners or mine-owners; both have squeezed them to the utmost in their selfish struggles. There is no desire to gratify either, no enthusiasm for the old system or for the proposed new one, but an uneasy distrust of the whole business and of the arguments on all sides. An ounce of real disinterestedness and goodwill would carry more weight than tons of argument. If need be, the decision will be referred to a popular vote; and this seems at present the most probable course. In that case the verdict will fall against any proposal bearing the marks of sectional interest or based on purely theoretical grounds or backed by threats of compulsion.

But a solution by common understanding would be preferable if it can be attained. There is no approach to it yet except on a few points to be mentioned presently; but there is plenty of material in which to look for one. We have before us the outlines of five schemes, not counting that of the Miners' Federation. It has not been withdrawn, but it seems to have passed tacitly into abeyance; and its interest now lies chiefly in the light it throws on the attitude of the Federation. It is not, however, dead; and its influence is seen in the vital modifications of Mr Justice Sankey's scheme proposed by the miners' representatives and Socialists on the Coal Commission.

The schemes are: (1) Mr Justice Sankey's; (2) the miners' modification of it; (3) the scheme of the mine-owners and other employers on the Commission; (4) Sir A. Duckham's scheme; (5) the Government's scheme. I have just said that they have something in common; and the first point is the ownership of coal as mineral. There is complete agreement in these pronouncements that coal shall be acquired by the State and become the property of the nation; and there is nearly complete agreement that it shall be bought from the present owners at a fair valuation. The only dissentients are the miners on the Commission, who separate themselves from their Socialist colleagues on this point and do not agree that any compensation shall be paid to the owners. But they are not very emphatic about it, and suggest a

'compassionate allowance' in cases of hardship. We may, therefore, assume that there is not likely to be a very determined opposition to buying out the royalty owners, as they are called, though some attempt will be made to confiscate their property.

Acquisition by the State at a fair price will undoubtedly meet with general support from the public at large. The reasons for it are clear, and will commend themselves to the common sense of the community. Coal is too important a national asset to be left subject to the caprice of private individuals in regard to its use or neglect. The instances of obstruction to its exploitation may not be numerous, but there should be no opportunity for obstruction at all. No one can doubt that, if its importance had been realised in the past, it would have been reserved to the Crown like the precious metals. It is, in fact, a precious metal, though it has not been treated like one; and, since it is a wasting asset, there is all the more need to remedy a state of things that is contrary to the national interest. It is true that misuse of the power conferred by ownership might be prevented in other ways, but the conclusion reached by the colliery owners and other employers on the Coal Commission that the most effective way is the transference of ownership to the State will command general, though not universal, assent.

It would, however, be foolish to expect that this preliminary question of the ownership of the mineral will go through without a conflict. Even if State acquisition be agreed to, differences will arise about the compensation to be paid, and will probably be very sharp. The Government have given no indication of their views except that they propose to raise a fund for improving miners' housing out of the purchase value of the royalties. Mr Lloyd George was silent about the mode of assessment in his speech on Aug. 18; and the Reports of the Royal Commission contain three different utterances on the subject, apart from the refusal of the miners to pay anything. This is a highly important matter, for, whether the transference of coal from private to State ownership will act as a precedent or not—a question referred to later—the method of assessing the purchase value certainly will. The prospect is a conflict

so heated that all chances of an agreed settlement will disappear.

I suggest, in accordance with the line of argument laid down above, that this unfortunate prospect might be obviated if the opponents of State acquisition were to yield with a good grace on the ground of public interest, and the miners in return would lay aside their obvious animus against the royalty owners, so ostentatiously displayed at the Coal Commission's inquiry by misstatements of facts, malicious inuendoes and attacks on individuals which had to be withdrawn. This display made a very unfavourable impression, and justly; it is equally stupid and unsportsmanlike, for the royalty owners are no more responsible for their birth and station in life than the miners. Nor does any one who knows both suppose that if they were exchanged for so many miners the latter would behave differently.

Such a mutual advance as that suggested would take much bitterness out of the conflict, improve the atmosphere all round, and greatly increase the chances of further agreement. And there is more in it than that. The nationalisation of minerals would be a far-reaching change, entailing effects which are not recognised in any of the Coal Commission's Reports or in public discussions of the question. The State, as owner, would be able to impose conditions on the working of its property, and thus be in a position to exercise a large measure of control over the conduct of the industry without direct interference. This control would gradually extend with the granting of new leases until it covered the whole field. It might, indeed, be applied at once to existing leases by provisions included in the arrangement for taking over the royalty rights. It would enable the State to protect the interests of consumers and workmen, to insist on efficient management, the amalgamation of collieries, and any other measures thought desirable for the most economical and beneficial exploitation of the coal supply. It might, indeed, be so applied as to do all that is really needed. After all, the mineral itself is the essential thing; and its ownership carries the right to the last word. The present owners are to be bought out because their position gives them too much power over the working; the same power

transferred to the State and rightly applied is sufficient to remedy all real defects. In fact, the argument might be advanced that acquisition of the mineral will of itself give the State too much power. The failure of all parties, including the Government, to discuss this side of the question, or even recognise its existence, shows how little study has been given to the subject.

As an instance I may refer to the debate on nationalisation at the Trades Union Congress. In moving the resolution, Mr Smillie said he did not think it necessary to go into the question of nationalisation in order to justify the resolution, because it had been before the Congress so long and so often. He emphasised this by reminding his audience that 'it was over twenty years since the Congress affirmed the principle that the mineral lying under the surface of the soil, which was not created by man, ought to be the wealth of the State and not of individuals.' He evidently did not perceive that the reference was quite irrelevant to the resolution, because nationalisation of the mineral has been conceded, and the present demand is that something which *has* been created by man—namely the mines—should become the property of the State. The fact that the Government have consented to nationalise the mineral was not mentioned in the discussion, nor did any one show the slightest consciousness of its far-reaching importance.

Leaving this, however, and passing on to the question of the ownership and administration of the mines or collieries, which has been the main subject of controversy, we find here, too, a certain amount of agreement. All the Reports recommend the establishment of a Ministry or State Department of Mines. This, indeed, follows automatically on State acquisition of the minerals. There must be a department to administer the property; and, as we have seen, its functions would be far-reaching. Further, all the Reports recommend the organisation of the industry by an ascending series of joint committees or councils on the Whitley system, beginning with committees for single mines, from which district councils would be formed, and finally a national council. Sir A. Duckham does not mention a national council; but his proposal that the Minister of Mines should hold regular meetings with the chairmen of district boards

comes to pretty nearly the same thing. There is, therefore, a general resemblance between the schemes in this respect, though important differences in detail. It is impossible to tell, from the scanty outline given by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 18, what the Government's scheme is. He made no mention of pit committees or of a national council, but they are not incompatible with the organisation he did indicate and may very well form part of it.

There is one other important point of agreement, namely that the manager of each colliery should be responsible for its working. Mr Justice Sankey's Report makes explicit provision for this in Paragraph XLV :

'Every mine shall be under one duly certificated manager, who shall be responsible for the control, management, direction and safety of the mine and the extent and method of working, provided always that such manager shall not be personally liable for conforming to any lawful order for safety made by the District Mining Council.'

The miners' representatives raised no objection to this provision, which is quite incompatible with the scheme proposed by the Miners' Federation. Thus one deadlock is removed which would have rendered the conduct of the industry impossible; for the mine-managers could not have worked under the Federation scheme.

Here, however, agreement ends and serious differences begin. They are many and various, but the heart of the conflict is the question of public or private ownership and control—otherwise the question of nationalisation. Everything else is secondary to that; and the battle will be fought mainly, though not entirely, upon it.

Before going on to discuss the position, let me say a word about the feeling of the public and my own attitude. The question is one on which strong prejudice exists on both sides; and most of the controversy about it is inspired, on one side, by the preconceived opinion that nationalisation is in itself and necessarily a good thing, and, on the other side, by the counter-opinion, that it is essentially a bad thing. This prejudice colours the arguments on both sides; they are partisan arguments. It is a common feature of controversy, but is exceptionally

marked in the present case, and peculiarly unfortunate, because the question at issue is of great practical importance and one which should be decided on its merits by dispassionate scrutiny. That should have been the function of the Coal Commission.

The Commission should have been a judicial inquiry conducted by competent judges and with the partisan element confined to the witness chair. Then the findings of the Court would have served as a real guide to the public, who are the final judges. It implies no reflexion on the Chairman to say that the partisan composition of the Commission made this impossible. The time limit was another obstacle to the sort of inquiry that was needed. Whatever scheme was adopted for the future conduct of the industry, it should have been presented in detail with the reasons for the several provisions included in it and the manner of their working explained. But that was quite impossible; and the result is that, apart from the partisans, the public are left confused, bewildered and irritated. They feel that they are being rushed into something which they do not understand, but on which their future prosperity, their comfort and even their lives may depend.

Now I do not believe that this public of whom I speak have any prejudice against nationalisation, though they have none in favour of it. I believe they have an open mind and would accept any proposed plan, if they were convinced that it would be for the benefit of the community. That is my own attitude. I have no prejudice against nationalisation. I see that several things have been nationalised or municipalised—which is the same thing in principle—without producing red ruin and the breaking-up of laws or even making any marked difference one way or the other. If the benefits conferred by the change from private to public ownership and administration are doubtful or imperceptible, as I think they generally are, the disadvantages, on the other hand, have in no case been such as to excite any demand for a return to the former conditions, which would certainly have happened if they had been at all serious or acutely felt.

Among the things that have been nationalised in some countries are coal mines; and I have long regarded the

nationalisation of the mines in this country as a possible and even probable development, if not a certain one. The mining industry is one of those that could conceivably be carried on by the State. There are many that could not, for definite and sufficient reasons into which I need not enter here, because they do not apply to mining or apply in very small measure.

The prospect of nationalisation, therefore, neither surprises nor alarms me in itself. Nor am I at all impressed by the thin-end-of-the-wedge argument, which foresees in the transference of this industry the same fate for all others. On the contrary, I think the effect might be exactly the opposite. It is strange that those who think the nationalisation of mines would be ruinous do not see that, if that were the result, there would be an intense reaction, and the policy would be utterly discredited. Of course those who regard nationalisation as an end in itself would be unconvinced and unchanged. They would lay the blame on anything rather than their sacred fetish, and would demand further sacrifices to it as the certain remedy for the failure of those already made. People with an *idée fixe* always do that. But no one would listen to them, and it would be a long time before the policy got another hearing. Once bit, twice shy, is a true adage.

In any case so great an experiment would have to justify itself before consent could be obtained for another. Labour itself would insist upon that; and by Labour I mean the general body of workmen, not the 'hot-air merchants,' as they call each other, who assume the name and pose for the part. In spite of all the congresses that ever sat, workmen are by no means enamoured of nationalisation; many of them disbelieve in it altogether, and a great many more are doubtful. They would all want to see how it worked before extending it. And they would be very difficult to satisfy. The nationalisers have seen to that by their advocacy. In order to win support they have raised expectations which they cannot satisfy, as men in their position always do.

Nationalisation is a Mesopotamia, as I have said in my pamphlet on the subject; a blessed word which every one interprets in his own way. To the miners

who believe in nationalisation it means less work and more pay, to be their own masters and do pretty much as they please. The Russian workmen and peasants looked to such results from their revolution, and they have had a rude awakening. Things will not be so bad here, but it will be impossible to satisfy the expectations raised, because two and two will still make four, even though Mr Smillie himself were Prime Minister and Sir L. C. Money Chancellor of the Exchequer. Their position would be instantly changed by the achievement of their aims. Instead of denouncing, demanding and criticising—a part that every fool can play—they would themselves be the object of denunciations, demands and criticisms from their disappointed and discontented followers, and would be in no position to pursue an aggressive policy. They would be on the defensive and pretty hard put to it to keep their footing. Success is the Nemesis of the demagogue.

For these reasons I cannot share the apprehensions of those who think that the nationalisation of mines would open the flood-gates and pour a devastating torrent of revolutionary change over our industries at large. But I am equally unimpressed by the opposite view that it would work wonders in the mining industry and benefit producers and consumers alike. It would work no wonders. It never has done so anywhere. Any advantages it may confer are counter-balanced by disadvantages. In that country where the State has been a more efficient instrument of administration than in any other, the two systems—public and private—have been in operation together and can be compared. The comparison is not to the advantage of the first. The administration of the State mines of Prussia has been conspicuously inferior to that of the privately-owned. It has been less efficient, slower to adopt improvements, more backward; it has paid lower wages and done far less for the miners in other ways, in housing and welfare work; and the miners are less free under it. Nor is it any answer to say that the proposed system here would be quite different. So is the proposed private system. One must compare the two under the same conditions; and the experience we have to go by does not bear out the promises made on behalf of nationalisation. It is a

singular thing that so little guidance was sought from experience at the Sankey inquiry, for experience is the best guide.

I can see no general ground, then, for expecting that nationalisation would fulfil the promise of benefiting both producers and consumers; and, on the other hand, there are particular grounds for expecting a disastrous conflict between these interests. That will arise from the way in which the demand has been made and pressed; it is the most sinister feature of the whole business and one that fills the public with mistrust. It brings me back to the point where I broke off before proceeding to examine the present position; and to this point I return.

The demand for nationalisation comes from the Miners' Federation—a fact that should be kept in view, because that body exists to advance the interests of miners, and has never pretended to subordinate them to any other interests, though some spokesmen have recently found it politic to profess concern for the latter. It is an old demand on paper, but it took a new turn and entered the field of practical politics, as a live issue, at the end of January last, when the Federation, following a conference held earlier in the month, presented a series of demands to the Government at the time of the rioting at Glasgow and Belfast and during the absence of the Prime Minister at the Peace Conference. The Federation demanded an increase of 30 per cent. in wages, a six-hours' day, the nationalisation of mines and some other things. The Government in reply offered an immediate advance of 1s. a day and a joint inquiry into the other demands. This offer was communicated to the miners' conference at Southport on Feb. 12 and summarily refused. On Feb. 21 the Prime Minister met the Executive Committee of the Miners' Federation and offered a Commission of Inquiry into their demands. This offer was accepted on condition that the miners nominated half the Commission, exclusive of the Chairman, and that the Commission reported on the question of hours and wages by March 20. The Commission was appointed, with Mr Justice Sankey for Chairman, and began the inquiry at once. In the mean time the Federation had held a ballot on the question of striking to enforce their

demands, and the result was a vote of about 6 to 1 in favour of striking. Strike notices had been issued, to expire on March 15, but were held back in view of the inquiry, though only until March 22.

Punctually on March 20 the Commission reported, but in three discordant documents, as was inevitable from its composition. The Government's nominees signed one, the miners' representatives a second, and the coal-owners a third. The last made some concessions; they offered an advance of 1s. 6d. instead of 1s. a day and seven hours instead of eight. The miners' representatives found all the demands justified, and declared that, 'in the interest of the consumers as much as in that of the miners, nationalisation ought to be, in principle, at once determined on.' This Report bears internal evidence of having been prepared at leisure before the conclusion of the inquiry. The third Report, signed by the Chairman and the three other Government nominees, recommended a seven hours' day from July 1919, to become a six hours' day in July 1921, and an advance of 2s. a day. It further declared that 'the present system of ownership and working in the coal industry stands condemned, and some other system must be substituted for it, either nationalisation or a method of unification by national purchase and/or by joint control.' It also urged that colliery workers should have an effective voice in the direction of the mines, and suggested a levy of 1d. per ton on coal raised to be applied to housing.

This Report was received with general approval and was accepted by the Government 'in spirit and in letter.' The Miners' Federation took another ballot on acceptance of the terms; and this resulted in a majority for acceptance larger than the previous one for a strike. But the subsequent announcement by the Government in July that the concessions would entail raising the price of coal by 6s. a ton caused a great shock and aroused an angry controversy. The miners' spokesmen contended that the increase was unwarranted and a mere political trick on the part of the Government; but the calculations of the Coal Controller's department have withstood the adverse criticisms, and the price has been maintained. All that the public understands is that concessions have been made to the miners at its own cost.

Whether it should have been something less than 6s. a ton or not is a minor consideration. In any case the miners' gain was everybody else's loss. And no return consideration was given either in increased production or in diminished strikes. The former went on continually falling and the latter rising.

Meanwhile the inquiry was resumed by the Sankey Commission on the question of nationalisation, which had been left over; and the six members who had already pronounced judgment on it continued to sit—in imitation of the Alice-through-the-looking-glass procedure of sentence first, evidence afterwards, including their own. The proceedings were of a piece with this travesty of judicial methods. It soon became apparent that one object was to promote the class war by holding up to odium the royalty owners, including one who had nothing to do with the administration of the property of which he is the titular owner, and who is incapacitated by physical affliction from answering for himself. The deadly animus revealed by this hitting below the belt revolted the public, who do like fair play. The Commission produced the four Reports referred to above, which were published on June 23. I have indicated the amount of agreement between them. It is comparatively small, and is overwhelmed by the amount of disagreement which reveals irreconcilable antagonism.

The most salient facts are that the Chairman recommends nationalisation, and is, so far, in accord with the six members who decided for it beforehand; and that the other six members are against it. The Chairman is entirely independent, and must be held to have regard solely to the public interest. He is judicially minded, being a Judge of the High Court, and accustomed to weigh evidence. He allowed extraordinary latitude, it is true, in the conduct of the inquiry; but that was probably a pure matter of policy, and, if the advantage taken of it affected his judgment at all, it would rather be adversely to the members who brought discredit on his tribunal than in favour of them. In any case I think his opinion ought to carry great weight. What are his reasons for recommending nationalisation? And what is the form of nationalisation he recommends?

His reasons, concisely stated, are the following :—

(1) The unique place occupied by the coal industry in national life.

(2) The right of other industries and consumers generally to have a voice in deciding the amount of coal to be produced and the selling price.

(3) The competition between many private owners and exporters prevents the industry from getting the full value of the export trade.

(4) The system of inland distribution prevents the consumer from getting coal as cheaply as he should.

(5) Lack of capital in some mines and of proper management in others prevents development to the best advantage of the nation.

(6) Multiplicity of owners makes it impossible to effect economies by standardising materials and appliances, which would be made possible by unification under State ownership.

Having set out these concrete reasons, he acknowledges the argument that the defects enumerated could be removed by unification short of State ownership, and proceeds to give further reasons.

(7) The difficulty of carrying on the industry on the old lines, caused by the bad relations between owners and miners, and the apparent impossibility of bettering them under the present system of ownership. 'Many of the workers think they are working for the capitalist, and a strike becomes a contest between labour and capital. This is much less likely to apply with the State as owner; and there is fair reason to expect that the relationship between labour and the community will be an improvement upon the relationship between labour and capital in the coal-fields.'

(8) New aspirations of miners resulting from education, and their growing ambition to take 'their due share and interest in the direction of the industry.'

(9) The counter-attitude of the owners, expressed by Lord Gainford, who said on behalf of the Mining Association that, 'if the owners are not to be left complete executive control, they will decline to accept the responsibility of carrying on the industry,' and will be driven to nationalisation though they regard it as disastrous to the country.

(10) With regard to the loss of incentive under State ownership, this problematical risk is outweighed by the certainty of the continuance of industrial strife.

The last paragraph contains the heart of the matter. To shun the evils that we know, we are advised to fly to others that we know not of, but which it is hoped are less. The deciding factor in the argument is the certain continuance of industrial strife under private ownership; and I am afraid that it cannot be gainsaid. It is not that all miners will refuse to work for private owners; many prefer it and have no desire for State ownership and control. In some coalfields the old system would work quite well with a reasonable readjustment of relations. In others there is no prospect of peace on any terms under it. Even if the men were compelled to work by dire necessity after an unsuccessful strike, they would do so grudgingly and sullenly; and after an interval the ferment would rise again, for a young generation is always coming on, full of fight and ambition, schooled in revolt against the existing order. To expect anything else is to cherish a blind delusion. If all were shareholders and co-partners in the concern it might be different; but that is not offered, and would be refused if it were, for nationalisation as a door into the millennium has become an *idée fixe* with too many. Nothing will dislodge it but its demonstrated failure, which involves a trial.

But that does not conclusively settle the matter. The continuance of industrial strife is the evil that we know; what are those we know not of under nationalisation? And how does the balance stand? Two questions here arise—the loss involved in abandoning private ownership, and the gain to be expected from State ownership.

Mr Justice Sankey's Report recognises a loss, which he calls the 'loss of incentive.' He calls it 'problematical' and minimises it. He devotes some paragraphs to the subject of State service and admits that hitherto 'State management of industries has failed to prove itself free from serious shortcomings'; but he thinks these are due to neglect of proper training, and argues from the war experience that it is possible 'to provide a class of administrative officers who combine the strongest sense of public duty with the greatest energy and capacity for initiative.' It is dangerous to argue from war experience to ordinary routine administration; but, if that evidence is called, it should be taken as a whole. The war brought

special motives into play and produced a certain number of men such as he describes. But officialism thwarted them at every turn and nearly broke their hearts; and the war also produced a much larger number of official incompetents. I speak of what I know from direct observation of one capital department of war organisation; and the revelations that keep dropping out show that the same defects prevailed in others.

But does any one seriously argue that private enterprise and initiative, which have created and developed all our industrial and commercial activities, are worth nothing? They are not so indispensable in coal-mining as in younger industries, but they cannot be abandoned without real loss. No State department can or ought to exert the enterprise and initiative of a private concern. It ought not to risk the loss of public money, and would be severely condemned if it did. Nor can officials act with freedom, because the responsibility goes back to the Minister through the chain of offices. He must protect himself by rules for their procedure, and they must protect themselves by sticking to the rules. This is red tape and is absolutely inevitable. There is a certain, not a problematical, loss of energy. And it is not a question of incentive. A great deal has been made of the motive of public service. Certain members of the Coal Commission, who make much of it, showed their own regard for it by threatening to resign if something was said or done which they did not like; and Mr Smillie showed his when he declined the invitation to become Food Controller. But, even if the alleged efficacy of this motive be granted, it does not touch the point, which is that the atmosphere created by official hierarchy, promotion by seniority, routine and red tape is intolerable to men of energetic and adventurous disposition; it suits those who like a secure and set career, equally devoid of risks and great prizes. It attracts and creates the type; it represses zeal.

Some loss is therefore certain. And what of the gain? The gain on which Mr Justice Sankey calculates is the absence or diminution of industrial strife. If we got it, the price might not be too high; but, if we did not get it, there would be no gain at all to set against the loss. What is the prospect?

In the first place, experience proves that public employment by the State or the municipality provides no immunity against strikes in any country; and the examples of France and Australia go to show that, the more democratic the Government, the greater the liability to such strikes. Australia is classical, for it has been the scene of very large and determined strikes against the State under a Labour Government, in State coal mines, shipyards and railways. Then we have the war record, which is invoked to prove the altruistic influence of public service. The Government intervened between employers and employed and took control of important industries. Far more trouble occurred in these industries than in those left outside Government control. It is true that the Government did not own them; but the strikes and threats to strike, which occurred in an unending series, were against the State, against conditions determined by Government, and were carried on by men virtually employed by the State in public services. The last big strike, which was that of the Yorkshire miners in July last, is particularly instructive, because it occurred after the conclusion of peace and was directly attributed by the miners' leaders to the interference of the Government between mine-owners and miners. As Mr Lloyd George said in the House of Commons, it was a strike against the State.

Further evidence is furnished by the origin of the demand for nationalisation and the manner in which it has been pressed. It was a purely sectional demand, the miners' 'national programme,' put forward in their own interests and presented to the Government with threats. Nothing was said about the public interest until the impolicy of antagonising public opinion became evident; and the miners' own scheme clearly indicated the intention of running the industry in their own interests. There is only too much ground for the misgivings entertained by Mr Justice Sankey himself, in spite of his optimism. They find expression in the provision forbidding strikes until the dispute has been before the local and the district mining councils. No milder restriction could be framed, and the objection to it raised by the miners' representatives on the Commission throws a most sinister light on the prospects of peace under

nationalisation. The unfavourable inference inevitably drawn from it was fully justified by remarks let fall by Mr Duncan Graham, M.P., at the meeting of the Scottish Miners' Federation at Ayr on Aug. 14 :—

'If the mines became the property of the nation, the miners would need to be more determined than ever in their policy and more vigorous in the trade union organisation, because, instead of fighting local employers, they would be fighting the Government.'

The speaker's subsequent attempt to explain away this statement only made it worse; it is too explicit to be explained away. He may have been expressing his own opinion only, but he occupies a responsible position, and his remarks met with applause and were not repudiated. They have found an echo in the newly-formed federation of postal unions, which has formally adopted the strike policy.

What prospect of peace or better service does all this portend? I can see none. And all there is to set against it is some belated expressions of concern for the public interest and of personal belief in improvement. But no pledges are given, and no action is taken as an earnest of goodwill. On the contrary, if we look to the practical side—which is what really matters to the public—we see a steadily dropping output when all allowance has been made for holidays and incidental disturbances.

I can discern no way out so long as the problem is approached in the present frame of mind. The emphatic endorsement of nationalisation by the Trades Union Congress adds great weight to the demand and cannot be ignored. But the Government cannot buy a little more tenure of office by merely yielding to the minatory attitude of the Congress; this would only ensure their greater damnation in the end. On the other hand, there is no need for them to hold rigidly by their own scheme, which seems quite hopeless, so far as can be judged from the scanty indications given by the Prime Minister. It would have been better to adopt the scheme outlined in Sir A. Duckham's Report, which is the best-reasoned of the Commission's various utterances. Agreement might conceivably be found somewhere between the proposals of Sir A. Duckham and those of Mr Justice Sankey, the

two detached members of the Commission. But there will be no possibility of it without a spirit of agreement. On both sides there should be a more open mind on the subject of nationalisation. On the one hand, its possibility should be frankly recognised; and, on the other, there should be equal recognition of the right to demand some effectual guarantee or convincing proof of public benefit before the nation is asked to consent to such a leap in the dark. For the nation's consent must be asked either by a referendum or a general election.

At any rate there is material for negotiation; and before Parliament reassembles negotiations will have begun. The Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress will have brought before the Government the resolution passed on Aug. 10, peremptorily rejecting the Government's scheme (without knowing what it is) and demanding the adoption of the 'majority report.' The Government may reply that their scheme has been misunderstood, and may ask what is meant by the 'majority report.' Here is an opportunity for the Miners' Federation to prove their good faith. Are they prepared to accept the Sankey recommendations regarding strikes, the composition of the mining councils, the disposal of subsidiary undertakings and compensation to royalty owners? Another way of lessening public distrust would be for every lodge to pass a resolution pledging themselves to do their best in the national interest. But the most convincing and the only true test is a practical trial or period of probation.

I put forward these suggestions for the avoidance of a disastrous conflict, but have little expectation of their being acted on. We are much more likely to have a great battle leading to a general election. For my own part I should like to see the Labour Party form a Government, for there will be no peace and no stability until its discordant elements exchange the easy business of criticism and agitation for practical administration, and shoulder the responsibility of carrying on the affairs of the country.

A. SHADWELL.

Art. 11.—IRELAND AND FEDERALISM.

1. *Federal Government: Its Function and Method.* By Prof. G. B. Adams. New York: Knickerbocker Press. 1919.
2. *Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention, 1917-8.* [Cd. 9019.]
3. *Forms of Government within the Empire: Memorandum printed for the use of the Irish Convention.*
4. *Irish Peace and an Irish Settlement.* Articles and Correspondence in 'The Times,' 1919.

FEDERALISM has long been advocated as a means of closer union, of more formal union, between the United Kingdom and the five Dominions, and possibly India and other parts of the Empire, but recently it has been more often suggested as a means of meeting three distinct problems within the United Kingdom itself: namely, first, the congestion of work in the Parliament of the United Kingdom; secondly, the Irish claim for self-government; and, thirdly, the Ulster objection to any such concession. In view of the proposed appointment of a Parliamentary Committee to consider federal devolution in connexion with the first matter and the present state of the Irish question and the Ulster difficulty, the time seems opportune for examining this suggestion. The object of this article is not to consider the need for devolution in the United Kingdom, or the merits or demerits of the demand in Ireland for self-government, or of the Ulster attitude thereto, but merely to inquire how far federalism is applicable to or helpful for the solution of these problems. Federalism, however, is a term little understood and vaguely used; it therefore appears necessary, first of all, to ascertain, as far as is possible in a limited space, what federal government really means.

Prof. Adams's book discusses, from the standpoint of a political philosopher, the function and method of federalism; but more useful for present purposes is the section on federal government in the 'Memorandum on Forms of Government within the Empire,' which it is understood was written by one of the Secretaries of the Irish Convention and circulated among the members for

their information. The Memorandum points out that federalism, as the term is generally understood, has usually arisen where countries capable of union and connected by the bond of many common interests became desirous of union in some matters but of the retention of independence in others. History, from the days of the Achæan League, furnishes many examples of states so situated. Sometimes the desire or necessity for complete union gained the upper hand, with the result that unification ensued, as it did in South Africa. Sometimes the desire for individual independence prevailed, and little more than an alliance resulted, as in the case of the confederation of the thirteen American States in 1777. Both to alliances and incorporate unions the term 'federation' has been applied by some writers, but it is usually confined to the intermediate cases where, on the one hand, each of the federating communities continues in possession of certain powers with which the central government cannot interfere (whereby a federation is distinguished from an incorporate union); and where, on the other hand, the union has been sufficiently close to enable the central government—in which each of the federating units is represented—to deal, as regards the matters assigned to it, not merely with the governments of the federating communities (as in the case of confederate alliances), but also direct with the individuals who compose these communities.

The Memorandum states that it is only to unions of this nature that the term 'federal' can be properly applied; and, though this statement may appear somewhat sweeping, the writer seems to establish his case by an analysis of the three great federal systems that exist among English-speaking people. When the thirteen American Confederate States decided in 1788 to enter into a federal bond, a central government representative of the thirteen states had to be called into existence; and the powers of government—to use a convenient if technically inaccurate term—had to be divided between this new government and the existing state or local governments. The plan adopted was the assignment to the central government of certain matters and the retention of practically all other matters by the state governments. When, eighty years later, the British provinces of North America were

federated, the method of the division of powers was reversed; for the powers of the provincial or local governments were enumerated, and all powers not thus assigned to them were vested in the new central government. But, when the six Australian colonies were federated nineteen years ago, the American model, not the Canadian, was followed.

How, precisely, the totality of the powers of government is divided between the central and local governments is not of the essence of federalism. Though some powers are obviously suitable, and indeed necessary, for the central government, while other powers are obviously suitable for the local governments, there is no hard-and-fast rule in this matter. What is of more importance than the exact line of division is the fact that most of the powers possessed by the central government and the local governments are possessed exclusively as against the other, though there are, in all the three cases mentioned, some matters on which both the central and local governments are free to legislate concurrently. The result of the division is that in the United States, Canada and Australia the central government and each local government have spheres of their own in which their power is exclusive, while there is a third sphere in which both the central and the local governments may operate. There is also a fourth small but very important sphere in which neither the central nor the state government may act, consisting of matters which can be legislated on only by the people through a formal amendment of the Constitution or, in the case of Canada and Australia, by an Act of the Imperial Parliament.* The third sphere is not essential to federalism, but the fourth is, though the only matter which must necessarily be placed beyond the control of both the central and local legislatures is the division between them of the powers of government. This limitation of the power of both legislatures is the inevitable corollary of the possession by each of an exclusive field of authority.

The co-existence, in every part of a country, of two governments, one central and the other local, between

* Imperial legislation is the only machinery available in Canada.

which the powers of government are divided, is often said to be the essential characteristic of federalism; but what is really essential to true federalism is that each government should be supreme in the sphere marked out for it and not therein subject to the other government. To allow the federal parliament to legislate on every matter and overrule at its will all local legislation or to take away the powers of the local legislatures would mean unification, while to allow the local parliaments to legislate effectively on all matters would be to nullify federation. The existence in a federation of an absolutely supreme parliament unlimited in its scope of authority is thus inconsistent with the root principle of federalism.

This point, which has received little attention from previous writers on federalism, and least of all from those who advocate the introduction of a federal system into the United Kingdom, is dwelt upon by the writer of the Memorandum under review as of cardinal importance in connexion with all such proposals. As he points out, the establishment of local legislatures in the United Kingdom, with exclusive powers over certain matters—which is essential to a real federalisation—seems incompatible with the continued existence of the Imperial Parliament, as we know it. Local legislatures might, indeed, be set up in different parts of the United Kingdom; and their powers might be declared exclusive over the matters assigned to them. Unless, however, the whole constitutional theory of the United Kingdom and the Empire were revolutionised, the Imperial Parliament could not, in law, deprive itself of its powers of legislation on these matters, or of the power of resumption; and nothing less than this would make the system really federal. A strictly federal constitution might indeed be established in two ways. In the first place, the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom might be disintegrated into its component parts by a repeal of the Act of Union; and the independent Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland, thus revived, might contract to surrender to some new legislature, in which both kingdoms would be represented, all control over certain matters, while each retained exclusive power within its own area over all other matters. This federal process might be carried a step

further if the repeal of the Act of Union between Great Britain and Ireland were followed by a repeal of the Act of Union between England and Scotland. A truly federal system might be established by one other method, that is, by the existing Parliament of the United Kingdom passing an Act which would create three or more new parliaments (one central and two or more local), and then itself ceasing to exist.*

Needless to say, the whole constitutional system of the United Kingdom and the Empire is not likely to be thus revolutionised for the purpose of relieving congestion in Parliament, nor even as a method of conferring a measure of self-government on Ireland. The truth is that those who advocate a federal solution of these problems do not mean quite what they say. They mean, it is true, that local parliaments should be set up in the United Kingdom, one (possibly more) in England, one in Scotland, one (possibly more) in Ireland, and possibly one in Wales, to deal with certain matters of a more or less local nature, and that each part of the United Kingdom should continue to be represented in the Imperial Parliament. They do not, however, mean that the local parliaments should possess legally exclusive powers and thus be co-ordinate with the Imperial Parliament in the sense in which the state legislatures in America, the provincial legislatures in Canada and the state parliaments in Australia are co-ordinate with Congress, the Dominion Parliament and the Commonwealth Parliament respectively. They mean that the local parliaments they propose for different parts of the United Kingdom should be, in law, like all colonial parliaments, subordinate legislatures, and that the power and scope of the Imperial Parliament should remain unlimited. So long as the latter body abstained from exercising its powers of legislating on the matters assigned to the local parliaments of England, Scotland and Ireland, as it abstains from legislating on matters within the jurisdiction of colonial parliaments, the new constitution of the United

* Lord Bryce has suggested in 'The American Commonwealth' that the Assembly of the Achæan League was sovereign in the same sense that the Imperial Parliament is sovereign in the British Empire. This, however, is doubtful, and if true would only show that the League was not strictly federal.

Kingdom would work on federal lines, but it would not be strictly federal.

This difference is not a mere legal distinction; it is a fact of the utmost political importance. It vitiates many of the arguments such as that relating to the possession of 'residual powers,' which, though based on the principles of truly federal constitutions, are used both for and against the introduction into the United Kingdom of a scheme which can be, at most, quasi-federal. The practical importance of this fact will be more apparent later; here it is sufficient to note that the 'federal' schemes advocated for relieving parliamentary congestion and settling the Irish question are not strictly federal.

With regard to the first object—the relief of the Imperial Parliament—a quasi-federal scheme seems quite adequate; indeed, the only question is whether such an extreme remedy is required. The need for some sort of devolution in the United Kingdom, quite apart from the Irish Question, is generally admitted. Parliament, in addition to being the supreme deliberative and legislative body for the Empire, is also the sole legislature for the United Kingdom and each part thereof. The result is that many things are left undone and more are done badly. For many years before the war it was evident that the burden thus cast upon Parliament was too great, and that that body was becoming more and more unable to cope with its work, which steadily increases with the increasing complexity of modern life and the increasing demand for governmental intervention. The congestion in Parliament is, in part, due to the fact that neither legislation nor administration is uniform or identical throughout the United Kingdom. About half the statutes passed since the Union, notably those dealing with ecclesiastical matters, local government, poor law, education, land, agriculture, law and justice (including police, prisons, etc.), apply to part of the United Kingdom only; and the work of administration, so far as such matters are concerned, is carried on by distinct departments in each of the three kingdoms. Moreover, many of the Acts which purport to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom have, in fact, to deal

with conditions which vary in England, Scotland and Ireland; and, as they are generally framed to meet the conditions existing in England, they have to be made suitable for Scotland and Ireland by means of 'application clauses,' which *pro tanto* means differential legislation. If the problem of the excessive burden cast upon our one Parliament was serious before the war, it is now insistent. Some, at any rate, of the present unrest seems due to the feeling amongst certain classes that Parliament is unable to grapple with the work of reconstruction so far as their needs are concerned. Parliamentary Government, as we know it, is on its trial; and, if it does not emerge triumphant from the ordeal, the movement in favour of 'direct action' and sectional, or rather vocational, organisations on the 'soviet' model may grow.

The fact that, despite the existence of a single legislature for all parts of the United Kingdom, separate, often diverse, legislation on many matters has to be passed for each of the three kingdoms, inevitably suggests, as the readiest way of relieving parliamentary congestion, the establishment of distinct bodies in England, Scotland and Ireland to deal with the matters on which legislation is not now uniform throughout the United Kingdom, and possibly other matters too. It does not, however, follow, though it is often assumed, that devolution of this sort must be federal; that is, that it necessitates the introduction of a federal or quasi-federal system into the United Kingdom. Certainly, the relief of parliamentary congestion, apart from the question of Ireland, does not seem to require the establishment in England, Scotland and Ireland of bodies of the true parliamentary type such as the seventeen legislatures that exist in the two federated Dominions, each of which, as much as the single Parliament in the other three Dominions, possesses within the scope of its authority no mere delegated power but power as plenary and as ample 'as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow.' The measure of devolution that is required to relieve parliamentary congestion does not seem to call for more than the establishment of legislative bodies of a minor nature, such as the provincial councils which existed in New

Zealand from 1852 until 1876, and exist in South Africa to-day.*

The truth is that the driving force behind the movement for the introduction of a federal or quasi-federal system into the United Kingdom, as distinguished from the devolution of certain matters to quasi-municipal bodies, is the belief entertained by many that such a system would not only relieve parliamentary congestion but would also meet what they consider to be the legitimate claims of Ireland to control Irish affairs. The root difficulty in the way of thus killing two birds with one stone is the question of the scope of authority to be assigned to the local legislatures in England, Scotland and Ireland. The scope that would be sufficient to relieve the excessive burden now borne by Parliament—roughly the matters now regulated by diverse laws in different parts of the United Kingdom—would not satisfy the Irish demand for control of Irish affairs; and the scope indicated by that demand is far greater than what is thought desirable or practicable for local legislatures in England or Scotland. This point, crucial though it is, has been rather neglected by the federalists, and seems to require consideration in some detail.

The extent of the autonomy that is sought by constitutional nationalists, as distinguished from Sinn Féin republicans, is fairly clear. The power proposed for the Irish Parliament in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 and the Act of 1914 was, like the power given to the legislature of every self-governing colony, a general power to make laws for the peace, order and good

* The Union of South Africa is sometimes described as a federal system, but this is obviously incorrect. The South African provincial councils, unlike the Canadian provincial legislatures and the Australian state parliaments, do not possess plenary powers; and no part of their jurisdiction is independent of control by the Union Parliament, which can not only override provincial legislation but can take away the powers and even terminate the existence of the councils. The fact that each provincial executive is not, like cabinets elsewhere, dependent on the continued support of a majority of the council but is elected by the council—on a system of proportional representation—for a definite term of years, indicates pretty clearly that the framers of the South Africa Act intended the Union, as stated in the preamble, to be a 'legislative Union,' not a federal Union, and regarded the provincial councils not as legislatures of the parliamentary type but as institutions of a quasi-municipal type.

government of the country; but, while the colonial constitution Acts contained practically no specific limitations of this general power, all the Irish measures contained a list of matters which were specifically declared to be outside the power of the Irish Parliament. Despite these exclusions, the matters within the power of the Irish Parliament in all three measures included a number of matters which are now regulated by uniform laws throughout the United Kingdom, and might well be thought to be *prima facie* unsuitable for devolution to local legislatures in England and Scotland, e.g., direct taxation, postal matters, railways, factory and industrial legislation, etc.*

The matter, however, does not now stand as it did in 1886, 1893 and 1914. The Irish demand has grown as the result of a generation of postponement and drift. Eighteen months ago the question of what matters should be assigned to the Irish Parliament and what matters should be excluded from its power was considered by the Irish Convention, and the result is clearly set out in their Report. The great majority of that body—Nationalists, Southern Unionists and Labour members, in fact the whole Convention excluding the Ulster Unionists—agreed, except in one important question, upon limiting the matters to be excluded from the power of the Irish Parliament, viz. (1) the Crown, (2) peace and war, (3) foreign relations, (4) dignities, (5) defence (including certain control of harbours, etc.), (6) coinage, legal tender, weights and measures, (7) copyright and patent rights.†

As regards the one matter on which agreement was not reached—indirect taxation—Lord MacDonnell put the issue very clearly in a recent letter to 'The Times.' The whole Convention, exclusive of the Ulster Unionists, were in favour of Irish control of Excise; and the Nationalists

* In some of the measures the Irish control of direct taxation and postal services was curtailed.

† The partial reservation of Police and Post Office under the Convention scheme was to cease as soon as possible after the end of the war. It may be noted that the matters comprised in the first four of these classes, though not specifically excluded from the scope of Dominion parliaments, are, in practice, beyond their control; and that their control over some of the other matters, e.g., coinage, is not unfettered.

and Labour men, but not the Southern Unionists, were in favour of Irish control of Customs also. The Prime Minister, however, in his famous letter to the Chairman, dated Feb. 25, 1918, while stating that the settlement of the Irish question was a task incumbent on the Government, and declaring their intention to submit legislative proposals to Parliament with the least possible delay, remarked that it would not be possible in the middle of a great war to face the financial and fiscal disturbance involved in the transfer of Customs and Excise to an Irish Parliament. It was, as Lord MacDonnell points out, to meet this view and the objection of the Southern Unionists to Irish control of Customs, and thereby to secure, as it was thought, in view of the terms of the Prime Minister's letter, the immediate establishment of an Irish Parliament, that the majority of the Nationalists agreed to the postponement of the decision on Customs and Excise. The general view in Ireland seems to be that this Nationalist consent to a postponement is no longer binding, as the Government did not, in accordance with the Prime Minister's undertaking on the presentation of the Convention's Report, introduce legislative proposals—an undertaking which the Nationalists regard as absolute and not contingent on complete agreement being reached in the Convention. Be this as it may, Lord MacDonnell points out that, as the war is now over, there is no longer any valid reason for postponing the decision; the question of Customs and Excise should be settled in any Act which sets up an Irish Parliament, and settled, he claims, in accordance with the views of the majority of the Convention, that is, by the grant of full fiscal autonomy.

Under the Convention's scheme, the Irish Parliament, would thus have control over such matters as treason, alienage, naturalisation, quarantine, external trade and navigation (including merchant shipping), and, most important of all, indirect taxation, in addition to the powers proposed in 1886 and 1893 and conceded in 1914. The Irish Dominion League, in their manifesto of June last, has reiterated this demand; and the scheme recently suggested by 'The Times' contemplates the assignment of most of these powers to an Irish Parliament. There may be strong British, and even Imperial, reasons why

such powers should not be conceded—the question of Ulster objections is postponed for the moment—but it is quite clear that no measure of Home Rule, whether federal or otherwise, will now receive support from the most moderate Nationalists which excludes from the power of the Irish Parliament matters other than the seven heads mentioned above as excluded under the Convention's scheme, with possibly one or two additions, such as treason.

On the other hand, the relief of parliamentary congestion does not require the assignment to English and Scottish legislatures of many of the powers demanded for the Irish Parliament. The law and administration of direct and indirect taxation, postal services, trade and navigation and many other matters, are now uniform, or practically uniform, throughout the United Kingdom. Their transfer to local bodies in England, Scotland and Ireland is not required for the relief of parliamentary congestion. Their transfer to an Irish legislature is apparently required to satisfy the Irish claim for self-government; and the breaking-up of the unity of the United Kingdom that is involved in such transfer might be accepted for the sake of an Irish settlement. The further step, however, of partitioning Great Britain and assigning the control of such matters as customs and excise, trade and navigation, etc., to separate bodies in England and Scotland, will never be accepted merely in order to settle the Irish question on a federal basis. Hence one school of politicians regards the grant of a full measure of self-government to Ireland as incompatible with a federalised United Kingdom, while another school declares that the federalisation of the United Kingdom precludes the grant of a full measure of self-government to Ireland.

It must be admitted that the advocates of a federalised United Kingdom have never frankly grappled with this difficulty; certainly they have never, as a body, seriously addressed themselves to the problem of reconciling two apparent incompatibles—the demand for large powers for an Irish legislature and the demand for small powers for English and Scottish legislatures. There has been much vague talk about a compromise, but they will not face the fact that a compromise means giving an Irish legislature less power than would be sufficient to secure

a settlement and giving English and Scottish legislatures more power than would be convenient. The result is that a majority of the Irish people have become persistently hostile to all suggestions of a federal settlement. To them it seems inevitably to imply a curtailment of the powers that might otherwise be given to the Irish Parliament. Indeed, many Irishmen genuinely believe that some of those who favour a federal solution do so because they regard it as the easiest and most certain way of cutting down the extent of the autonomy which it is thought must sooner or later be given to Ireland.*

The only other solution of this very real difficulty that has, so far, been advanced by federalists is a suggestion—for which some support can be found in Prof. Adams's book—that the powers given to each of the local legislatures in the United Kingdom need not be identical. Under such a scheme, the control of customs and excise, trade and navigation and other matters, would be given to the Irish legislature but not to the other local legislatures, while the control of these matters in England and Scotland would be retained by the Imperial Parliament. Such a solution of the Irish Question would, it has been argued, be really anti-federal—first, because in all existing federations the powers assigned to local legislatures are identical in each case; and secondly, because the control of such matters as indirect taxation, postal services, external trade and navigation, throughout every unit of a federation, are invariably retained by the central parliament.

As regards the first point, it is certainly usual for all the local legislatures within a federation to possess the same powers; but differentiation is not unknown. Thus, in Canada, Crown lands and forests are controlled in some of the provinces by the provincial government and in other provinces by the Dominion Government. Again, several units of the pre-war German federation possessed some control over certain important matters, e.g., army, indirect taxation and postal services, in respect of which the other units had no power. It is, however, undoubtedly true that there is no real parallel in any

* It is perhaps for this reason that a leading Irish newspaper has a standing headline for all federal proposals—'The Federal Fraud.'

federal system for the wide differentiation that would seem inevitable under this scheme between the powers of an Irish legislature on the one hand, and the English and Scottish legislatures on the other hand.

As regards the second point, viz. that the settlement suggested would involve the control by the Irish legislature of matters which, according to all federal precedents, should be reserved to the central parliament, it should be observed that the concession of the full Irish demand would still leave the Imperial Parliament with exclusive control over the matters most necessary for a central parliament, such as foreign relations, defence, peace and war. As regards the other matters in dispute, it must be remembered that there is no hard-and-fast rule for the division of powers between the central and local legislatures. Thus the local legislatures have far greater powers in Australia than in Canada; and the pre-war German federal system affords some analogies for a certain amount of control by some of the units over even indirect taxation and postal services. Still, here again it is undoubtedly true that the existing federal systems afford no true parallel for the possession by local legislatures of some of the powers that seem necessary for an Irish Parliament, if Irish sentiment is to be satisfied.

The true answer to the critics who condemn as anti-federal a scheme assigning to one local legislature powers not assigned to the others, and assigning to a local legislature power over such matters as customs and excise, usually reserved for the central authority, merely because such an arrangement would be contrary to federal precedents, has been already indicated. The system suggested for the United Kingdom involves the continuance of a supreme parliament, and is therefore not really federal but at most quasi-federal; and consequently the canons of strict federalism cannot be properly applied to it. Precisely the same consideration applies to any scheme of Imperial Federation that is likely to be introduced. No one who knows the Dominions imagines that Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand or even Newfoundland will ever give up in favour of the Imperial Parliament, however representative of the Empire it may become, their present right of framing their own

tariff or making their own trade arrangements. Yet this would be contrary to all federal precedents. The truth is that, as any system of federation that is likely to be introduced, either into the Empire or the United Kingdom, is certain to display, in the existence of a central parliament with illimitable power, at least one striking departure from the essence of legal federation, other departures from the normal federal type are not unnatural and cannot be appropriately described as 'anti-federal.'

There is, however, an objection of real substance against trying to settle both the Irish Question and the congestion in Parliament by setting up local legislatures in England, Scotland and Ireland, and giving the Irish local legislature, but not the English and Scottish legislatures, power over such matters as indirect taxation, postal services, trade and navigation, etc., apart from the fact that Ulster has declared against such a plan on the ground that Ireland must not receive exceptional treatment differing from that of the rest of the United Kingdom. This objection is that any such arrangement

* There are special reasons why a federation of the United Kingdom and a federation of the Empire are likely to present marked departures from the normal federal type, but one reason common to both cases may be noted, viz. the predominance of Great Britain. It is a recognised principle of the constitution of federal parliaments that each unit should be represented in the popular house in proportion to its population and, though this principle is not so strictly followed, that each unit should be equally represented in the Second Chamber. There are great variations in the population of the different units of the United States, Canada and Australia, but there is no predominance which would enable one unit to direct the legislation that applies to all. Thus, it would take a combination of the ten most populous American States to outvote the rest; and, though Ontario and Quebec could outvote the other seven Canadian Provinces, or New South Wales and Victoria the other four Australian States, these combinations do not in practice occur, and are in fact the least likely combinations. The result is that the views of one unit are checked by the views of the other units, and a healthy federal balance is preserved. The population of Great Britain alone, however, is double the white population of the rest of the Empire, and consequently Ireland and the Dominions are indisposed to acquiesce in the control by a federal parliament of matters such as the tariff, which vitally concerns each unit and in which their interests may not coincide with British interests. It is obvious that even the partition of England and the restoration of the heptarchy would not really affect the predominance of Great Britain. It is, perhaps, not irrelevant to note that the German Federation was the one federation in which one unit dwarfed all the others, and that it was the German Federation which presented the most marked departures from the normal federal type.

would almost hopelessly complicate the working of the Imperial Parliament. The continued representation of Ireland in that parliament is, of course, a root principle of every federal or quasi-federal system. The Imperial Parliament, however, under such a scheme, in addition to dealing with foreign relations, questions involving peace and war, and defence, for England, Scotland, Ireland and the rest of the Empire, would also have to deal, so far as England and Scotland are concerned, with the matters, such as customs and excise, postal services and navigation, over which the Irish, but not the English or Scottish legislatures would have power. In other words, the Imperial Parliament, in addition to having to act as an Imperial legislature for the whole of the United Kingdom and the Empire, would have to act as a local legislature for Great Britain in certain matters. Obviously it would be unjust if the Irish members could vote on such matters.

This was 'the great Serbonian Bog' which encompassed Gladstone in 1886 and 1893. The first solution tried was to exclude Ireland from representation at Westminster. This, besides being anti-federal, meant injustice to Ireland, and was declared by Parnell in 1888, in his famous letter to Cecil Rhodes, to have been a mistake. In 1893 it was at first proposed to allow the Irish members to vote on Imperial but not on British matters. Though Gladstone had previously declared it would pass the wit of man to distinguish between the two classes of matters, the real difficulty was found to be the disturbing effect this 'in and out' solution might have upon the stability of the Government of the day. Ultimately the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes was adopted; and this was followed in the Act of 1914, though the injustice to Great Britain of Irish interference in British matters was diminished by the reduction of Irish representation below the number indicated by population. This was, at best, but a partial palliative. The difficulty still remains, and seems to render any quasi-federal solution which takes the form of the creation of local legislatures in England, Scotland and Ireland with unequal powers not merely a marked departure from federal principles but also impossible as a permanent solution.

While the root difficulty that lies in the way of combining federal devolution with a grant of Irish self-government—viz. the difference between the powers required for the Irish legislature and those suitable for the other local legislatures—cannot, apparently, be removed by either of the solutions usually advanced by federalists, viz. compromise on the question of powers or the assignment of greater powers to an Irish legislature than to other local legislatures, it may be satisfactorily met in another way. The federalisation of the United Kingdom can be combined with the satisfaction of Ireland's demands if only two subordinate local legislatures with identical powers are established, one in Great Britain, the other in Ireland. As there would be but one local legislature for England and Scotland combined, no question of breaking up the unity which now exists in Great Britain could arise; and there would be nothing to prevent the new British legislature being given power, within its area, over all matters which it is thought desirable to assign to the Irish legislature, including direct and indirect taxation, postal services, trade and navigation, etc.

This scheme would, of course, be open to one of the objections urged against all schemes which contemplate Irish control of customs and excise, postal matters, etc., viz. that it would be a marked departure from all federal precedents to assign control over some of these matters to a local legislature. As before, the only complete answer that can be made is that it is misleading to apply the canons of strict federalism to a system that cannot be strictly federal, since the central legislature would possess legally illimitable powers, and the local legislatures would have no legally exclusive powers. The scheme of two local legislatures, one for Ireland and only one for Great Britain, is, however, free from all the other objections that may be raised against other federal schemes. It enables the Irish demand to be met without either the partition of Great Britain in matters in which British unity is desirable, or, alternatively, the assignment of certain powers to the legislature in Ireland and the withholding of some of them from the local legislatures in England and Scotland. Consequently, it does not involve control by the Imperial Parliament of certain

matters in one part of the United Kingdom and not in another part, and it does not put the Irish members of the Imperial Parliament in an anomalous position. The scheme certainly relieves the congestion in Parliament; and, while it preserves the unity in Great Britain which seems essential in such matters as tariff, postal services, trade, etc., there is nothing to prevent the new Parliament set up for Great Britain from devolving upon minor bodies of a quasi-municipal type in Scotland, Wales and England (or parts thereof) such matters as may be thought to require differential treatment. Incidentally, it may be noted that this scheme fulfils the Ulster postulate that Ireland should not receive exceptional treatment differentiating her from the rest of the United Kingdom.

Finally, this scheme of United Kingdom federation would greatly help to clear the way for Imperial federation by establishing in Great Britain and Ireland parliaments with powers similar to those possessed by the Dominion Parliaments, and so relieving the Imperial Parliament, in practice, of all work other than what is truly imperial. The Imperial Parliament would interfere in British and Irish affairs only to the same extent as it now interferes in Canadian and Australian affairs. Thus the objection that is felt against the Dominions sending representatives to the Imperial Parliament, so long as that body is mainly occupied with the control in the United Kingdom of matters over which the Dominions, within their own areas, are in practice supreme, would disappear.

It may be urged that, under the scheme indicated for the federalisation of the United Kingdom and the settlement of the Irish Question, the Imperial Parliament, while responsible for foreign and colonial affairs, defence, etc., would have no power to raise the money required for expenditure on these matters, since both direct and indirect taxation would be under the control of the British and Irish legislatures. This difficulty was, of course, the rock upon which the American Confederation of 1777 broke, since the central government could not levy taxes, but could only requisition the sum required from each of the thirteen States, and had no means of enforcing these requisitions. It may, however, be fairly answered that the two cases are not comparable. To-day

the money required for this expenditure is raised by one unit—the United Kingdom. Pending the federation of the Empire, there would, under the scheme indicated, be only two units concerned—Ireland and Great Britain. Under any scheme of Home Rule for Ireland, just as much as under the federal scheme under discussion, the Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure will have to be determined—probably by a Royal Commission, as Lord MacDonnell proposed in the Irish Convention—and the balance, pending the federation of the Empire, found by Great Britain. The problem would certainly become more complicated and more likely to cause friction if and when the Dominions send representatives to Westminster, and become liable for their share of the expenditure; but this is a problem of Imperial Federation which would arise whether the United Kingdom had been already federalised or not.* Whether the scheme indicated above—namely, that of two local parliaments in the United Kingdom, one for Great Britain and one for Ireland, with identical powers—is desirable or not, it seems to negative the idea that the federalisation of the United Kingdom is necessarily incompatible with the grant of a full measure of self-government to Ireland or *vice versa*.

Before passing from the federalisation of the United Kingdom to the federalisation of Ireland, it may be worth while to consider, in the light of the views expressed above, how far the actual scheme of self-government framed by the Irish Convention is consistent with federalism in the United Kingdom. Lord Dunraven, the best-known advocate of Federalism in the Convention, declared that they were not incompatible, though he regretted that the Convention did not proceed 'on more definite federal lines.' Some well-known supporters of United Kingdom federalism have, however, criticised the Convention's report as anti-federal. There seems to be singularly little foundation for this opinion. In the first place, much of this criticism is based on a fallacy already discussed—that of applying to what can at most

* One fairly simple solution of this problem of Imperial Federation has already been indicated by Mr Lionel Curtis in 'The Problem of the Commonwealth' (cap. xviii).

be a quasi-federal arrangement the canons of strict federalism. It is true that the powers proposed by the Convention for the Irish Parliament are greater than those possessed by a local legislature in any known federation; but any less powers would probably be inadequate to secure an Irish settlement. Moreover, as has been pointed out above, there is nothing to prevent the same powers as were proposed for the Irish Parliament being, now or later, conferred upon one co-ordinate legislature in Great Britain, though there may be insuperable difficulties in the way of conferring them on two separate legislatures in England and Scotland. Further, the Convention's scheme definitely reserved to the Imperial Parliament control over the matters most necessary for a central parliament, viz. the Crown, foreign relations, peace and war, defence, etc., and it expressly recognised the liability of Ireland to contribute towards Imperial expenditure. Finally, and most important of all, it provided for the continued representation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament. It is significant to note that the plan recently advocated in 'The Times' closely follows the Convention's scheme so far as the place of Ireland in the United Kingdom and the Empire is concerned.

The truth appears to be that the Convention went as far as it could in the federal direction; and it is not apparent what more it could have done, or how it could have proceeded 'on more definite federal lines,' unless it had suggested that a local legislature should be established in Great Britain simultaneously with the Irish Parliament. The business of the Convention, however, was to formulate a constitution for Ireland; to have gone further and drafted a constitution for Great Britain also would have been to exceed its function. It may well have been thought that the anomaly of the Imperial Parliament continuing to combine purely British work with its Imperial task would soon have brought about the obvious remedy for that anomaly—the establishment of a local legislature for Great Britain with powers similar to those possessed by the Irish Parliament. The Convention, at any rate, put no obstacle in the way of development; and its plan of self-government for Ireland within the Empire may be fairly described as consistent

with and leading up to the larger policy of United Kingdom federation. After all, federalism is more than a frame of government, it is an attitude of mind; and the Convention certainly encouraged the development of that mental attitude which is so urgently required, the mental attitude which leads men to regard the Empire, as has been finely said, 'not as a prison house into which they have been thrust by invincible force,' but rather as a vantage ground where the pursuit of high Imperial ideals may be combined with the fostering of national pride and patriotism.

It is a matter for regret that the manifesto of the Irish Dominion League shows a marked departure in this respect from the spirit of the Convention. Why it should do so is not, at first sight, clear. More than a year ago Sir H. Plunkett, the Chairman of the Convention, who is now the spokesman of the League, pointed out that the Irish constitution agreed upon by all the members of the Convention, except the Ulster Unionists, was characterised by three points of departure from the normal Dominion status, viz: (1) lack of control over defence matters (except as regards conscription and, in certain eventualities, territorial forces); (2) representation of Ireland at Westminster; and (3) payment by Ireland of a contribution to Imperial expenditure, which was to be, at any rate at first, secured by a Statute of Imperial Parliament. There was a difference of opinion, which has been already explained, about indirect taxation; and the Report of the Convention suggested some minor departures, of no great consequence, from full Dominion status. One would have expected that an association of moderate men like the members of the League, who desired a full measure of self-government for Ireland, would have taken their stand on this 'foundation of Irish agreement unprecedented in history'—to use Sir H. Plunkett's own words—modified in the direction of fiscal autonomy, for the reasons explained above, and, if necessary, in other directions for cause shown. The manifesto of the Irish Dominion League, however, proceeds on rather different lines, and practically ignores the agreement reached in the Convention, apparently in order to emphasise its own demand as one for the Dominion status, though it does not seem

to have got much nearer its ideal. It is not easy to compare the clear-cut scheme propounded by the Convention with the somewhat vague proposals of the League, but the only important difference between the two proposals seems to be that the League insists on the cessation of Irish representation at Westminster.*

Undoubtedly the League's proposals would in this respect more clearly place Ireland in the position of a Dominion than would the Convention's scheme, but the change is hardly an improvement. The Dominion analogy has, of course, but little relevance. The colonies were never represented in the Imperial Parliament, as Ireland has been since 1800. Undoubtedly, however, there is a general, though perhaps not an informed, feeling in Ireland against representation at Westminster, of which the League was not unconscious. This feeling is commonly based on a tendency to identify non-representation with Dominion Home Rule, and representation with Federal Home Rule, which is persistently portrayed as 'gas and water' autonomy—a view that seems wholly erroneous. A prejudice against Federal Home Rule was not unnatural among Repealers and the Young Ireland party over seventy years ago, since the establishment of a subordinate parliament in Dublin, coupled with Irish representation at Westminster, seemed less desirable to them than their ideal of an Irish Parliament co-ordinate with the Imperial Parliament. Such a prejudice, however, seems meaningless to-day, when the demand of all constitutional Nationalists is for a parliament which would be in law subordinate, as are all colonial legislatures. It has been already pointed out that the full satisfaction of the demand made by constitutional Nationalists is quite compatible with the federalisation of Great Britain and Ireland, though it may not be with the federalisation of England, Scotland

* The League demands full fiscal autonomy; the attitude of the Convention has been explained. It is not clear how far, if at all, the League's proposals differ from the Convention's as regards defence. The League, like the Convention, agrees to an Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure, though the League's interpretation of that expression seems to include only the cost of the army, navy and diplomatic services and neither the charge for the National Debt nor the Civil List. Possibly this was not intended.

and Ireland. In any case, the amount of autonomy proposed for Ireland has never depended on whether Ireland was or was not to be represented in the Imperial Parliament. Isaac Butt's scheme of Federal Home Rule involved a far fuller measure of self-government than did the scheme of 1886, under which Ireland was not to be represented at Westminster. Again, though such representation was conceded in 1893 and 1914, the powers then given were certainly not less than the powers of 1886. Moreover, if the powers recommended by the Convention and the League are given, they would not become less because representation at Westminster is also given.

The argument, however, against representation that appeals to thinking men in Ireland is the view which Parnell advanced in 1886 but withdrew two years later—that Ireland needs the best brains of her sons, and that representation in Imperial Parliament would divert the mind of Ireland from Dublin to Westminster. Exclusion from Westminster seems, however, more likely to divert the attention of Irishmen, especially the men of the Irish Parliament, from Irish affairs. If Ireland had no voice in a Parliament which controlled foreign and colonial affairs, peace and war, defence, etc., an Irish Parliament might well feel itself compelled to discuss these matters, which might vitally affect Ireland, and towards which she would be paying a contribution. The fact that there would be no other way of 'voicing' Irish opinion would almost inevitably lead to discussions in College Green of motions expressing Irish opinion on the policy of the Imperial Parliament; and Irish Ministers would be more than human if they did not sometimes, when the opposition threatened trouble, yield to the temptation thus held out to them 'to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.' No doubt, the cessation of Irish representation proposed by the Irish Dominion League would be a real concession to Sinn Féin prejudice against the retention by Ireland of her place in the Empire, but it has little else to recommend it. It certainly runs counter to the views of over a quarter of a million Southern Unionists, whose spokesman in the Convention declared that representation at Westminster was a *sine quâ non* of their acceptance of Home Rule, and to the opinion of most federalists, who regard it as a retrograde proposal.

The question of the federalisation of Ireland is comparatively simple. It means the establishment, in addition to an All-Ireland Parliament, of two or more provincial legislatures, and the division between the central Irish Parliament and these provincial legislatures of all powers not reserved to the Imperial Parliament. Even with a grant of the fullest possible powers of self-government, one parliament and one government would, from an administrative point of view, be quite sufficient for Ireland. Any decentralisation which might be required could be fully met by a moderate extension of the existing system of local government. The truth is that almost the sole reason why the federalisation of Ireland, or any form of 'home rule within home rule,' has been advocated is that some people regard the establishment of provincial legislatures as a means of meeting the Ulster objection to Home Rule. It is no secret that the matter was discussed in the Convention, but allowed to drop, as no encouragement was forthcoming for the idea that the grant of autonomy to Ulster in respect of the matters to be assigned to provincial legislatures would diminish the objection of Ulster to the control of other matters by an All-Ireland Parliament. It was, however, revived by the Irish Centre Party under the leadership of Captain Gwynn; and its claim for consideration has been strengthened by the fact that it is the central feature of the scheme advocated by 'The Times.'

It may be said at once that this scheme is well thought out, and that the author frankly faces the difficulties of the situation with definite suggestions, instead of turning them aside with a phrase, as do most English federalists and Irish constitution-makers, not excluding Sinn Féin republicans. The source from which the scheme emanates has secured for it adequate publicity in England; and in Ireland it has been received, to use the words of 'The Irish Statesman,' as 'an overture honestly made and made in the grand style.' The scheme suggests the immediate establishment of two state or provincial legislatures in Ireland, one for Ulster and one for the other three provinces, with power over such matters as agriculture, fisheries, technical instruction, municipal interests and local government, local works

and undertakings, licensing, hospitals and charitable institutions, direct taxation for provincial purposes, control of provincial revenues, borrowing on the sole credit of the province, factory legislation and private bill legislation in matters affecting the province. It may be noted that these powers are roughly comparable with the powers possessed by the provincial legislatures in Canada, though considerably less than the powers possessed by an American or Australian State. An All-Ireland Parliament is also to be established, but is to be endowed with power only at some later date. The powers suggested for this parliament are substantially the powers recommended by the Irish Convention, *minus* the powers mentioned above as assigned to provincial legislatures.* The scheme, so far as it has been outlined above, contains nothing new. It is certainly federal, and would possibly be acquiesced in by Nationalists if acceptable to Ulster—a point which will be shortly considered; but it contains three additional features, one of them novel, which entirely alter the situation and call for consideration.

In the first place, the Irish Parliament is to be composed of representatives of Ulster and of the rest of Ireland in equal numbers. The Nationalists showed in the Convention that they were quite ready to give both Northern and Southern Unionists generous representation in an Irish Parliament, far in excess of what would be justified by population; but it seems an extreme measure to give one and a half million people in the North of Ireland the same weight as nearly three million people elsewhere. Still, it might be accepted if it would content Ulster.

In the second place, the Ulster state or provincial legislature is to have a perpetual veto on every legislative measure of the Irish Parliament and every administrative act of the Irish Government, so far as Ulster is concerned. It is known that it was suggested in the Convention 'that the members representing each province

* Treason felony, trade marks, alienage and naturalisation, quarantine and navigation, are the only matters placed under Irish control in the Convention's scheme which are reserved to Imperial Parliament in the 'Times' scheme.

in the Irish Parliament should be constituted into a provincial Grand Committee with special powers of veto, and possibly of initiative, in respect of legislation and administration, so far as that province was concerned'; and it is stated that a scheme was worked out by Lord MacDonnell (Report, p. 10). It seems almost impossible to give one province an absolute veto, so far as that province is concerned, over all Irish legislation, and it would obviously be hard to make any administrative veto workable in practice; but still the suggestion might, with modifications, be accepted by Ireland if it would placate Ulster.

The third special feature of the 'Times' scheme is new, but apparently impossible of acceptance. It is an essential part of the plan that all the matters indicated for control by the Irish Parliament are to remain under the exclusive control of the Imperial Parliament unless and until both the state or provincial legislatures assent to the transfer of some or all of these powers to the Irish Parliament, which until that event would be a mere debating society. Until Ulster consents, the Irish Parliament could not, to take an example, amend the National Health Insurance Acts or control their administration; so long as Ulster objects, the Irish canals, to take another illustration, must remain under the exclusive control of the Imperial Parliament and the Executive responsible thereto. This would never do. At present, though Ulster blocks the way, it does not claim to exercise a veto over the enjoyment of autonomy by the rest of Ireland. Its claim is confined to Ulster, and is based not on an Act of Parliament, but mainly on undertakings of certain ministers and ex-ministers. Constitutional Nationalists now deny the reasonableness of this veto and the sanctity of these undertakings. It seems futile to expect them to accept an arrangement under which Ulster's veto is to be given statutory recognition and extended to the whole of Ireland.

If this—in the eyes of the Nationalists—radical defect were removed, and the perpetual veto on legislation and administration modified, the general scheme might be accepted, if it disarmed Ulster's hostility to Home Rule. This could be the only reason for dividing Ireland (for certain purposes) into two states, for there is no real

need, apart from the Ulster question, for the multiplication of legislatures in Ireland. Moreover, differences in both law and administration between Ulster and the rest of Ireland, in some of the matters suggested for provincial control, might be productive of much inconvenience in view of Ulster's artificial frontier ; * and the settlement of provincial finance is notoriously difficult.

There does not, however, seem to be the slightest reason for imagining that Ulster's objection to the establishment of an All-Ireland Parliament would be to any appreciable extent diminished by the assignment to an Ulster provincial legislature of the matters suggested by 'The Times.' It is not about these matters that the soul of Ulster is mostly vexed ; it is about taxation (especially customs and excise), trade, railways, education, etc. ; and these matters are, under the 'Times' scheme and every quasi-federal scheme as yet suggested, to be controlled by the All-Ireland Parliament. Ulster might, of course, be placated if these and all the other matters about which it is apprehensive were transferred from the Imperial Parliament, not to the central Irish Parliament but to the provincial legislatures ; but that would be only thinly veiled partition. That policy may be good or bad, inevitable or impossible, workable or unworkable, but it is not the 'Times' scheme, nor is it federal, and it is therefore outside the scope of this article. The conclusion seems inevitable that, while the solution of the future relations between Great Britain and Ireland may be found in federalism, no federalisation of Ireland, which would leave the central Irish Parliament any genuine power, seems to offer any real hope of affording a *modus vivendi* between Ulster and the rest of Ireland.

* The outbreak a few years ago of foot-and-mouth disease illustrates how easily inconvenience might become disaster if dual control within Ireland of the greatest national industry were permitted. Incidentally it may be noted that similar dangers are inevitable under all schemes of partition.

Art. 12.—SHIPPING PROSPECTS.

1. *Lloyd's Register of Shipping*. Vol. III. 1914-15, 1919-20.
2. *Lloyd's Register. Annual and Quarterly Shipbuilding Returns*.
3. *Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom. Annual Report*, 1918-19.
4. *Merchant Tonnage and the Submarine*. Parliamentary Paper. [Cd. 9221.] H. M. Stationery Office.

DURING hostilities the British Mercantile Marine became one of the main fighting forces of the country. It was not designed for the purpose, but it had to defend itself. The number of merchant ships which, before the war, were planned with any idea of self-defence could be counted on the fingers of one's hand. Protests were even made in certain quarters, when the suggestion was put forward that some of the principal vessels should be fitted with gun-mountings in the stern. Attempts were made to bring pressure to bear on newspaper offices to print articles attempting to show how unnecessary such measures were, and suggesting that it would be impossible for any German merchant vessels to arm themselves for the purpose of harrying British commerce.

Although, therefore, some perceived that, in the event of a war with Germany, British merchant ships would have to fight, very few, if any, could have realised the turn which events actually took. It certainly did not ever occur to the public that any Power would be prepared to use the submarine weapon to sink merchant vessels at sight, regardless of the fate of those on board, whether women and children passengers or civilian men and crew. The result was that the Merchant Marine, totally unprepared for such tactics, was called upon to undergo great risks; and it did not flinch. Many of the ships were quite unsuited for fighting. At the outset, and for a long time afterwards, merchant ships could rely neither on the protection of a screen of destroyers nor, as regards the great majority, on superior speed. Until the convoy system was instituted, fairly late in the war, British merchant ships had to rely

upon the courses laid to enable them to escape submarines and, largely, upon luck. The Mercantile Marine survived the ordeal amazingly well, but the toll was very heavy.

While the Mercantile Marine had to become, against its will, a fighting force, it was the one force which could not be relieved from service on the conclusion of hostilities. The declaration of war in August 1914 opened an era of tremendous trial for the fighting forces. The signing of the Armistice meant relaxation of effort for the Navy and the Army; it meant for the Mercantile Marine merely a transfer of effort. Just as, during the war, the Mercantile Marine had to adapt itself to novel conditions, so, with the closing of hostilities, it had to re-adapt itself to a new set of conditions. They were not, and are not yet, ordinary peaceful conditions, because British shipping was called upon to take a very large share in effecting the change from war to peace. It had brought millions of men across the oceans to the fighting areas; it was now called upon to take them back again. It had enabled the Allies to prosecute the war, and it was now called upon to enable them, first, to get back to more normal conditions, and secondly, to make commerce between the nations possible. There could be no breathing-space for British shipping.

The position was rendered much more difficult because a very great deal of leeway had to be made up. During the conflict, all the available resources of British shipping were used solely with the object of enabling the allied and associated nations to win the war. No regard was paid to what the effect after the war would be. A substantial proportion of shipping had previously been engaged in carrying for other nations, these services representing an important element of national revenue. Such services were ruthlessly cut down. When the American troops were being poured across the North Atlantic, British ships were diverted from every trade. Ships intended to face the North Atlantic weather are often designed with particular strength for that trade. Considerations such as these were not allowed to weigh. Any liners which were considered sea-worthy for service were put into the North Atlantic. It was sufficient that they were fit to make the voyage;

the fact that their hulls might be strained and that their new use might affect the length of their life could not be counted. In normal times their owners would not have employed them in the North Atlantic; their employment in this service would have been too costly. Questions of cost did not count in the war. A very heavy price had to be paid in lives and treasure for the winning of the war, and British shipping had to make its share of sacrifice. It was a very full share indeed; precisely how large it was can never be known.

Considering, first, shipping losses, the United Kingdom tonnage destroyed, owing to direct war causes, is stated by Lloyd's Register to have been 7,753,000 tons gross. In addition, there were 1,033,000 tons lost by marine causes. Some of the losses by marine causes were really indirect war losses, the distinction between the two classes of perils being sometimes very small. Vessels were stranded and so were accounted to have been lost by marine perils, because these were the *proxima causa*, although the stranding may really have been due indirectly to the removal of the usual aids to navigation or even to the withdrawal of some of the most efficient officers for the Navy. Similarly, when the convoy system was in operation, collisions were frequent because vessels were moving in close proximity to each other. In any case, the total tonnage of the United Kingdom lost during the war amounted to 8,786,000 tons. If the losses of the British Dominions shipping, amounting to 269,000 tons, be added to this, the total British loss was 9,055,000 tons. The losses of no other nation could approach these in magnitude. The next heaviest losses were those of Norway, which amounted to 1,172,000 tons. Italy came third with a loss of 861,000 tons; France fourth with 807,000 tons; and the United States with a total loss of 531,000 tons. Greece lost 415,000 tons. Then there was a long interval. Japan lost 270,000 tons, Sweden 264,000 tons, Denmark 245,000 tons, Spain 238,000 tons, and Holland 229,000. The Belgian loss was 105,000 tons and that of Brazil 31,000 tons.

These are the actual figures of tonnage lost, but they naturally do not show the very serious depreciation suffered by the tonnage remaining afloat. This depreciation was suffered chiefly by the Allies. It was of a very

formidable character, as in the case of British passenger liners which were converted into armed cruisers and were often employed while running at high speed for long periods. In the emergency, such considerations as the strain thrown on to the engines could not be taken into account. Further, a very large number of the ships which are still included as active units of the British Mercantile Marine were badly damaged by mine or torpedo. The strain to the hulls has only appeared in many instances when the vessels were put into dry dock. The extent of the actual damage done to British shipping may be gauged by the fact that, taking into account shipping repairing and also fitting after launching, there were 1,500,000 tons out of action in April 1918. This figure remained stationary throughout 1918, but in February 1919 it increased to 1,900,000 tons. The figure now stands at about 1,400,000 tons.

The present is an opportune time for taking stock of British tonnage, in view of the statistics of ownership recently issued by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The Register sets out the steam tonnage owned by the principal maritime countries in June last and compares it with the corresponding figures for June 1914. It thus shows the net result of five years of war, after taking into account both the losses and new construction. The Register includes in its calculations steamships of 100 tons and upwards, and shows that, as compared with 18,892,000 tons in June 1914, there were in June last 16,345,000 tons owned in the United Kingdom, a net reduction of 2,547,000 tons, or 13·5 per cent. If this figure be deducted from that of the tonnage (8,786,000 tons) shown to have been lost from all causes, we get the amount of new construction during the five years, amounting to 6,239,000 tons. This figure included vessels built at home and abroad. Considering these figures of net losses, the next greatest sufferer was Greece, which owned in June last only 291,000 tons, as compared with 821,000 tons in 1914, a loss of 530,000 tons, or 64·6 per cent. Norway owned in June last 1,597,000 tons—a reduction of 350,000 tons, or 18·4 per cent. As her total losses were shown earlier to have been 1,172,000 tons, she appears to have acquired during the quinquennial period some 821,000 tons. Norwegian owners placed a large number of orders

with American shipbuilders, but all these contracts were subsequently requisitioned by the United States. It would seem, therefore, that the additions to her mercantile fleet were, to some extent, secured in Japan. The net loss of Italy was 192,000 tons, or 13·4 per cent., thus reducing her Mercantile Marine in June last to 1,238,000 tons. Spain lost 175,000 tons, or 19·8 per cent., her Mercantile Marine standing this summer at 709,000 tons. Denmark incurred a net loss of 139,000 tons, or 18·1 per cent. Her Mercantile Marine is now represented by 631,000 tons.

In these returns the Mercantile Marine of Germany is put at 3,247,000 tons, a reduction of 1,888,000 tons, or 36·8 per cent.; but it is pointed out that these figures do not take into account the tonnage which was to be handed over to the Allies under the Peace Treaty. The loss of Germany is, therefore, in reality very much greater. Similarly, the loss of Austria-Hungary is put at only 339,000 tons, or 32·2 per cent., thereby reducing her Mercantile Marine to 713,000 tons. This figure has since been further diminished by vessels handed over to the Allies. The total tonnage of enemy vessels handed over to the Allies since the Armistice amounts to over 1,750,000 tons.

One of the most striking features of the returns is the great increase in the American Mercantile Marine. As already shown, the total loss of the United States due to both war and marine perils was 531,000 tons. The net result of the five years ended June last was an increase of no less than 7,746,000 tons, or 382·1 per cent., in the seagoing Merchant Fleet of the United States. On June 1914, there were 2,027,000 tons in the ocean-going Merchant Marine of the United States; five years later there were 9,773,000 tons. The total for the United States, it should be noted, included about 1,300,000 tons of wooden steam shipping. The construction of the wooden ships may have been justified as a war emergency measure—the United States had the carpenters and the timber—but the wooden ships cannot be regarded as a commercial success. They have been appearing in European waters and have been engaged notably in carrying coals from the United States to Scandinavia, but their future is obscure. There may, no doubt, be

uses for wooden ships in the coasting trade of the United States. If these were entirely excluded, the American seagoing tonnage would be reduced to 8,426,000 tons, as compared with 16,267,000 tons for the United Kingdom.

Lloyd's Register makes a very striking comparison between the relative positions of the United Kingdom and United States in 1919 and 1914. In the earlier year 41·6 per cent. of the world's tonnage was owned in the United Kingdom, and 4·46 per cent. consisted of the seagoing tonnage of the United States. At the present time, the United Kingdom owns 34·1 per cent. and the United States 24·9 per cent., including 20·4 per cent. of the seagoing tonnage. These United States figures include wooden shipping.

An interesting calculation is made by the Register to show the real effect of the war on the world's Merchant Marine. The calculation is made on the assumption that the percentage of addition to the world's tonnage would have continued at the ratio (a decreasing one) recorded during the last fifteen pre-war years, and that countries in which there had been a large addition of tonnage during the previous quinquennial period might be expected to show a reduction in the ratio of increase. The conclusion is reached that the real loss of British tonnage was 5,202,000 tons, and that of foreign tonnage, excluding the United States, 9,000,000 tons, making a total loss for the world of 14,202,000 tons. The net gain to the United States is put at 6,729,000 tons, thus reducing the net world's loss to 7,473,000 tons. It will therefore be seen that by far the largest loss was incurred by the United Kingdom. Excluding enemy countries, the greatest sufferers on this basis after the United Kingdom were Norway, which lost over 1,000,000 tons; Italy to the extent of 677,000 tons; and France, which lost 536,000 tons. Further, there is a hidden loss, through depreciation in the efficiency of ships by special strain, and also owing to the fact that a large proportion of the tonnage built during the war was not equal in general efficiency to that completed in the few years previous to the war. The Register does not, however, attempt to estimate the full extent of the depreciation, and considers it reasonable to assume that the world has actually lost through the war 8,500,000 tons gross of shipping,

representing a deadweight carrying capacity of about 12,500,000 tons.

The enormous increase in the American Mercantile Marine is of course due mainly to the great ship-building crusade of 1917-18; and the progress of this wonderful development should be studied in detail. Last year the output of tonnage of the United States amounted to 3,033,000 tons, in comparison with only 1,348,000 tons gross launched in the United Kingdom. Our losses amounted to about 1,940,000, and so substantially exceeded our new construction. The output in the United Kingdom fell far below that anticipated by the then First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Eric Geddes) in the spring of last year. That estimate was for 1,800,000 tons, whereas in the best year yet experienced—1913—approximately 2,000,000 tons were produced. By the spring of last year the Government had at last been aroused to an appreciation of the urgent need of maximum output; and but for the strong agitation the output must have been far smaller. Nothing like the 1913 total can be expected for 1919, although the recent decision to reduce warship construction should leave an opening for much more merchant building than has hitherto been practicable. The decline in the share of the world's shipping taken by the United Kingdom was shown in the tables issued by Lloyd's Register early in the year. During the five years 1894-98 the share of the United Kingdom amounted to 74.4 per cent. of the total output. In the following quinquennial periods the proportion was 60 per cent., 59.8 per cent., and 61 per cent. respectively, thus showing that for the fifteen years 1899-1913 the share of the United Kingdom was quite 60 per cent. During the war years 1914-18 only 38.6 per cent. of the world's output of mercantile tonnage was launched in the United Kingdom. The diminution was really the more striking because the figures of the total output for the world during the war did not include the production in Germany and Austria-Hungary, whereas in the earlier years the figures for these countries were included.

It is, of course, true that, but for the absorption of the ship yards of the country on naval work, the production of British yards during the war period would have been very much greater. Here, again, in constructing

warships which were at the service not only of herself but also of the Allies and Associated Nations, Great Britain did not think of after-war conditions. These conditions have now to be faced.

For trustworthy figures of present construction we again have to rely upon Lloyd's Register. The last returns available are those for the quarter ended June 30. There were then under construction in the United Kingdom 782 vessels of 2,524,000 tons gross, showing an increase of 269,000 tons as compared with the March quarter, and 709,000 as compared with June 1918. These figures compare with 994 vessels of 3,874,000 tons under construction in the United States. The tonnage building in the United States is consequently 1,350,000 tons more than in this country. Comparing steel ships alone, there are now building in this country 711 steamers of 2,492,000 tons, as compared with 680 steel steamers of 3,165,000 tons building in the United States. Taking steel steamers alone, the tonnage building in the United States is thus still larger than that under construction in this country, although the number of ships is not quite as great. In the American figures 133 steamers of 326,000 tons building on the Great Lakes of North America are included, because the great majority of steamers building lately on the Great Lakes have been for ocean service.

The total tonnage under construction abroad now amounts to 5,494,000 tons. This, with the 2,524,000 tons building in the United Kingdom, gives a total under construction of 8,018,000 tons. It is generally found, at any rate in normal times, that an amount of tonnage equal to that under construction at the end of any quarter is launched within the ensuing twelve months. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a year hence there will be in the water an additional 8,000,000 tons of shipping. This, it will be noticed, falls not far short of the amount of tonnage by which the world is now the poorer in consequence of the war. In other words, a year hence the mercantile marine of the world should represent nearly the amount of tonnage which would have been in existence if there had been no war. One great change brought about will, however, be that a much larger share of the ownership will rest with

countries other than Great Britain. Further, the tonnage now under construction, especially abroad, is largely cargo shipping; and, in order to maintain mail and passenger services, Great Britain must build a very large amount of high-class shipping, her liner fleet having been most seriously depleted.

Freights are still high, and, but for new factors which have been introduced, a substantial reduction might reasonably have been anticipated. One of these chief factors is the heavy cost of shipbuilding, common to all countries. In this country it now costs three or four times the pre-war price. How this high price affects freights may be illustrated by an example. A cargo vessel of refrigerated type may have cost 135,000*l.* to build before the war. The estimate for building such a vessel to-day on the time and line basis would be 500,000*l.* If interest on this money be calculated at the rate of 5 per cent. and depreciation at the rate of 5 per cent. which, in view of the inflated price is probably far too low, 10 per cent. on this money, representing 50,000*l.* a year, has to be earned before working expenses begin. These expenses include wages, coal, stores, port dues and pilotage, etc., and are all now on a high scale. A vessel of this type can only be expected to make two round voyages to New Zealand and back in a year, upon which this great sum of money has to be earned. For some months past, vessels have been proceeding to Australasia with very little if any cargo, so that practically the whole amount has to be earned on the two homeward voyages.

Considering the enormous shipbuilding costs to be faced, the prospect of low freights does not seem promising. British shipping companies have in the past been able to rely upon carrying at rates much below those of most other nations, although the working costs of the Scandinavian countries have been lower. Shipbuilding costs in this country, for instance, are now not much lower than in the United States. The costs of construction in the two countries have been gradually approaching the same level—a fact of immense significance. In view of the greatly increased cost of building, it will be in the interest of shipowners in all countries to maintain freights for some time to come on a fairly high level.

Yet, when the competition of much new tonnage prepares the way for falling freights, some of the foreign mercantile marines may find themselves in a more favourable position than our own to meet it. The neutral countries have, ever since the outbreak of the war, been able to earn higher freights, because they were not controlled by Government. British shipping is still so controlled. The continuance of control, which takes the form of direction of voyages and licensing, is a subject often discussed in the shipping exchanges. Every shipping man would like to see control lifted, for he knows that there will be little opportunity for the enterprise by means of which British shipping obtained its former pre-eminent position until it is removed. But the fact has to be recognised that control of food and control of shipping are closely linked together. Thus, all wheat imports are still in the hands of the Wheat Commission; and vessels are directed to load wheat at the various ports at fixed rates. The alternative would be for the Wheat Commission to go into the market and bid for tonnage. Presumably freight rates would rise. At present vessels are directed to load wheat in Argentina at 62s. 6d. per ton or in Australia at 105s. per ton. Many steamers were lately directed to proceed to load at Canadian ports before the closing of river navigation for the season at 10s. per quarter. These rates, although high as compared with pre-war terms, are considered to leave only a small profit, even though the steamers may be able to load a cargo of coals for South America at 40s. a ton. Foreign ships, uncontrolled, are able to secure an advantage of 5l. per ton or more for the voyage from South America to the Continent, as compared with the corresponding voyage of British ships to the United Kingdom. The rates in other trades show similar discrepancies; and in all cases the advantage to the foreign ships may amount to a great many thousands of pounds for practically the same voyage. For bunker coals as much as 60s. a ton has now to be paid. The American ships can bunker in United States ports at the equivalent of 25s. a ton.

While British ships are controlled in this way, foreign vessels can go where they please and earn the highest freight they can. The discrepancy is again made clear

in the time-charter rates paid for British and foreign steamers. The Liner companies are usually ready to charter vessels, because they have to try to maintain their regular services; and many cargo steamship owners are ready to charter their vessels to them, because they are relieved of the worry of possible serious detention in the ports and delays owing to labour troubles. The risk of delay in consequence of the chaos at the ports is very serious indeed. For some time past the usual rate of time-charter for a fair-sized British steamer has been 25s. per ton deadweight per month for twelve months. Quite lately it dropped to 24s. For Japanese or Scandinavian steamers, rates varying from 40s. to 50s. a ton have been quoted. A difference of only 10s. a ton on a steamer of 10,000 tons deadweight means an addition of 5000*l.* per month to the earning power, or 60,000*l.* a year—a very substantial advantage indeed for the foreign-owned vessel. It is not in the interest of British shipping that the earnings of British vessels should fall so far below those of foreign ships.

So long as the policy of the nation is to limit the price of food, it may be argued that such control is inevitable. Were control to be relaxed, freights would probably rise at first; and some time might elapse before they fell below the present level of fixed rates. In the mean time there would, no doubt, be a great outcry, although the comparatively small influence of the level of freights on the prices of commodities is little appreciated. It is asserted, for instance, that, although a suit of clothes may now cost in this country 12*l.* 12s., the freight on the wool employed is represented by 6*d.* The effect of Government control may again be seen very clearly in the North Atlantic trade, where a substantial proportion of the space is still requisitioned by the Government. During September, 50 per cent. of the space was requisitioned at a minimum freight of 42s. 6*d.* per ton, while a representative rate of freight for similar cargo carried on ships under foreign flags was over 100s. per ton. In short, the British shipowner is still at a great disadvantage as compared with the foreign owner, so far as profits are concerned; and, when the time for free competition comes, the foreign owner will have the satisfaction of knowing that he has large reserves, which

it was easy to build up, since his earnings were always the highest in the market and the taxation of his profits was comparatively small.

Although there is a very large amount of tonnage now in course of construction in the world, and the greater part of it is for foreign ownerships, British companies would seem to have no alternative but to build on a large scale, and as rapidly as possible. It has been shown above that the Mercantile Marine of the United Kingdom now consists of 16,345,000 tons gross, this figure including all steamers of 100 tons and upwards. Before the war some 12,000,000 tons were employed solely in trade with the United Kingdom. Considering that the total tonnage owned in the United Kingdom now amounts to less than 16,500,000 tons gross, and a proportion of this total consists of vessels unsuitable for ocean service, the margin left for all the other work which hitherto has been done by British shipping is very small indeed.

It is true that, as compared with the 12,000,000 tons employed in the United Kingdom trade before the war, there were at the beginning of 1917 only 7,500,000 tons, and at the end of 1918 only 6,250,000 tons so engaged. In the circumstances, imports of essential commodities were extremely well maintained, but the control established was not shipping management as it was understood before the war and as it should be again. Firstly, imports other than essential commodities were soon ruled out; secondly, the work of the Ministry of Shipping had necessarily to include the jettisoning of a large part of the results achieved by shipowners in gradually building up a world-wide shipping trade. The Ministry of Shipping had to divert tonnage from the long-distance routes to the short-distance routes. The problems of the supply of foodstuffs and raw material and their transport were closely connected. The departments responsible bought the supplies overseas, and did so on the understanding that the purchases must be made in the nearest markets. Thus, wheat was bought in North America, while enormous stocks were available in Australia but could not be imported because of the length of voyage. Everything possible that could be brought from North America was

brought, since the distance was short. A main function of the Ministry of Shipping was therefore to put every possible ton of shipping into the North Atlantic. This policy reached its climax in the spring and summer of 1918, when special efforts were necessary in order to transport the American army across the Atlantic. This policy was clearly sound war strategy, but it was not commerce. Britain could no longer carry for the world; she had more than she could do to carry for the Allied and Associated Nations. Similarly, the shipbuilding policy was to construct plain cargo steamers of standard types. This could be thoroughly justified as also an emergency war measure, but it was not commercial shipbuilding. Very gradually conditions in both shipbuilding and shipping are reverting to a commercial basis; and it will be in competitive commercial conditions that British shipping will have to fight for its existence. The sooner the bonds of State control can be untied, the easier will it be for British shipping to expand.

The aftermath of the war policies is now being acutely felt. The British Dominions overseas have been starved of tonnage, and they continue to be starved. Yet the British Dominions are joined with the United Kingdom by shipping. Before the war, thanks to the enterprise of the shipping owners, sufficient tonnage was placed in the services to meet all the demands of communication between the old and the young nations. Now tonnage is lacking. It is well known that there are enormous numbers of persons wanting to proceed home to British Dominions overseas from this country who cannot obtain berths. There were, quite lately, 14,000 names of persons on the waiting list of the Union Castle Company alone who were wanting passages to South Africa. The present inadequacy of accommodation is in no possible way the fault of the company. Its ships, like those of all the other Mail and Passenger Lines, were requisitioned by the Government as mercantile cruisers, hospital ships, and transports; and rehabilitation, especially in these days of short working hours, takes time. Until the beginning of October practically the whole of the space was absorbed by Government for repatriation of troops. Now the situation has been relieved by the decision of

the Government to allot not more than 25 per cent. of the accommodation for this purpose, leaving 75 per cent. free for the ordinary travelling public holding priority certificates. No doubt the certificate system was carefully considered, but great hardship has been inflicted on private individuals, whether they were persons wishing to travel for domestic reasons or business men wanting to go abroad to open up or develop trade relations. When business men are denied opportunities of travel an actual loss to the nation is often incurred. The lack of passenger accommodation has affected every route, and the South African is merely cited as an example. In the Indian trade the shortcomings have also been very serious indeed. Many months must elapse before the companies can keep pace with the demand; and the loss of business opportunities to the nation is a grave matter.

In another direction, the tonnage difficulties during the war have led to a situation which is regarded in shipping circles with especially grave concern. This is the position which has been created by the ownership by the Commonwealth of Australia of a fleet of steamers. This development can be traced directly to the dissatisfaction of Mr W. M. Hughes, the Australian Premier, when ships were diverted to other routes during the war. A fleet of second-hand British steamers was acquired, ostensibly for the purpose of transporting the Australian wheat crop to Europe. This policy was not in accordance with that of the Imperial Government, by which the employment of every British ship was directed by a central authority. Clearly the wheat crop should have at once been acquired by the Imperial Government and held in reserve if ships could not be spared for its transport. However, Mr Hughes purchased the ships in the summer of 1916; and the Ministry of Shipping was not formed until a campaign in favour of central control had been long conducted in 'The Times.' By then the ships had been removed from the Register of the United Kingdom, and formed the nucleus of a Commonwealth Government Line. They have been reinforced by the fleet of German steamers seized in Australian ports. The earnings of these ships were not subject to the high taxation which was imposed in this country on the earnings of

all industrial undertakings. The result is that, owing to the high freights which were earned and the freedom from taxation, the Commonwealth Government Line has been enabled to build up a strong financial position.

During his recent visit to this country, Mr Hughes placed contracts for five large steamers with builders in the United Kingdom, while other ships are known to be building in Australia. At the moment, perhaps, the placing of ships on the berth by the Commonwealth Government Line is not a matter which need cause owners sleepless nights. Admittedly, the second-hand ships acquired during the war were not the equal of the fine refrigerated ships which have been specially built by the shipping companies for the trade. But when the ships now to be built are placed in the service, a new factor will be introduced. New ships are being built for the companies—orders were placed as long ago as the spring of 1915—at prodigious cost; and the shipping managers admit that the competition of the Government Line, having behind it all the resources of Australia, will be difficult to meet, especially as it would be possible to keep the accounts in such a way that the real results could be concealed.

Many merchants, no less than shipping owners, regard this Commonwealth Government development with extremely grave concern. It is known that the Labour Party in Australia openly advocates the nationalisation of banking, insurance, shipping, coal, etc. Presumably the underlying idea is that the Government would arrange for financial facilities and provide for disposal and transport. Such a programme naturally arouses the utmost distrust among business men trading with Australia. Many merchants reason that, if they were to give encouragement to the Commonwealth Shipping Line, their own turn for being attacked would come. Feeling is very strong indeed on the subject of the acceptance of orders by British builders for a Government which has not lost a single vessel which it owned before the war, when the yards could be filled by British and allied companies whose fleets have been so seriously depleted by the war. It is suggested that representation should be made to the Shipping Controller and the Controller General of Merchant Shipbuilding on this point; and it

is certain that, if and when the Commonwealth Government comes to this country to finance its schemes, business men will want to know, before subscribing, for what purposes the money is to be used.

Although the outlook is obscured in the Australian trade, the policy now required of British shipowners would seem to be one of enterprising development. A large amount of tonnage will be required for the direct trade with the United Kingdom, as well as for the trades between British Dominions overseas and other nations. Happily, the British Commonwealth of Nations includes some young countries which are yet little developed; and it may be in the opening up of services between these growing countries and the more densely populated lands that the genius of British shipping managers will find most scope. Unless British owners build fast, other owners will no doubt make full use of their opportunities. The United States are showing many signs of enterprise in construction, in opening up new services, and in collecting information respecting the work of British companies having offices in the United States. The spirit of pride in the possession of a great mercantile marine is being encouraged there. The workers in the shipyards are kept informed of the movements of the ships which they have built, and the merchants are being urged to ship in American vessels. The same spirit needs to be encouraged here, for such interest in and pride of work leads to good work. The right of the United States to the possession of a substantial mercantile marine is of course recognised by leading British shipping men, who consider that the policy of the two countries should be one of co-operation. The German mercantile marine, which before the war was in some trades the most formidable competitor, is not at present a factor.

Unquestionably, the United States are attacking the problem of developing a big mercantile marine with enthusiasm and vigour. How serious the nation is, was shown by the successful prosecution of their claim for the eighty-nine German liners¹ which sought shelter in the United States at the outbreak of war in order to escape capture by Allied vessels. This claim is admittedly a delicate one, and it is remarkable that no frank statement has ever been made on the subject by

the British Government. Many of the ships will be useful in forming the foundation of American passenger lines. It would be idle to deny that a strong feeling exists in this country, and exists among many who greatly admire the United States and are proud to claim many warm American friends, that it would have been better if the ships had been placed in a common pool and distributed among the Allied and Associated Nations in proportion to their losses. The United States achieved so much in shipbuilding during the war and is capable of so much more, that the nation could well have afforded to agree to the normal method of distribution. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the whole fleet which was seized has been appraised by a Navy Department Board as having a value of about 6,840,000*l.*, whereas, when the decision of the United States Government to retain the ships was first announced, the sum of 20,000,000*l.* was mentioned.

In this brief review of shipping conditions, the development of the Japanese mercantile fleet cannot be overlooked. In the actual percentage increase it comes second only to the United States, but is still a very long way behind that nation. As compared with an increase of 382·1 per cent. for the United States, the Japanese Mercantile Marine increased during the war by 36·1 per cent. It consisted in June last of 2,325,000 tons, an increase of 617,000 tons. The leading Japanese companies—the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Toyo Kisen Kaisha, and Osaka Shosen Kabushiki Kaisha—have prospered exceedingly. New lines have been opened up between Japan and India, Japan and the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, and between Japan and Europe. The Japanese Mercantile Marine was able, to a large extent, to fill the gaps made in Eastern waters left by the withdrawal of British ships to the North Atlantic. At one time the greater part of the trade from Japan to India was carried on in British ships; now the bulk of the exports are shipped in Japanese steamers. Many fine feats of construction were performed during the war, and new yards were built. The construction of a large ten-way shipyard by the Asano Shipyard Company was a notable achievement. So far, Japan has been dependent upon steel imported from this country and the United States, but iron ore

deposits are being developed in China. Japanese firms have a large interest in the Han-Yeh-Ping Iron and Coal Co. (Ltd.) at Hanyang, while the Mistu Bishi Works at Kanjiho, Korea, are being developed. The output of this latter plate-mill is now estimated at 150 tons of finished plates per day. At present Japan has no difficulty whatever about labour; and, once she secures adequate supplies of steel from neighbouring sources, her future as a shipbuilding country should be brilliant.

This country is committed, in return for shipping placed at her service during the war, to building 250,000 tons of shipping a year for Norway during the next two or three years, and a large amount of tonnage is at present in hand for France. To this extent the replacement of the British tonnage which was destroyed will be affected. But it is probably well that this country should begin again without delay to build for the rest of the world. She has in the past been shipbuilder for the world and carrier for the world. Her most pressing need is to build for herself and carry for herself. Yet, as she is at present dependent on other countries to a large degree for the imports of foodstuffs and raw materials, she must be prepared to render services in return. And to shipbuilding and shipownership she must look largely to help her to maintain her position in world-wide commerce.

CUTHBERT MAUGHAN.

Art. 13.—THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN.

1. *Report of the Working Classes Cost of Living Committee* (November 1918). [Cd. 8980.]
2. *British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions.* Board of Trade Report, 1903. [Cd. 1761.]
3. *Bulletin of Statistics prepared by the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade for the British Section of the Supreme Economic Council*, 1918. Vol. I, Bulletin No. 2.
4. *Course of Average Prices of General Commodities in England.* By Augustus Sauerbeck. King & Son.

DURING the past five years the world has been passing through the greatest economic disturbance of which we have any record. The Great War of 1914-8 has transcended in magnitude all the conflicts of the past, and its economic effects have been correspondingly great. The fighting has ceased, and we have now an opportunity of realising, in a measure, some of the economic changes which have already been brought about by five years of world-wide war; but many years must pass before we can ascertain the full extent of these alterations, and of their reaction upon the lives of our people and the other peoples of the world. In this welter of financial uncertainty and disturbance, it is natural that there should be grave anxiety and perplexity as to our own economic position, and in particular as to the condition of the national finances; and some observations with regard to these questions may be of interest at the present time. In order to understand the economic position of the world to-day, it is necessary to examine in detail some of the principal changes which have taken place, such as the rise in wages and in commodity prices, the increase in the amount of paper money, and the growth of the National Debts of the great Powers since 1914.

All great wars have exercised a profound influence upon the economic development of the world, the extent of this influence varying with the duration of the war and the economic development of the belligerents. The figures contained in Sauerbeck's Chart show the

extent to which the prices of commodities have been affected by war during the past 123 years. It is not suggested that the reaction from the various wars was responsible for the whole of each of the declines recorded in the above table; nor, on the other hand, is it suggested that the whole of the rise was in each case due to war influences; but the co-relation between war and a rise in prices and peace and a fall in prices is so invariable that it admits of no other conclusion than that war has been the principal influence which has determined the changes in commodity prices. War increases consumption and causes the demand to exceed the supply; this results in a rise of prices. The rise in prices then stimulates production; and production overtakes consumption, with the result that prices fall. According to Sauerbeck, taking the average of 1867-77 as 100, the prices of commodities rose from 95 in 1790 to 167 in 1809. For eight years prices fell, until 1815, when they had declined to 100. In the three years following peace they advanced to 142. In the following four years they fell again to 101. There was then a period of very great depression; and, although prices advanced to 117 in 1825, there was a heavy fall during the seven succeeding years, which brought the average down to 89. There were recoveries in 1836 and 1840, and by 1849 the low average of 74 was reached.

The Crimean War caused a sharp rebound, but half of this rise was lost in the two years following. The American Civil War then carried prices to 105 in 1864; and six years of world-peace brought them down again to 69, on the eve of the outbreak of the Franco-German War. This war terminated in March 1871, but prices continued to rise after peace was declared, and in 1873 the high level of 111 was reached. In the five following years there was a rapid decline of 30 points to 81; with one or two short-lived upward movements prices continued to decline steadily during the succeeding seventeen years, until 1895, when the lowest level, 61, was reached. The Spanish-American and South-African Wars then caused a recovery of 14 points to 75. This was followed by a decline of six points to 69 in 1903. The Russo-Japanese (1904-5) War then caused a substantial recovery, and by 1907 the average was 80.

From the South-African War down to 1907 wholesale prices showed comparatively trifling changes, and they fluctuated between 69 in 1903 and 80 in 1907, falling again in 1908 to 73. But in 1909 an upward movement began, which continued almost without interruption until 1913, when the average was 85. For the first half of 1914 there was a slight check in this advance, and at the end of June 1914 the average was 81·2. Immediately after the outbreak of war there was a considerable rise in the price of foodstuffs; but for the first five months the movement in raw materials was mainly downwards, owing to the dislocation of trade. In 1915, however, practically every article advanced to a marked degree, especially in the later months of that year, when the abnormal freight situation was the dominant factor. The 'Statist' index number for forty-five articles was 108 for 1915, as compared with 85 in 1913. The advance continued throughout 1916, and was more pronounced than in the preceding twelve months, the index number for the year being 136. The upward movement continued at an accelerated rate in 1917, the index number for that year being 175. A further advance was recorded in 1918, when the high average of 193 was reached, an advance of 127 per cent. on the figures for 1913. The highest point of the year, 197·8, was reached in October 1918. After that date prices fell slightly until April 1919, when the average was 184·6, but an upward movement then began which carried the average up to 206·4 in July. Minerals were responsible for the bulk of this rise.

It will be observed that, while during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars prices advanced from 85 to 157, or 84·7 per cent. in, say, twenty years, in the war which has just concluded prices advanced from 85 to 193, or 127 per cent., in four and a half years. And, as in the case of the Franco-German War, the rise continued after the fighting ceased. The fluctuations in prices in the wars which occurred between 1854 and 1905 were trivial in comparison with this vast movement; and it is obvious that these conflicts afford insufficient data when we attempt to measure the economic consequences of the World War of 1914-8.

The loss of life and the expenditure of money have

been on a colossal scale. The total casualties of the Allies may be estimated at about 16,600,000, and the total deaths at about 5,250,000. The missing and permanently disabled will have amounted to not less than 80 per cent. of the killed, so that Germany and her Allies caused the death or disablement of about 9,000,000 men of the Allied nationalities. The total casualties of the Central Powers were about 12,000,000 men, and the deaths and disablements about 6,600,000. Including both the Allies and the Central Powers the casualties exceed 28,600,000, and the deaths and disablements exceed 15,500,000.

The total expenditure of the Allied Governments, including indirect losses in some cases, exceeds 29,000,000,000*l.* The war expenditure of the Central Powers, apart from the cost of reparation, exceeds 13,600,000,000*l.*; and the aggregate cost to the Allies and Central Powers is well over 42,000,000,000*l.*, irrespective of (1) shipping losses, (2) claims for pensions, and (3) damage to property, plant, etc., and replacement of raw materials. Including these items, the total gross cost of the war may be put at about 52,000,000,000*l.*

There has been nothing approaching this destruction of life and wealth in the history of the world (although I do not accept the general view that the gross cost of the war represents in every case the actual destruction of wealth); and it is my belief that this stupendous conflict has produced the greatest economic revolution of which we have any record. The immediate manifestation of this revolution is to be found in the rise in the cost of living and the universal increase of wages.

Cost of Living.—An extremely valuable report (mentioned at the head of this article) on the increase in the cost of living in Great Britain was issued in November 1918. The items of expenditure which the Committee took into account were food, rent, clothing, fuel, insurance, household sundries and fares. The conclusions of the Committee were mainly based upon the household budgets (over 1900 in number) which it collected. In reducing to averages results obtained from families composed of persons of both sexes and of varying ages, it is necessary to reduce persons of all kinds to a uniform standard unit. This is done by expressing the consumption of women and children in terms of that of

men according to one of the scales worked up by specialists in dietary. The Committee employed the scale used by the Inter-Allied Scientific Food Commission. On this basis their 'standard family' of the employed-at-home class is found to consist of 4.57 equivalent 'men' or 'unfits' including 1.2 supplementary earners. The general conclusion of the Committee is embodied in the following approximate estimate of the average weekly expenditure of a 'standard' urban working-class family in July 1914 and June 1918:—

GREAT BRITAIN,							
			1914.		1918.		
			<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>	
Food	.	.	24	11	.	47	3
Sundries	.	.	1	2	.	2	6
Fuel and Light	.	.	2	4	.	4	2
Rent	.	.	6	7	.	6	9
Fares	.	.	0	10	.	1	0
Insurance	.	.	3	0	.	3	0
Clothing	.	.	5	6	.	10	9
Total			44	4	.	75	5

The Committee estimated the general average rise in expenditure at 74 per cent., from July 1914 to July 1918; they further estimated that by September 1918 the increase was 80 per cent. The Committee found, on the evidence of the budgets of working-class expenditure, that in June 1918 the working classes, as a whole, were in a position to purchase food of substantially the same nutritive value as in June 1914. Indeed, their figures indicate that the families of unskilled workmen were slightly better fed at the later date, in spite of the rise in the cost of food. This conclusion is more than confirmed by the reports the Committee obtained from the Medical Officers to the Education Authorities in the great cities.

As the advance in commodity prices has been world-wide, though of course by no means equal, it has been reflected by a universal increase in the cost of living. A comparison of the index numbers of the retail prices of food in various countries which appeared in the second number of the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, prepared

by the Supreme Economic Council, showed the following increases since July 1914:—

Country.	Date.	Percentage of Increase.
United Kingdom . . .	July 1919 . . .	109
France (Paris) . . .	June 1919 . . .	164
" (other towns) . . .	" " . . .	193
Italy	April " . . .	181
United States . . .	June " . . .	80
Canada	" " . . .	85
Australia	Dec. 1918 . . .	35
New Zealand . . .	Feb. 1919 . . .	42
India (Calcutta) . . .	Nov. 1918 . . .	35
Norway	April 1919 . . .	176
Sweden	June " . . .	219
Denmark	July " . . .	112
Netherlands	June " . . .	104
Switzerland	" " . . .	150

It will be observed that on the whole the United Kingdom compares favourably with other European countries in the matter of the increase of retail food prices.

Wages.—On the outbreak of war, employment became very active; and before the end of 1914 a good deal of overtime was being worked, while in several trades complaint was made of a shortage of labour. This was especially the case in engineering, shipbuilding, woollen and leather and kindred trades. Concurrently, the prices of food and other necessaries rose. Owing to these circumstances, a movement to raise wages began in 1915. From March 1915 onwards it spread to nearly all the principal industries; and its effects have been far greater than those of any other upward movement in wages previously recorded. No complete account can be given of all the changes in rates of wages which have been made since the beginning of the war, since among the unorganised workers many changes escape attention; but it appears that before the end of 1916 nearly 6,000,000 workpeople had received some advance. The average weekly increase was about 6s. per head. In 1917 a further great increase of wages took place; and 5,000,000 workpeople received advances of wages amounting in the aggregate to 2,300,000*l.* per week ('Labour Gazette,' January 1918).

The 'Labour Gazette' for January 1919 stated that the changes in the rates of wages during 1918 which were brought to the notice of the Labour Department resulted in an aggregate increase of nearly 2,800,000*l.* in the weekly wages of over 5,650,000 workpeople. Taking the whole of the employed people of the United Kingdom, I estimate that the wages bill for 1918 was about 900,000,000*l.* more than in 1913. (In 1903 it was estimated that the total wages bill of the United Kingdom was about 750,000,000*l.*) Of course real wages have not increased to anything approaching that figure. But the rise in wages has been a world movement, and it reflects the universal advance in the cost of living. 'The average weekly wage *per capita* in New York State in June 1918 was \$20.44, as against \$12.85 in June 1915.'

Through all the economic records of the past it is possible to trace an advance (notwithstanding set-backs in certain periods) in the wages of labour, concurrently with an increase in the amount of money in circulation and a decline in the purchasing power of money. Prof. Thorold Rogers, in his 'History of Agriculture and Prices in England' (Vol. I), devotes a chapter to the question of the purchasing power of money in the Middle Ages, which, according to him, was about twelve times as great as it was at the time when he was writing (1866). He estimates the money value of the wages of regular farm servants at different epochs as follows:—

	£	s.	d.	
Before the Plague (1348)	2	7	10	per annum.
After " "	3	15	0	"
Arthur Young's time (1771)	18	4	7	"
In 1866	31	4	0	"

It will therefore be seen that between 1348 and 1866 the labourer's wages had risen, from the point of view of purchasing power, only about 10 per cent. Prof. Rogers points out the remarkable economic effects of the Great Plague, in which, according to some authorities, from one-third to one-half of the population fell victims to the disease. The immediate effect of this catastrophe was to double the wages of labour; and they ultimately settled down at an advance of about 50 per cent.

In 1903 the Board of Trade published a Report on British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions, which contained a tabular statement of the average cash wages per week of ordinary agricultural labourers employed on certain farms in England and Wales. The averages for certain years are shown below :—

	s.	d.		s.	d.
1850 . . .	9	4	1880 . . .	13	2
1860 . . .	10	11	1890 . . .	13	1
1870 . . .	11	10	1900 . . .	14	6

It is very significant that the average amount of wages fixed for ordinary agricultural workers under the Corn Production Act (1917) for the year 1918 should have been 33s. 6d. per week; and for 1919 and 1920 the average will be substantially higher. We have here, therefore, a wages movement comparable with that which occurred at the time of the Great Plague; and this conclusion is confirmed by the estimates furnished in the Report on Cost of Living already referred to, which shows an advance from 44s. 4d. in 1914 to 75s. 5d. in 1918 in the cost of living of a standard family.

From the evidence given before the Coal Mines Commission by H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, on March 11, 1919, it is clear that the average earnings per person of those employed in the production of coal advanced from 82*l.* per annum during the five years preceding the war to 169*l.* per annum for the period July to September 1918—an increase of 104 per cent. An even larger increase appears to have occurred in the case of women's wages. 'The information we have would seem to suggest that, whereas before the war the majority of women earned between 10s. and 15s. a week, they now earn between 25s. and 35s. (12s. 6d. and 17s. 6d. by pre-war standards).' *

Currency.—One of the most significant economic consequences of the war is the increase in the amount of paper money in circulation throughout the world, the principal features of which are shown in the following table :—

* 'The Course of Women's Wages': 'Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,' July 1919.

GOLD RESERVES AND PAPER CIRCULATION.
 Unit: One Thousand Pounds. NOTE.—These figures have been taken from the Annual Review of the Swiss Bank Corporation for the year 1918.

	June 1914.				December 1918.				Paper Circulation per Capita.	
	Gold.	Notes.	Percentage of Gold to Notes.		Gold.	Notes.	Percentage of Gold to Notes.		1914.	1918.
A.—BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES—										
ALLIES:										
Great Britain*	40,085	29,784	134·6		107,859	421,080	25·6		0·7	10·0
France†	162,307	242,046	67·0		137,619	1,209,984	11·4		6·0	30·3
Japan	21,867	32,722	66·8		72,004	87,495	82·3		0·6	1·5
Italy	60,680	102,140	59·4		43,720	551,080	7·9		2·8	15·1
United States of America	307,735	535,993	68·6		632,399	962,106	65·7		5·2	9·4
Finland	1,656	4,486	36·9		1,691	45,604	3·7		1·4	13·9
Total or average	654,330	947,171	69·1		995,492	3,277,319	30·3		—	—
B.—CENTRAL POWERS—										
Austria-Hungary	52,295	96,681	53·9		11,000	1,480,000	0·7		1·9	28·9
Germany‡	65,308	120,329	54·3		113,000	1,614,850	7·0		1·8	23·8
Total or average	117,603	217,210	54·2		124,000	3,094,850	4·0		—	—
C.—NEUTRAL COUNTRIES—										
Spain	21,264	75,686	28·1		89,134	132,649	67·2		3·6	6·4
Denmark	4,565	8,879	51·4		10,812	25,002	43·2		3·0	8·6
Holland	13,386	25,313	52·8		57,453	89,079	64·5		4·0	13·5
Norway	2,707	6,433	42·0		6,721	24,039	28·0		2·8	10·0
Sweden	5,823	12,086	48·1		15,862	43,933	36·1		2·1	7·6
Switzerland	7,033	11,411	61·6		16,589	39,028	42·5		2·9	10·0
Argentina.	48,194	67,886	71·0		77,806	101,592	76·6		7·9	11·8
Total or average	102,972	207,694	49·6		274,377	455,376	60·3		4·1	8·9

* Currency notes included, but exclusive of deposits with the Bank of England.

† Inclusive of notes of the War Credit Institutions.

‡ Gold in hand.
‡ Beginning of November 1918.

¶ Nov. 30, 1918.

Leaving Russia out of consideration, it will be observed that during the war the note circulation of the belligerents advanced from 1,164,000,000*l.* to 6,372,000,000*l.*—an increase of 5,208,000,000*l.*, or 447 per cent. During the same period their aggregate gold reserves only increased from 772,000,000*l.* to 1,119,000,000*l.*, an advance of 347,000,000*l.*, or 45 per cent.; and of this aggregate increase the United States accounted for 264,000,000*l.*

Having regard to the fact that the quantity of paper money in existence in belligerent countries (exclusive of Russia) has increased nearly 450 per cent., the protagonists of the quantity theory of money may be somewhat hard put to it to explain why the world prices of commodities have not increased to a greater extent than is shown above. But this is no doubt largely accounted for by the policy of fixing maximum prices and unified buying. This was very clearly put by Mr Hoover, the Food Administrator of the United States, who writes in his pamphlet 'Food in War' (p. 13):—

'The European Governments have been compelled to undertake, as the outcome of the shortage of supplies, the single-handed purchase of their supplies both for civil and military purposes. There has thus grown up an enormous consolidation of buying for 120,000,000 European people, a phenomenon never before witnessed in the economic history of the world. . . . We find ourselves in the presence of a gigantic monopoly of buying, just as potent for good or evil as any monopoly in selling, and, in many instances, either making or influencing prices. Thus, not by virtue of any theory, but by virtue of an actual physical fact, the price made by this gigantic buyer dominates the market.'

It is significant that during the war period the Gold Reserves of the Neutral Banks of Issue advanced from 103,000,000*l.* to 274,400,000*l.*, an increase of 171,000,000*l.*, or 266 per cent., while their note circulation only increased from 207,000,000*l.* to 455,000,000*l.*, or 120 per cent.

Public Debts.—An even greater increase has taken place in the amount of the public debts of the belligerents, as is shown in the following table:—

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PUBLIC DEBT OF THE PRINCIPAL BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES IN MILLION POUNDS.

Allied Powers.

Before the War.			Result of War.*	
Power.	Date.	Amount.	Date.	Amount.
Great Britain . .	Aug. 1, 1914	710·6	Mar. 31, 1919	7435·0
France	Aug. 1, 1913	1012·4	Dec. 31, 1917	4445·4
Italy	June 30, 1914	558·4	Mar. 31, 1918	2140·6
United States . .	Mar. 31, 1917	241·6	June 30, 1918	2479·2†
Russia	Jan. 1, 1914	1018·4	Sept. 1, 1917	5076·6
		3541·4		21576·8

Central Powers.

Germany (Empire)	Oct. 1, 1913	233·0	December 1917	5081·6
„ (Federal States)	Oct. 1, 1912	784·8	„	1000·0
Austria	July 1, 1914	508·0	„	(Estimated amount)
Hungary	July 1, 1914	269·0	„	2662·8
		1794·8		1140·8
				9885·2

Taking the nine principal belligerent Powers, it will be found that their National Debts increased from 5,336,400,000*l.* in 1914 to 31,462,600,000*l.* at the end of 1918, and by the time demobilisation is completed and the war expenditure liquidated, their aggregate debts will probably exceed 40,000,000,000*l.* The burden of interest charges on the National Debts has therefore advanced from about 260,000,000*l.* in 1914 to over 2,000,000,000*l.* in 1919. Thus, in five years, the National Debts have increased nearly sixfold, and the note circulation more than fourfold.

Decrease in Production.—All competent observers appear to be agreed that there was an alarming decrease of productivity, not only in Great Britain, but throughout Europe, after the Armistice. An able and instructive analysis on the economic situation in Europe was prepared by Mr Hoover in a memorandum, a summary of which was published in 'The Times' of Aug. 12, 1919. Mr Hoover pointed out that the production of necessities

* The dates are the most recent available.

† 'Times,' Nov. 30, 1918.

for the population of Europe (including Russia), numbering 450,000,000 souls, had never reached so low an ebb. A summary of the unemployment bureaux in Europe would, he said, show that 15,000,000 families were receiving unemployment allowances in one form or another, or were in the main being paid by constant inflation of currency. A rough estimate would indicate that the population of Europe was at least 100,000,000 greater than could be supported without imports, and must live by the production and distribution of exports. In production, generally, Europe was not only far below even the level attained at the date of the Armistice, but far below the amount required for the maintenance of life and health without an unparalleled rate of import.

This decrease in productivity was attributed by Mr Hoover chiefly to the industrial and commercial demoralisation, arising out of the war but continued in consequence of the struggle for political rearrangement after the Armistice. The creation of new governments, the inexperience of, and friction between, these governments, and the readjustment of economic relations, were contributory causes. The decrease was also due to the fact that the proper and insistent demand of Labour for higher standards of living and a voice in the direction of its efforts, had become infected by the theory that the limitation of effort below physical necessity will increase the total employment or improve the condition of the manual workers. Mr Hoover was also of opinion that the relaxation of effort was due largely to physical exhaustion among large sections of the population, resulting from privation and from the mental and physical strain of the war. The diminution in the production of coal, in particular, he attributed in part to the physical limitations of coal-mines or their equipment, but in a larger degree to the human factor of the limitation of effort. In his view, the continuation of the blockade after the Armistice destroyed enterprise even in open countries, and prevented any recovery in enemy countries; while the shortage in oversea transport and the effect of the uncertainties of the Armistice upon international credits checked the flow of raw materials, and hindered recovery in the production of commodities especially needed for exchange for imports from oversea. The

results of this delay, he submitted, were unemployment, stagnation, and absorption of capital in consumable commodities to some extent all over Europe.

Dealing with the social ferment and class-selfishness which have arisen, he found Europe full of noisy denunciations of private property on the ground that it necessarily means exploitation. The extremists of communism were loud in their assertion that production could only be maintained by the impulse of altruism, instead of self-interest. Every trial of this hypothesis, however, had reduced production; and Mr Hoover declared that the first and cardinal effort of European statesmanship must be to secure the materials and tools of Labour, and procure its return to work. They must also obtain the recognition of the fact that, whatever the economic theory or political cry, it must embrace the maximum individual effort, for there was no margin of surplus productivity in Europe to bear the risk of revolutionary experiments. There was no use in shedding tears over rising prices; they were to a great degree the necessary outcome of insufficient production. Mr Hoover, in his analysis, omitted to mention two important obstacles to the resumption of peace production, namely, the necessity of converting machinery from war production to peace production, and the need for repair and renewal of machinery. But, despite these omissions and certain obvious exaggerations, I believe that his survey gives a fairly accurate picture of the economical condition of Europe about the middle of the year 1919. He sees clearly that America can play only a small part in the economic reconstruction of Europe, and that Europe must save herself by work.

The views expressed by Mr Hoover with regard to the economic conditions prevailing in the leading countries of the world before the war and since the Armistice are, in the main, supported by the extremely valuable Bulletin of Statistics prepared by the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade at the instance of the British Section of the Supreme Economic Council. These tables show that the output of coal in the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (not including German lignite), was, in 1913, at the rate of somewhat more than 85,000,000 tons per month in the aggregate.

During the first half of 1919 the output shown in the tables averaged only 67,500,000 tons per month. To this the output of the Saar district should be added for comparison with earlier years. The amount of this addition has not been precisely ascertained, but the aggregate reduction from the 1913 to the 1918 rate of output would appear to be about 20 per cent., or 17,000,000 tons per month. If the three European countries be taken separately, the reduction is from 43,000,000 tons to about 30,500,000 tons (including the Saar) per month, a reduction of about 12,500,000 tons per month, say 30 per cent. Compared with 1918, the reduction of output in the three European countries was about 10 per cent.

The aggregate output of pig iron in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Germany, which the expansion of American production had maintained in 1918, almost at the level of 1913, or 5,000,000 tons monthly, had fallen by June of the present year to about two-thirds of that amount.

The great expansion of shipbuilding in the United States was responsible for the fact that the tonnage launched in 1918 was nearly two-thirds greater than in 1913. But even this expansion was insufficient to make up for the low output of mercantile tonnage during the war, apart from the losses due to the war.*

We are now in a position to approach the question, how Great Britain stands in regard to the new economic conditions which have been created by the war.

Monetary Standards.—In the first place, we must approach it in the light of the fact that the monetary standards, not only of this country but of the world, have been profoundly modified during the past five years. 'The Times' of Aug. 28 contained the following table, received from an official source, showing the value of the pound sterling in various countries (1) before the declaration of war; (2) at the Armistice; (3) on the signing of peace; and (4) two months after the peace. The values are given in shillings and pence.

* This subject is fully dealt with in another article.

	1914. July 30.	1918. Nov. 11.	1919. June 22.	1919. Aug. 22.
	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.	s. d.
France	19 9	20 6	23 6	26 10
Belgium	19 11	—	24 5	27 11
Italy	20 10	24 0	29 1	31 8
Finland	20 2	—	44 7	50 9
Portugal	23 8	34 4	35 6	40 11
U.S.A.	20 4	19 17	18 11	17 3
Canada	20 4	20 0	19 6	17 9
Holland	20 1	18 11	19 5	18 9
Spain	20 7	19 1	18 5	16 8
Switzerland	20 0	19 0	19 10	18 10
Greece	19 11	—	19 4	18 4
Norway	20 2	19 4	20 3	20 1
Sweden	20 2	18 11	19 8	18 11
Denmark	20 2	19 8	21 5	21 3
Japan	20 2	17 10	18 7	17 3
Brazil	22 11	25 10	24 7	25 0
Argentina	19 10	18 6	18 7	17 4
Germany	20 2	—	—	87 8

The Financial Editor of 'The Times,' in commenting on the above table on Aug. 29, wrote as follows:

'The very interesting official table published yesterday, showing the fluctuations in value of the pound sterling in eighteen of the principal countries during the past five years, deserves a little study. It shows that on Aug. 22 last the average purchasing power of the pound sterling was over 27s., or nearly 7s. above the average in 1914. If we eliminate the exceptionally high value of sterling in German and Finnish currency, the average value of the pound comes out at 22s. 3d. on Aug. 22 last, as compared with 20s. 6d. on July 30, 1914. Of course, the relative importance of the exchanges varies considerably, but it is nevertheless gratifying to find that, despite the enormous debts incurred during the war, British currency demands a handsome premium, taking the average value in sixteen different currencies. The reason for this result is that we have resorted to inflation less than other countries, and that our economic losses have not been such as really to imperil our financial and commercial position, provided that we act with prudence. It is distinctly encouraging to observe that the issue of currency notes has been further reduced during the past week by 3½ millions, following upon a reduction of 4½ millions in the week before.'

The American exchange is heavily against us, but it may be urged that this is not an unmixed evil. Owing

to the war an abnormal proportion of our external trade was diverted to the United States; and the adverse position of the American exchange will give our foreign trade a European or Eastern orientation and help us to take up again the disturbed channels of our Empire trade. A large part of the wealth which America acquired during the war is about to be moved back by the natural operation of economic laws from the United States to Europe; and I am inclined to think that it is of far greater importance for us to devote our energies to the re-establishment of the credit system of Europe than it is to bring the American exchange up to par.

I am of opinion that it is of the first importance that all the World Powers should base their post-war economic policies upon the principle that their monetary units have now one-half of the purchasing power in terms of commodities and services that they had before the war. Our position in world trade, as reflected in the foreign exchanges, is such that we could establish this principle with comparative ease and a minimum of disturbance, a far smaller disturbance in fact than would be created if we attempted to go back to pre-war money standards. The adoption of some such policy is of even greater importance to our European Allies than it is to us, because in their case the burden of their war expenditure in relation to their national income is greater than it is in ours, and they have not yet made any serious attempt to bring their taxation into line with their liabilities.

If this principle is established, the real burden of the National Debts in terms of commodities and services will be very much less than is commonly believed. In our case it will mean that the cost of National Government (say 800,000,000*l.* in a normal year) will only call for commodities and services equivalent to 400,000,000*l.* in pre-war values; but, even on this basis, the burden of taxation will be doubled.

International Trade.—During the second quarter of 1919 there has appeared a tendency to expansion in values of international trade, resulting from greater freedom of movement, a larger tonnage of shipping available, a rising level of prices, and other causes. The very large excess of imports over exports in the case of the European Allies is one of the outstanding features

of the Board of Trade tables, this excess being in 1918, for the United Kingdom, six times as great as in 1913, and for France and Italy ten times as great. On the other hand, the United States could show in 1918 an excess of exports over imports amounting in value to four and a half times that of 1913; while in the first half of 1919 the monthly average excess of exports was six times as great as in 1913. The tables also indicate that such countries as Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, Spain and Brazil, which, in 1913, had an excess of imports, had turned their trade balance the other way, and in some cases to a notable extent. The countries named had in 1913 an average monthly excess of imports amounting in the aggregate to nearly 6,000,000*l.* During the first half of the current year the records available showed an aggregate monthly excess of exports amounting to 10,000,000*l.*

In this connexion the figures relating to our foreign trade for the first eight months of the current year, which are summarised hereunder, are significant:—

Jan.—Sept.	Million £.	
	1918.	1919.
Imports	871·4	1018·3
Exports of British manufactures	334·0	474·8
Re-exports of foreign manufactures	21·1	82·5
Excess of imports over exports	516·3	461·0

Much anxiety has been caused by the fact that the Board of Trade Returns appear to show that we now have an adverse balance of trade at the rate of 700,000,000*l.* per annum; and from this circumstance, coupled with our heavy national expenditure, it is inferred that we are 'on the road to ruin.' When the trade figures are analysed, they admit of no such inference; on the contrary, they point to the extraordinary strength of our economic position, and the rapidity with which we are re-establishing our former commanding position in international trade.

For the first eight months of the present year the imports of foodstuffs and raw materials were valued at 1,018,300,000*l.* In view of the world increase in commodity prices this is not unduly alarming. It is natural that, as a first step to the resumption of our foreign trade,

we should obtain food for our workers and raw materials for our manufactures. It is obvious that the sellers of these commodities believe that we can pay for them; and it is equally obvious that our British buyers can see their way to reselling them at a profit. The fact is that we are in a better position than any other country in the world to pay world prices for commodities. The growth of exports is equally satisfactory, and gives some indication of what we shall be able to export when our transport machinery is in full working order and our factories have been fully transformed from war production to peace production. In considering the question of the amount of our exports it must be remembered that our manufacturers are naturally supplying the urgent home demands first. As to our excess of imports, we have to set the following credit items against our so-called adverse balance of 700,000,000*l.*, viz. :—

	Million £.
Earnings of British Shipping in the carrying trade of the world	350
Earnings of British Insurance, Mercantile and Banking Houses engaged in international trade and finance	100
Interest on Investments abroad	150
	<hr/>
	600
Less Interest on British Government Securities held abroad	75
	<hr/>
	525
	<hr/>

The bulk of the balance of 175,000,000*l.* may be held to represent commodities purchased by or through England on behalf of European countries; the effect of this is already apparent in the growth of our re-export trade. Our command of shipping, our credit and our machinery for the conduct of international trade render it inevitable that the restocking of Europe with raw materials should be effected through London, and we shall thus re-establish our extremely profitable entrepôt trade.

External Assets and Liabilities.—The position with regard to our external capital, assets and liabilities, is approximately as follows :—

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	Million £.
Pre-war Investments abroad, value	4000
Deduct pre-war Investments sold	1000
Deduct sums borrowed abroad	1200
	<hr/> 2200
Leaving us with a credit balance of	<hr/> 1800

To this we may add the value of the loans we have made to our Allies as under :—

	Million £.
Russia	568
France	434
Italy	413
Other Allies	153
	<hr/> 1568

Assuming these assets to be ultimately worth 50 per cent. of their face value, we have a credit of	784
Add Loans to the Dominions and India's obligation	201
	<hr/>
Making our total new Investments abroad during the war	985

A credit balance of nearly 3,000,000,000*l.* does not justify the profound depression manifested in some quarters as to our liabilities abroad.

Revenue and Expenditure.—We may now consider the position of the National finances. Mr Chamberlain presented the Budget for the current financial year on April 30. The principle items are given below, together with the corresponding figures for the year 1913-4.

1913-4. Million £.	EXPENDITURE.	1919-20. Million £.
24·5	Debt Service	360·0
	Payments to Local Taxation and other	
	Cons. Debt Services	16·6
28·3	Army	287·0
49·0	Navy	149·2
	Air Force	66·5
	Civil Services	505·8
96·2	Post office Services, etc.	41·3
	Revenue Departments, etc..	8·5
<hr/> 198·0		<hr/> 1434·9

REVENUE.		
1913-4. Million £.		1919-20. Million £.
75	Customs and Excise	237·5
27	Estate Duties	33·5
14	Stamps, Land Tax, etc.	15·0
47	Income Tax	354·0
	Excess Profits Duty	300·0
35	Non Tax Revenue	41·0
<hr/>		<hr/>
198	Total Receipts from Taxes and P.O.	981·0
	Miscellaneous	220·1
		<hr/>
		1201·1
	Deficit to be provided by fresh borrowing	233·8
		<hr/>
		1434·9
		<hr/>

As Mr Chamberlain pointed out, owing to the winding-up of the war expenditure the current year must be regarded as an abnormal one; and the figures which he gave have altered substantially for the worse during the past five months. On the expenditure side demobilisation has taken longer than was anticipated, and the military and naval expenditure will be greater than was contemplated; moreover, pensions and other charges have been largely increased. On the revenue side the position is less favourable than was expected. It was anticipated that the Government could bring the food control to an end, but they have altered their decision. The winding-up of the Food Control would have meant the realisation of all the vast trading stocks in the hands of the Ministry of Food, and a return to the Exchequer of the trading capital which has been invested there. The retention of the Ministry of Food means that the capital must remain in the business. Therefore the revenue which the Chancellor anticipated from that source, estimated at 70,000,000*l.*, will not be received this year, though it is to be hoped it may come in during the next.

At the moment it seems probable that the Revenue and Expenditure for the year will be approximately as follows (in million £):—

Expenditure.		Revenue.	
Debt Service . . .	360	As estimated by the	
Army	350	Chancellor of the Ex-	
Navy	140	chequer	1201·1
Air Force	50	Less amount of trading	
Civil Service, etc. .	550	capital retained by	
		Ministry of Food . .	70·0
	<hr/> 1450 <hr/>		<hr/> 1131·1 <hr/>

The deficit will therefore probably be increased from 234,000,000*l.* to 319,000,000*l.*, making our total National Debt 7,520,000,000*l.* The National Debt in 1914 was 645,000,000*l.*; to-day it is in the neighbourhood of 7,500,000,000*l.*, against which we may set a substantial sum in respect of Loans to the Allies and Dominions, say 1,000,000,000*l.*; arrears of Excess Profits Duty 1919-20-21, 400,000,000*l.*; and saleable goods 400,000,000*l.* These items amount together to 1,800,000,000*l.*, and reduce the net amount of the National Debt to 5,700,000,000*l.*

Cost of Government.—Before the war the cost of the National Government was at the rate of 200,000,000*l.* a year, equivalent, on a national income of approximately 2,400,000,000*l.*, to say 8 per cent. It may be now estimated in a normal year at 800,000,000*l.*, or 22 per cent. of the national income. The position is, therefore, a serious one and calls for drastic treatment. To what end should we direct our post-war economic policy, and upon what basis should we frame our scheme of the cost of National Government? Our post-war economic policy should be directed to the following principal objects:—

- (1) The reduction of expenditure, national and individual.
- (2) The increase of production on such lines as will ensure that the standard of living shall be considerably higher than before the war.
- (3) The limitation of the issue of Currency Notes.
- (4) The stabilisation of the value of money at home and abroad on the basis that 1*l.* has now the same purchasing power in terms of commodities and services that 10*s.* had before the war.

With regard to the cost of the Army, Mr Churchill stated on Aug. 12 that the Rhine Army is to be reduced to 4000 or 5000 men. We have 400,000 German and Turkish

prisoners, requiring 100,000 British soldiers to look after them and feed them; we have more than 100,000 men in Mesopotamia, of whom 20,000 are British; we have more than 90,000 men in Egypt and Palestine; and we have 60,000 men in Ireland compared with 30,000 before the war. Then we must maintain our Army in India, and we must keep more than 100,000 men in France and Flanders on salvage work.

Mr Churchill also pointed out that next year there will only be two great nations in the world which will be free from conscription, namely, Great Britain and Germany. France, Italy, Russia, Japan and the United States, to say nothing of the smaller Powers, are all proposing to continue compulsory military service. Mr Churchill said that our policy is to go back to the little British Volunteer Army of previous days, subject only to such modification and improvement in organisation and material as the war has suggested. He added that he was told, on high expert authority, that to reproduce the pre-war army, which cost 29,000,000*l.* before the war, would now cost, having regard to the reduced purchasing power of money and the increased pay, between 65,000,000*l.* and 75,000,000*l.* a year.

With regard to the Navy, the cost for the current year will probably be 140,000,000*l.* Naval demobilisation appears to be proceeding at a fairly rapid rate; the strength at the date of the Armistice was 407,000 men; on July 24 it was 180,000, as compared with a pre-war strength of 151,000 men. It is rather difficult to resist the force of some of Lord Fisher's criticisms in connexion with Naval economy; but, if he would indicate an outline of his constructive policy, it would give a perplexed public a better lead than his drastic proposal to 'sack the lot.' The British public is not likely to draw a blank cheque on this vital question, even to a man who has rendered the nation such valuable services as Lord Fisher. It seems to me that we shall be fortunate if we can limit our expenditure on the Navy in a normal year to 80,000,000*l.* The economic value of sea-power cannot be expressed in terms of money; it is vital to the existence of the Empire as a world-power; but, if it were capable of such expression, an expenditure of, say, 80,000,000*l.* per annum appears small in comparison.

The war has created a great new source of expenditure in the shape of the Air Force. Here we have no pre-war experience to guide us in framing an estimate as to the amount we should expend on this branch of Imperial Defence. In August 1914 the British Air Service possessed a total of 272 machines, whereas in October 1918 the Royal Air Force possessed over 22,000 effective machines. So far as aero-engines are concerned, our position in 1914 was by no means satisfactory. We depended for a large proportion of our supply on other countries. By the end of the war British aero-engines had gained the foremost place in design and manufacture and were well up to requirement as regards supply.* As a provisional decision for us to work on until the whole question of our defence can be considered in relation to our financial position, Mr Churchill stated on Aug. 12, that he had instructed Sir Hugh Trenchard that he must provisionally frame his scheme within the limits of 25,000,000*l.* a year. Surely without unduly 'starving' this important branch of Imperial Defence we can hold our own on an expenditure of 15 to 20,000,000*l.*

The question of expenditure upon Imperial Defence should, however, not be considered merely from the point of view of what we can afford. It must be approached rather in the light of the new position and the new responsibilities of the Empire which have been created by the war. It may be confidently asserted that the British Empire can afford better than any other world-power (not excepting the United States) to maintain an Army, Navy and Air Force adequate for the protection of its interests and the fulfilment of its engagements.

One of the largest items of national expenditure for many years to come will be the war pensions. The Minister of Pensions stated on Aug. 1, that the Budget estimate of nearly 73,000,000*l.* was already out of date. Additional expenditure had been authorised; and the decisions of the Government on the recommendation of the Select Committee would call for an extra expenditure for the remainder of this year of about 11,000,000*l.*; so that the estimates should be treated as 84,000,000*l.*, and

* The Hon. C. A. Parsons, Presidential Address, British Association, Sept. 9, 1919.

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not (as presented) as just under 73,000,000*l.* For a full year, so long as the number of pensioners remained at or near the maximum, the cost would be about 96,000,000*l.* The number of pensions, gratuities and final allowances in actual payment on June 30, 1919, was as follows:—

Officers and nurses drawing retired pay	. 19,879
Officers' widows 9,536
Officers' dependents 4,961
Officers' children 9,196
	<hr/>
	43,572

The corresponding figures for other ranks were :

Men	875,687
Women	216,890
Dependents	279,440
	<hr/>
	1,372,017
Children	968,064
	<hr/>
	2,340,081

It would not be wise to look for any substantial reduction in the cost of pensions for some years, but after 1930 they should begin to decline rapidly.

Economies.—If the British public were fully informed on economic questions, it would not tolerate any policy which tended to restrict production, and it would bring the vicious system of subsidies to an end as quickly as possible. At the present time, the Railways are being subsidised at the rate of 60,000,000*l.* per annum, and Bread at the rate of 50,000,000*l.* per annum. Substantial subsidies will be required for Housing, and the Unemployment Dole is still very heavy. The bread subsidy, the unemployment dole and the housing subsidy can be partly justified upon the ground that they were rendered necessary by the conditions created by the war, but there is no justification for the railway subsidy.

Uneconomic methods bring their own nemesis; and we have a striking example of this in the case of the railways, on which goods have been carried at uneconomic rates during the war. The results of the railways

carrying under cost price are (1) the congestion of railway termini, docks, quays, warehouses, etc.; (2) loss of facilities to the public; (3) delays in transit; (4) increase in economic cost by handling; (5) lack of regular employment; (6) extra burden on taxpayer. According to official figures, there has been a falling off in coastwise traffic from 71,381,720 tons in 1914 to 35,470,377 tons in 1918. Among reasons assigned for this decline are dearth of railway trucks, unnecessary delay in ships, congestion of ports, and loss of shipping tonnage. Moreover, merchants are sending large quantities of goods by rail in preference to sea, as they find it cheaper to do so on account of pre-war rates of carriage being in existence, while the cost of sea-transport has increased considerably during the past few years.

The Civil Service estimates, therefore, offer a most promising field for the exercise of a policy of ruthless economy. The uneconomic subsidies must go, and the bureaucrats created during the war must go with them. An analysis of the returns prepared by the Treasury, showing the staffs employed in Government Departments at the time of the Armistice, on March 31, and July 1 of this year, shows that, eliminating the Post Office and allowing for the inclusion in the earlier figures of certain new Revenue staff, omitted from the first white paper, the comparative strengths of the staffs in Government Departments were as follows:—

August 1914	79,522
Nov. 11, 1918	299,186
March 31, 1919	203,329
July 1, 1919	196,399

The process of demobilisation is, therefore, painfully slow. The nation has not only to bear the cost of salaries and establishment charges for this vast army of new officials, but it has to suffer a much greater loss on account of the obstruction which these people have created to the resumption of the normal trading conditions of the country. I would suggest that we should aim at a policy which would enable us to fix the cost of Government, including Imperial Defence, on a basis which should not exceed 20 per cent. of the National

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Income, say 750,000,000*l.* to 800,000,000*l.* for the next five years, on some such lines as the following:—

	Million <i>£</i> .
Army	70
Navy	80
Air Force	15
Debt Service	360
Pensions	95
Civil Government charges, etc.	160
	<hr/>
	780
	<hr/>

Within ten years it should fall to 15 per cent. of the national income, say to 550,000,000*l.* per annum.

The Overseas Dominions did not hesitate to contribute generously in man-power and treasure to the Motherland during the war; and, since their new status has been recognised by the Treaty of Versailles, it would not be unreasonable to anticipate that they will desire to take up some share of the burden of Imperial Defence. We should be able to bear a charge for National Government at the rate of 20 per cent. upon the National Income during the next five years with comparative ease. So far as our external position is concerned, we have still a surplus of investments abroad to the value of 2,800,000,000*l.* Then, with regard to the internal position, the National Debt is about 7,500,000,000*l.* as compared with 645,000,000*l.* before the war. In 1913-4 the national income was about 2,400,000,000*l.*; and the cost of the Imperial Government was 198,000,000*l.* Our Peace Budget will be approximately 800,000,000*l.*, or four times the amount of our pre-war Budget. If the national wealth and national income had remained at the level of 1913-4, our economic position would indeed be serious, because the National Debt would be 36 per cent. of the national wealth, and the Budget would be 33 per cent. of the national income; but such is not the case. Our assets must be measured in the same monetary values as our liabilities, that is to say, in 1919 money values, not in 1914 money values. In 1914 I submitted to the Royal Statistical Society an estimate of the national wealth for 1912 at 16,472,000,000*l.* and the national income at 2,140,000,000*l.* At the present time the national wealth of the United Kingdom may be

safely computed at 24,000,000,000*l.*, and the national income at 3,600,000,000*l.*

I wish to make it perfectly clear that I do not maintain that in terms of commodities and services we are 50 per cent. better off than we were in 1912, but I do contend that, if the United Kingdom was then worth 16,400,000,000*l.* with the menace of German militarism confronting it, and the average price of commodities standing at 85, our national wealth to-day, with German militarism overcome, with our increased power of production, and with the average price of commodities in the neighbourhood of 200, may be fairly estimated at the figure I have stated, namely, 24,000,000,000*l.*, and the national income at 3,600,000,000*l.* In other words, if we accept and stabilise the new valuation of money, our post-war National Debt will be only equivalent to a sum representing 23 or 24 per cent. of the national wealth, and our post-war Budget will not amount to much more than 20 per cent. of income.

The economic problems which confront the peoples of this country and of the world may be solved by adopting one of two alternatives. We may (1) attempt to reduce drastically the amount of paper money in circulation, repudiate a part of the National Debt by means of levies on capital or otherwise, attempt to force commodity prices down to the pre-war level, and, with infinite suffering and strife, endeavour to get back to the pre-war economic standard of wages, prices, production and consumption. Or (2) we may recognise and stabilise the new valuation of money in relation to commodities and services, maintain wages and commodity prices at a high level, and increase the national production up to a point which will justify the raising of the standard of living to a much higher level.

A large number of people are naturally anxious to see commodity prices at a considerably lower level as soon as possible; and during the next decade a substantial fall appears to be inevitable. But I doubt if, in seeking to overcome their present troubles, the public have taken into account the full consequences of the great economic disturbance which would result if all commodity prices fell too rapidly and too heavily. The first effect would be to reduce materially the national

income. In 1917-8 the gross income brought under the review of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue was 1,800,000,000*l.* as compared with 1,167,000,000*l.* in 1913-4. If the national income declines heavily, the yield of the Income Tax must fall with it, at a period when it is most necessary that it should be increased. The rate of the tax in the £ would therefore have to be advanced far beyond its present oppressive level; and other taxation would have to be imposed. But, of course, there is a limit beyond which the Income Tax would cease to yield any increase of revenue. It is, therefore, of the first importance that the national income should be maintained at its present high level, and that this should be done by increased production and not by raising wages and the cost of living.

There appears to be general agreement as to the necessity for increased production; but, broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought as to the manner in which this can be most effectively brought about. The first school suggests that the proper way to meet the situation is to reduce wages, restrict credit and the amount of paper money in circulation, and impress upon the minds of the people the belief that the country is on the road to ruin. It is maintained that, until this is done, the workers will not realise the need of increased production. I believe this course to be impracticable. We cannot go back to pre-war conditions; and, if we are foolish enough to attempt it, we are in danger of losing the benefit of the great economic lessons of the war, as well as of creating for ourselves a period of very bad trade and therefore fresh Labour and economic troubles of a gravity far exceeding those which exist now.

The second school of thought considers that the decrease in production which has been observable since the Armistice is merely a passing phase, that it reflects the natural reaction from the war effort, and that this tendency to take a holiday is observable throughout the belligerent countries. It is pointed out that the British people are already showing that they have not forsaken the habit of industry, that production is increasing, as shown by the growth of the coal output and the expansion of exports; and the belief is widely held that, if the workers only have confidence that they will obtain a

reasonable share of the increase of profits, they will respond willingly to the need for a larger output.

The aspiration of Labour for a better standard of living is a natural one; and it can be satisfied if we learn and apply the economic lessons of the war. Wars have always exercised a great influence upon output and inventions, and consequently upon economic development. The Napoleonic wars greatly stimulated the industrial development of England. The extraordinary development of labour-saving inventions in the United States had its origin largely in the lessons which were brought home to the American people in the course of the Civil War. An immense impulse was given to the economic expansion of this country by the Franco-German War. The smaller wars of the ensuing 44 years were accompanied by a remarkable increase in the productive power of the world, as evidenced by the growth of international trade. We do not yet know all the discoveries and the labour-saving devices that the Great War has created, but I am convinced that, if we fully utilise our power of production, it has increased during the war by at least 50 per cent.

This result cannot possibly be achieved by a policy of nationalisation, because nationalisation does not, in the nature of things, result in economic production. The capitalistic system has survived ordeal by war. It has proved itself the only one under which production is stimulated on an economic basis, and it has shown that it is capable of infinite modifications. It is quite feasible, under the capitalistic system, to satisfy the reasonable demands of labour for a share of the benefits of increased production, and a voice in the direction and control of industry. A constructive policy which would meet the reasonable demands of labour should provide *inter alia*:-

- (1) For the maintenance of wages at a general level of 100 per cent. increase on pre-war rates.
- (2) For a great increase of production, which will result in a fall in prices, so that the margin between the workers' wages and the cost of living will be increased. The worker will thus benefit by the increase of production.
- (3) That wages must not be increased beyond the present level, otherwise commodity prices will

rise and the surplus between the wages and the cost of living will disappear. It is in the true interests of the workers themselves that wages should not be advanced, so that the purchasing power of money may be allowed to increase.

If we adopt, as I believe we can and should, the policy outlined above, the economic outlook is extremely favourable. The story of the splendid economic effort of the British Empire in the Great War has yet to be written. We have been the main instrument in the destruction of the great menace to the peace of the world during the past 45 years. The German Navy is at the bottom of the sea; and British sea-power has been established upon a more unchallengeable basis than it has ever occupied before. We have extended and consolidated the Empire, and we have done these things without materially impairing our economic strength. These achievements cannot fail to be reflected ultimately in the strength of British credit.

We are leading the world in the path of economic reconstruction. We have demobilised about 3,500,000 soldiers and munition workers and reabsorbed most of them into industry. We have adopted a policy of direct taxation of unparalleled severity, and we have already practically established an equilibrium between our normal post-war revenue and expenditure.

We have refitted and shall quickly re-establish our Mercantile Marine in its old position of supremacy in the carrying trade of the world. We are rapidly re-establishing our position in international trade and finance. We shall very soon have completed the adjustment of our financial machinery to the new economic conditions, and we are about to resume the economic leadership of the world which America has already shown herself incapable of taking up. The world is hungering for our manufactures; and, if our people continue to display, as I believe they will, those qualities of fair play, industry and enterprise, which have characterised them in the past, the British Empire cannot fail to experience a measure of trade activity and prosperity such as it has never known in the past.

EDGAR CRAMMOND.

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